THE TULANE UNIVERSITY GRADUATE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION: AN ORAL-INSTITUTIONAL HISTORY

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FOREWORD

J. D. B. DeBow, appropriately known as the "Magazinist of the Old South," came to New Orleans in 1845 for the purpose of starting a new commercial journal. After a slow and uncertain beginning, DeBow's Review became one of the most comprehensive accounts of ante-bellum Southern life ever published. Reflecting DeBow's interest in fostering the welfare of the South and West, the Review was aimed at upholding their policies, defending their rights, developing their resources, and preserving their important statistics.[1] In 1847, as a part of his efforts to promote Southern life, DeBow attempted to establish a chair of "Commerce, Public Economy, and Statistics" at the newly organized University of Louisiana. Located in New Orleans, which DeBow once described as the "emporium of boundless wealth," the university, he thought, was uniquely suited to become the first to establish a chair of commerce.[2]

DeBow not only pioneered the establishment of university-level commercial education, he also suggested what was to become a traditional relationship between schools of commerce and the surrounding community. He was confident that the energies and resources of the local community could be combined to form a strong foundation upon which university-level commercial education could be built. In return, the local community could expect to enjoy an "improved character" of

commercial activity, a well trained pool of ambitious and industrial youth, and the informed counsel of the professor.[3] Unfortunately, these pioneering efforts in commercial education were unsuccessful. Despite his tireless efforts at organizing and promoting the professorship and the financial support of a prominent local businessman, DeBow could not generate sufficient interest among students or support among local businessmen. Charles Gayarre, the noted Louisiana historian, described the commercial professorship as a ". . . barren honor. . . . It was a professorship without students, and no ability could have commanded an audience. The time had not yet come when any interest could have been taken in such subjects."[4]

Over fifty years passed before New Orleans had another opportunity to cooperate in establishing a university program in commercial studies. By 1914, the University of Louisiana had been endowed by Paul Tulane, a wealthy cotton broker. It was then renamed Tulane University. Although New Orleans had been uninterested in DeBow's efforts to start a commercial professorship, by 1914 it was ready to do whatever was necessary to establish collegiate-level business training. This study is a history of the effort to establish and develop the College of Commerce and Business Administration at Tulane University, from its beginning in 1914, through the most recent completed term of its dean in 1974.

This study is an institutional history. Institutional history is important, for much of modern life is spent in institutional settings. Education in America, to the extent that it has been conducted in schools, is an especially institutionalized activity. Yet, institutional history has been accorded a low status among professional historians because it generally has been poorly conceived, conducted, and written. Too often, institutional history has become "house" history written by those untrained in historical research and analysis and uninterested in presenting anything beyond an anecdotal account of "great moments" in an institution's past. The history of educational institutions does not account for all such histories, but it has suffered from a substantial number of them.

Institutional history offers distinct advantages and disadvantages for research and data management. First, the history focuses upon an institution, thereby providing the researcher with a manageable topic for study. Secondly, modern institutions often collect massive amounts of written records which are readily available for study. Both of these advantages, however, present potential problems for the historian. The built-in focus of institutional history can become so narrow that the institution is studied without reference to external events. And, although the written records of institutions are important, they also tend to be too narrowly

focused. Moreover, written records reflect only part of an institution's past.

Since institutions are managed by people, they have an oral as well as a written past. Deficiencies in the written record can be overcome, at least in part, by using oral information. Thus, this study also is an oral history. Oral history, the gathering of historical information through interviews, is especially appropriate for institutional history. Interviews can be used to supplement or corroborate the written record of an institution. Interviews also enable the historian to engage his topic more actively by asking questions of those who affected institutions or were affected by them. The information gathered in interviews often is more personal and provides insights unavailable through written records. Oral accounts enrich the occasionally perfunctory and often self-congratulatory official records of an institution. To be sure, oral information must be subjected to the same scrutiny as written information. The oral historian also must guard against focusing too narrowly upon events within the institution.

This history of Tulane's College of Commerce and Business Administration is based upon a variety of written and oral information. The written records of the college, including bulletins, reports, minutes of faculty meetings, correspondence files, and constitutions, were studied. These records were

supplemented with external sources: newspapers, local business association records, university documents, and national studies of collegiate level business education. Oral information was gathered by interviewing former and present faculty, administrators, staff, students, and alumni of the college. Important figures in other parts of the university and in the local business community also were interviewed.

The sixty-year history of the Tulane University College of Commerce and Business Administration reflects general developments in higher education and business education. Thus, the history of this college can be a contribution to, and a specimen of, the general history of education. The most pronounced development in American higher education in the twentieth century--the dramatic increase in enrollments--was accompanied by a dramatic movement toward professional training. When America became more sophisticated and influenced by the processes of technological production, the need for experts and professionals grew at an unprecedented rate. As elementary and secondary schooling had been pressed into service, institutions of higher learning were called upon to provide the skills and values needed to meet the demands of society. The liberal arts college, once secure in its isolation from the more mundane aspects of American life, could no longer survive in a society which viewed higher education as vital to social and material success.

Calvin Coolidge, in declaring that "the business of America is business" unwittingly issued a challenge to which institutions of higher learning had to respond. Like so many other fields of activity, the growth of business activity in America called for increased academic and professional training. As one of the so-called "new professions" (such as engineering, architecture, education, and agriculture), business slowly became accepted as a legitimate part of American higher education. The training of these "new professionals" was largely conducted in public institutions of higher learning, especially after the Morrill Acts of 1862 and 1890. Private colleges and universities also responded by developing professional schools with increasing vigor. Tulane's development of these schools was encouraged by its benefactors who were themselves men of practical affairs.

Tulane's College of Commerce also reflects developments in higher education for business. Its early emphasis on vocational training and its eventual development of a general business curriculum were characteristic of collegiate business training throughout the nation. Similarly, the decision to replace the undergraduate program with an exclusively graduate, professional curriculum mirrored developments in other private universities. The issues it faced in terms of its position in the university, its relationship to the local business community, and the nature of its faculty, students, and

courses are, in microcosm, the same as those faced by business educators across the country.

Yet, the experiences of the college must also be recognized as unique. The people important to the history of the college, as well as its institutional and community settings, must be understood to portray the college's past accurately, and to qualify the application of its experiences to others. This is where the history of the Tulane University College of Commerce and Business Administration can make its most significant contribution to the history of education--it can highlight both the common and unique aspects of attempts to educate by showing what people tried to teach and how they went about it.

NOTES

[1] J. D. B. DeBow, "The Commercial Review of the South and West," in DeBow's Review, ed. by J. D. B. DeBow (New Orleans, Louisiana: J. D. B. DeBow, Publisher), Volume I, Number 1, June, 1846, pp. 2-6.

[2] Ibid., Volume III, Number 6, June, 1847, p. 509.

[3] Ibid., pp. 511-512.

[4] Charles Gayarre, "James Dunwoody Brownson DeBow," in DeBow's Review (New Orleans, Louisiana: J. D. B. DeBow, Publisher), Volume III, Number 6 (After War Series), June, 1867, p. 501.

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This study is an oral-institutional history of the Tulane University Graduate School of Business Administration from the time it was founded in 1914 through the most recent completed term of its dean in 1974. Extensive oral testimony is used because the history of institutions can be only partially derived from the written record. Oral history, the collection, analysis, and presentation of historical data through interviews is especially appropriate for institutional history. Interviews can supplement and corroborate the written records of an institution. They also afford the historian an opportunity to engage his topic more actively by questioning those pertinent to the development of an institution. Among those interviewed as part of this study were all living deans and selected faculty, staff, and alumni of the school. Written records were used extensively

as well. Internal sources such as bulletins, reports, meeting minutes, self-studies, and questionnaires were used. External sources such as newspapers, local business association records, university documents, and national studies of collegiate business education provided for the examination of the social context in which the school functioned. These sources suggested that the development of the business school at Tulane reflected many developments in higher education for business in America.

Tulane University, a traditional liberal arts institution, was persuaded to start a college of commerce by business and civic leaders in New Orleans. The college was dominated by its dean, Morton A. Aldrich, from 1914 until 1939. Aldrich, a prototype utilitarian reformer in higher education, developed the college into one of the most popular colleges at Tulane. Because many members of the university community looked with disfavor upon what they perceived as mere vocational training, the college became isolated within the university. The two decades following Aldrich's years as dean were marked by significant changes in the college's curriculum and relationship with the university and local business communities. During this time, the college moved into the mainstream of American higher education for business.

The rate of change in the college accelerated during the sixties and seventies. It replaced the traditional

sequence of business courses with a curriculum focused on the quantification of making decisions and the use of electronic computers in the management of business. The school's teaching and research methods were among the most advanced in the nation. Its commitment to offer a sophisticated professional program led to the decision to abandon its undergraduate program in the middle of the nineteen sixties. These changes have had a profound impact on the school's relationship to the business community. The school is presently closer to the business community than at any period since the time it was started. This has resulted from the school's need to support itself financially, and the recognition that its educational program needs the community it serves.

The history of the Graduate School of Business Administration at Tulane University is a specimen of the general history of education. The dramatic growth of higher education in America in the twentieth century has resulted, to a large extent, from the professionalization of American culture. The power of universities to legitimize virtually any human endeavor has been well documented. Where businessmen were once trained in the business world, they are today trained in universities. The "schooling" of American businessmen is but one example of the "schooling" of American society. Examination of this phenomenon reveals that schools were changed profoundly when society turned to them. This study suggests

that the changes produced by the increasing intimacy of schools and society are among the most important developments in the history of education.

CHAPTER I
A COLLEGE OF COMMERCE FOR NEW ORLEANS: THE IDEA AND ITS REALIZATION

The New Orleans Association of Commerce was a busy place in the fall of 1914. The Association, dedicated to the promotion of the "Civic, Industrial, Commercial, and General Welfare" of the city, was keenly aware of commercial implications of the "European" war. The war had isolated European industrial centers from raw material suppliers in Central and South America. This circumstance was seen as providing the opportunity by which New Orleans could realize her full potential as a commercial center. Thus could the Association's Journal state that New Orleans has a "feeling today that she is being wafted on the wings of destiny. She has quite suddenly discovered that a rich prize has been deserted at her doorsteps; that a trade worth hundreds of millions is hers if she will but reach out and seize it."[1] That America had been unable to develop a lucrative South American trade was a problem which the war could remedy. Now, the newly completed Isthmian Canal could be used by Americans to "get at" the western side of South America. The position of New Orleans in the new order was thought to be clear--she was ideally situated between the big exporting and manufacturing cities of the Midwest and the raw material suppliers of South and Central America.[2] New Orleans, it was believed, could ill afford to let this opportunity pass her by.

Throughout September and October of 1914, actions were taken by the Association to assure the city of its share of the benefits. A delegation of civic and commercial leaders, headed by Mayor Martin Behrman, was sent to Chicago to effect an alliance with the large industrial cities of the Midwest for the new trade conquest of Latin America. At the same time, a "floating expo" was planned in which American merchants and manufacturers would embark on a seventy-five day cruise to dozens of Latin American ports in order to "display to the best advantage the wide variety of sample commodities."[3] Finally, numerous committees were established by the Association to study and solve such problems as international shipping, banking, and finance. The Association was determined that New Orleans would not be left out of what it perceived to be a new era of commercial prosperity.

The business community of New Orleans was not going to face its competitors without adequate preparation. On October 19, 1914, the Association's activities were extended into the evening hours. At eight o'clock on that evening, Ralph J. Schwarz conducted the first class at the newly organized College of Commerce and Business Administration of Tulane University. The new college, founded at the behest of the Association, was financially underwritten by a group of two hundred local business and civic leaders. Since its reorganization in 1913, the Association of Commerce had tried to forge a workable union of the theoretical and the practical--helping to found the College of Commerce was the most obvious

result of this effort. Thus, in 1914, many of the business leaders of New Orleans turned to collegiate business training in order to prepare for the challenges before them.

To begin, we must note that although there are ways in which the college was unique in its founding and early development, there are numerous important ways in which the Tulane experience in commercial training was part of a national or international movement in higher education for business. This movement, which began in 1881 with the founding of the Wharton School at the University of Pennsylvania, was characterized by an early period of slow growth in which only seven collegiate schools of business had been organized by the dawn of the twentieth century.[4] By 1910, twelve additional institutions had been organized and by 1915, twenty-one additional institutions had been established. After 1915, the movement of universities into professional commercial training "took off" to the extent that by 1925, at least one hundred and eighty-three collegiate departments, schools, or divisions of business or commercial training had been established.[5] Indeed, collegiate business education grew so rapidly in terms of programs and students, that leading educators feared it might suffer from a haphazard growth in which faculty and curriculum development might suffer. Business educators soon found themselves protesting that collegiate business training was not a mere fad in academic circles.[6]

Collegiate programs in business training grew because of the demands of businessmen who believed, for a number of reasons, that business training could no longer be conducted the way it had been for years. In the past, single owner proprietorships and partnerships were not scientifically managed, and business training was best received on the job. American business practices, however, changed dramatically in the last decades of the nineteenth century. These changes, for the most part, were evidence of a revolution in business organization and activity. American business was increasingly conducted on a mass scale and was increasingly organized along what has come to be known as corporate-bureaucratic lines complete with specialists and experts in many phases of its operation.[7] Collegiate level business training was unnecessary until these changes were experienced by American business leaders. Also, when the managerial executive could no longer pass his position on to his son, he had to get his son an education. Collegiate level business training proved to be increasingly useful in securing a successful future in American business.[8]

The business community of New Orleans, for the most part, believed that these changes in the scale and organization of business affected their affairs just as powerfully as they affected the business affairs of New York or Chicago. Their response to these perceived changes, like the response of businessmen throughout urban America, was to call for and support higher education for business.[9] For about a year

preceding the October, 1914, founding of the college, periodic editorials and feature articles in the three major newspapers of the city detailed the benefits which New Orleans and the South could expect to accrue from such an institution. These articles generally focused upon the inadequacies of apprenticeship training, the belief that the traditional European hegemony in Latin American trade was the result of widespread training in the "science of commerce," and upon the fact that most major progressive cities already had collegiate level business training.[10]

This training was believed to have become available at a most opportune time, just when New Orleans faced the challenge of taking over the lucrative commercial activities of Latin America. Yet another argument, similarly geared to the situation of New Orleans, was that most of the youth of the city, regardless of their training, generally ended up in some type of commercial activity.[11] Thus, a college which would train them in the theory and practice of financial and commercial life seemed eminently reasonable and inestimably valuable to New Orleans and the South.

An important aspect of all this concern for collegiate-level business education can be described best as "boosterism." Simply put, the local business community believed that a city of greatness must have institutions of higher learning which compared favorably with other cities. New Orleans was constantly compared in the popular press with New York, Chicago, St. Louis, and any other city with which it might

compete for commercial, financial, or civic prestige. Numerous references were made to cities "half our size" which had flourishing commercial education programs housed in universities.[12]

In sum, from the perspective of the local business community, the founding of collegiate level commercial education in New Orleans was similar to the experiences of other cities in America. Perceived changes in the scale and organization of business activities, increased specialization of business life with concommitant increases in bureaucratization and professionalization, and the increased faith in science to meet the complex challenges presented by modern urban society were taken as established irreversible facts. Another consideration was the burgeoning Latin American trade, just waiting to be picked up. These circumstances, combined with calls from all fronts for "efficiency" and social progress, pointed in one direction--university-level training for business.[13]

Amidst the hue and cry for collegiate-level business education within the business community of New Orleans, there were those who had doubts about its worth and necessity. These men believed that much of the business conducted in New Orleans was not yet of sufficient size or sophistication to warrant university level training. They believed that practical experience remained adequate to prepare businessmen. These men were joined by the operators of private business colleges who were concerned that a business training program at Tulane might severely interfere with their programs. Conservative

businessmen were generally ridiculed in the press as archaic relics of a by-gone era (a cartoon in the New Orleans Item[14] depicted them as perishing in the face of the college).

In order to appease the operators of private business colleges, newspaper articles stated that "the new college" is not intended to compete with but to supplement the work offered by existing business colleges."[15] The new college would offer "subjects embracing problems arising from the wider, complicated transactions in the commercial world."[16] Perhaps most importantly, training for business pursuits was compared with that of those entering the fields of medicine, law, or engineering. Business was too important to be left to either practical experience or private business colleges; it must be studied at a university. The future commercial success of New Orleans had been tied to the establishment of the Tulane College of Commerce and Business Administration.

By 1914, the American university had emerged in its modern form and had unquestioned authority to legitimize any professional activity.[17] Although universities defy simple categorization, three general reform movements of the period have been suggested: research, liberal culture, and utility. The research movement emphasized scientific investigation and specialized study conducted at the post-baccalaureate level. Although this movement received its strongest support among faculties in the physical and biological sciences, social sciences such as history (especially as studied in doctoral programs) were strongly influenced by the research movement.

The movement to liberal culture, on the other hand, focused on educating students in the so-called "humanities" with an emphasis on the methods and content of classical thought. The movement to utility sought to focus university study on the society in which it operated. Faculties in the developing professional schools supported academic utility. Proponents of academic utility were often caught between supporters of liberal culture who accused them of being preoccupied with job preparation (vocationalism) and practitioners who believed that they were too academically oriented.[18]

Considerable effort was expended on behalf of these movements to assure that each would prevail. Early in the debate, the various conceptions of the university's true purpose became associated with certain disciplines or professions. The so-called "hard sciences" as well as most graduate training was quickly associated with research. The liberal arts colleges, more often than not, were the bastions of the liberal culture movement. Finally, professional schools including Engineering, Architecture, and Business Administration were most often associated with the utility movement.

Within each field of study, there were those who argued for either research, liberal culture, utility, or some combination thereof. German-born scientism, for example, with its emphasis upon specialization and

narrowly defined research, swept through all American higher education gathering followers in every academic discipline. These movements, moreover, do not make up mutually exclusive categories. Pioneering economists, for example, expressed a desire to "make a difference," that is, to be useful. As economics formed into a discipline, it tended to become more "scientific," that is, more quantitative, theoretical, and research oriented. Economists felt that the best way for them to be useful was to become scientific "experts" who consulted with the nation's leaders in an effort to direct economic policy.[19] Thus, among economists, utility and research were effectively combined.

With few exceptions, university level business training developed in America as a part of the utility movement for reform in higher education. Proponents of this view wanted to integrate university life with "everyday" or "real" life. They also tended to view higher education as a primary agent in the democratization of America. This movement to utility grew strongest in the last few decades of the twentieth century. Among the greatest leaders of the movement were Andrew D. White of Cornell University and Charles W. Eliot of Harvard. Eliot, who championed the creation of the Harvard Business School, said that "there is no danger in any part of the university that too much attention will be paid to the sciences ordinarily

supposed to have useful applications. The problem is to get enough attention paid to them."[20] Eliot was not suggesting that universities get involved in vocational training, but that they raise practical pursuits to a higher plane. The delicate balance between vocationalism and higher level utility proved to be one of the most vexatious problems for followers of the utility movement in American universities. Another problem was striking an acceptable compromise between training the so-called "generalist" and "specialist." These issues still haunt professional schools in American universities.

Like most major American universities, Tulane could be found to have, among its faculty, believers in one or more of the three reform movements discussed above. As elsewhere, fierce personal loyalties developed and something just short of pitched battles were fought on occasion. The movement which we are most concerned with here is that of utility. Tulane had a strong and long-standing tradition of academic utility. First, it is important to point out that Tulane grew out of the old University of Louisiana which had, as a state institution, a strong tradition of useful service--it was, indeed, primarily devoted to legal and medical training.[21] Also, as early as 1848, J. D. B. DeBow had sought to establish

a commercial professorship because, "Our university will be sui generis--dedicated to the affairs of men, not philosophers, . . . and dedicated to educating our people in the vital affairs of commerce."[22]

When Paul Tulane decided to create a university and was convinced to combine his fortune and efforts with the University of Louisiana, he was most concerned that the new institutions be of practical utility. Paul Tulane seemed to embody the essential spirit of the movement to utility when in 1882 he expressed his views as to the nature of education:

> By the term education, I mean to foster such a course of intellectual development as shall be useful and of solid worth, and not be merely ornamental or superficial. I mean you should adopt the course which, as wise and good men, would commend itself to you as being conducive to immediate practical benefit, rather than theoretical possible advantage.[23]

Perhaps more than words, the establishment of schools or colleges generally associated with utility, is evidence of Tulane's commitment to the movement. To its schools of Medicine and Law, Tulane added Engineering, Architecture, Dentistry, and Commerce during the period 1893 to 1916.[24]

Tulane's commitment to utility in higher education, although long standing and evidenced in both word and action, was by no means total. The College of Arts and Sciences,

a bastion of liberal culture, was among the strongest in the university. In addition, graduate training generally expanded during this period. Among the faculty members in the Arts and Sciences College and the Graduate School were numerous detractors of the movement to utility in higher education. Their views regarding the formation of a business college within the university were often expressed vituperatively.[25]

Universities, however, rarely run on ideologies alone. If Tulane's commitment to utility in education was less than complete, its need to survive in the real world was rarely, if ever, questioned by anyone of any ideological persuasion. We can thus suggest another reason why Tulane eventually decided to create a business college. Tulane had never been a rich school. Despite, and possibly because of its reputation for wealth in the local community, endowments were pitifully small in size and few in number.[26] Aggravating an already bad situation was an extensive proliferation of programs at the turn of the century. Possibly in an effort to placate the demands of the three rival reform movements mentioned above, Tulane had over-extended itself. This was, at least, the conclusion of Abraham Flexner and Wallace Buttrick in a report made to the Tulane Board in 1914. Flexner and Buttrick recommended that the university curtail its growth, consolidate and eradicate several departments, and seek a substanial general endowment.[27]

The Flexner-Buttrick Report provided valid and convincing evidence against the establishment of yet another college, the College of Commerce and Business Administration. But, interestingly, the College of Commerce was being proposed by the very people to whom the university was going to have to turn for its endowment. Since Tulane had lost its battle in 1906 to receive state monies, there were few other possible sources of income. It would have been virtually impossible for the university to ask for substantial support and at the same time refuse to establish a program which those supporters felt to be intimately tied with the future growth and prosperity of the city.

Tulane could not refuse, but neither could it afford to establish the college on its own. The business community wanted a new college. And Tulane, with its tradition of utility and its need to secure an adequate endowment, wanted to start one. What was necessary was a catalyst, an agent which could reconcile the needs of both the business community of New Orleans as well as those of Tulane University. That catalyst was Morton Arnold Aldrich.

"Doc" Aldrich, like most pioneers in American higher education, defies simple categorization. He graduated summa cum laude from Harvard, traveled extensively in Asia and Europe, and graduated cum laude with a Ph.D. from the University of Halle--in Germany--he was, perhaps, the epitome of a worldly and sophisticated scholar. Yet, one of "Doc's" greatest pleasures was to swap stories with the trappers and

fisherman near his camp on the shores of lakes Pontchartrain and Maurepas.[28] Aldrich prided himself on his ability to get along with just about anyone--a man who was at home in the loftiest of political or economic discourse and could likewise trade stories in language which has been described as "colorful." Discussions with those who knew him best reveal him to be a warm man with "rough edges," a man who eschewed the snobbishness of many of his professional colleagues and, above all, an educator who had an ability to win the respect and admiration of his students, colleagues, and the local community.

Although Aldrich had qualities which compel us to view him as unique, he was also, upon careful study, very much a part of the national movement to establish collegiate level business education. In many ways, Aldrich was a prototype of the utilitarian reformer in higher education. The son of a New England shoe jobber, Aldrich received his A.B. degree from Harvard in 1895 at the age of twenty-one. His training at Harvard, taken during the period of Charles W. Eliot's presidency, had a profound impact upon him.[29] After completing his degree, he traveled to Asia and Europe studying at Munich, Berlin, and Halle, taking his Ph.D. in economics from the latter institution in 1897. From Halle, Aldrich returned to Harvard as a Fellow in Economics in 1898 and became an Instructor in Economics in 1899. Harvard and

Eliot thus got another chance to reinforce Aldrich's utilitarian training.

Aldrich left Harvard in 1899 to become Assistant Professor of Economics under Edward A. Ross at Stanford University. After only one year at Stanford, Aldrich resigned because of Ross's dismissal. Ross, an eminent sociologist, had spoken out on several issues of contemporary concern. These activities offended Mrs. Leland Stanford, and after a series of attempts at reconciliation, Ross was fired.[30] Aldrich was convinced that this was a case in which Ross's academic freedom had been infringed, and he was the first of several faculty members to resign in protest. Concern for academic freedom, although not expressed solely by advocates of utility, was certainly one of the hallmarks of the movement. This concern was obviously related to the movement's ideas about the role of higher education in the democratization of America.[31]

Aldrich's departure from Stanford came barely one month after Edwin Anderson Alderman became president of Tulane. Alderman has been described as a prototype of the modern university president--a propagandist for education who strove to build enrollments, impress the business world, and attract money.[32] Alderman preached a gospel of industrial growth and development to the business interests of the city. New Orleans and Tulane were to be partners in helping the city become " . . . what it is destined to become, one of the world's

greatest manufacturing cities. . . ."[33] Alderman needed a man to carry this message to every corner of the business community.

Aldrich assumed duties as Assistant Professor of Economics and Sociology in the College of Arts and Sciences in 1901.[34] Almost immediately, he began working, both in the university and the community, for the establishment of business training at Tulane. In his classes and in public lectures, Aldrich pleaded the case of utilitarian education and the establishment of a college of commerce. In 1902, for example, the New Orleans Times-Picayune published a public lecture by Aldrich in which he stated, "Education is anything that fits a man for a place in his community. . . . In New Orleans, it is unfortunate that so many businessmen come from the North and from abroad. We are glad to have them, to be sure, but would it not be more satisfactory if we could educate Louisianians to become leaders to a greater extent?"[35]

On campus, Aldrich preached his message to anyone who would listen. His students were fairly easily converted. Likewise, President Alderman and subsequently, in 1904, President Craighead accepted the notion that a college of commerce would benefit both the university and the community. There were, however, stumbling blocks. For one, money was exceedingly scarce and the university had barely enough to

maintain present programs, much less start new ones.[36] A second obstacle, as formidable as the first, was the general opinion held in the College of Arts and Sciences that commercial training did not belong in a university of Tulane's stature. Commercial training was thought to be both intellectually bankrupt and morally reprehensible. Tulane, they felt, could ill-afford to offer "vocational" training or a program devoted to pecuniary pursuits.

Failing to gain adequate support within the university, Aldrich focused his attention upon the business community of New Orleans. In 1909, at Aldrich's initiative, the Tulane Society of Economics was organized. The society, whose expressed aim was to encourage the " . . . investigation and discussion of economic and social subjects, and especially of industrial and social conditions in the South" counted scores of the most prominent local businessman in its membership.[37] At meetings held during the early years of its existence, members of the society heard such topics as "The Decadence of the Plantation System" (presented by Ulrich B. Phillips), "Tax Reform in Louisiana," "The Commission Form of Government," "Sugar and the Tariff," and "Manufacturing in New Orleans."[38] Aldrich used these meetings as a forum to illustrate how economic theory and practice could "make a difference" and to suggest that a college of commerce would be most beneficial to the community. Later, when the college was organized, it incorporated the society's offerings into its own program. The

founding of the college also meant that the society was no longer needed as a forum to promote a college of commerce. Thus, by 1917, the Tulane Society of Economics ceased to function.

In 1912, Aldrich further demonstrated his value to the community. In association with O. O. Provosty, M. H. Carver, and E. H. Farrar (a local attorney and President of the American Bar Association), Aldrich drafted a tax reform proposal for the state of Louisiana. In recognizing these efforts, the Louisiana Legislature, in a joint resolution, complimented these "distinguished citizens" for their eloquent appeal that Louisiana ". . . put aside an obsolete system of taxation for one that would lead in progressiveness and would quicken the coming of prosperity to the people of Louisiana."[39] One month later, Aldrich's draft of the proposed tax reform measure was published, with annotations, as a series of articles in the New Orleans Times-Democrat.[40]

Aldrich's successes in the community apparently gave him renewed hope that Tulane might be persuaded to start a college of commerce. In July of 1912, barely one month before Aldrich received statewide attention for his work on the tax reform measure, Tulane named Robert Sharp to replace Edwin Craighead as its president. Sharp was confronted with what had become the bane of recent Tulane

presidents--inadequate revenues and no foreseeable future source of them. Perhaps the new president could be convinced of the wisdom of establishing a college of commerce. Aldrich tried, and his persistent efforts to sell President Sharp on his idea were praised by some as tenacious and cursed by others as stubborn.[41]

What Aldrich needed was something that he had been cultivating since his arrival in New Orleans--the support of local business leaders. Beginning in the summer of 1913, the support which Aldrich needed began to coalesce around the New Orleans Association of Commerce. Association President Leon C. Simon in speaking to the Education Committee of the Association, stated that he

> . . . had a talk with Professor Aldrich sometime ago, the gist of which was that, while Tulane was an excellent institution in so far as it went, it did not take in the commercial side of the city, and the consensus of opinion among a number of people was that it should have in its curriculum a commercial course for the benefit of students who desired to enter commercial life.[42]

Simon also told of unsuccessful efforts to get the matter before the Board of Administrators of Tulane University. The Education Committee adjourned after recommending that the Board of Directors of the Association of Commerce address a communication to the Tulane Board suggesting that a school of commerce be established.[43]

In December, 1913, a letter was sent to President Sharp and the Tulane Board which expressed the Association's views about the establishment of the college. In essence, Tulane was asked to establish a college of commerce. Copies of this letter were published in several local newspapers.[44] Sharp promptly responded to the Association's proposal by revealing his own support of it. He noted, however, that despite the pressing need for such a program, Tulane was without the means to initiate it. Sharp further stated that, "Unfortunately, the opinion prevails that Tulane is a rich university, and many things are demanded of it that are utterly beyond its means."[45] The ball was back in the Association's court.

A minor victory had been won. The university now, willingly or unwillingly, accepted the idea of establishing a college of commerce. In addressing the Education Committee of the Association of Commerce, Aldrich stated that

> . . . heretofore certain members of the Board of Administrators of Tulane University were prone to look upon a College of Commerce with disfavor, but due to the agitation of this matter by the Association of Commerce which clearly demonstrates that it is not only a necessary course at Tulane but was demanded by the businessmen, that opinion was likely to be changed.[46]

Aldrich's prediction was correct; Tulane was ready.

The next move was made by the Association. In the summer of 1914, it called a conference of businessmen to meet and develop a plan, both educational and financial, to be submitted

to the Tulane Board. In addition to Aldrich, Association President Simon, and others, two members of this conference are of particular importance--Paul Havener and Levering Moore. Havener and Moore were both graduates of the College of Commerce of Northwestern University, which had been established in 1908.[47] With few modifications, the plan used to establish Northwestern's college was adopted by the conference to establish the Tulane College of Commerce. The plan called for the formation of a Board of Guarantors made up of members of the Association of Commerce, the local Society of Certified Public Accountants, and other local businessmen. The Board of Guarantors would select officers who would, in turn, enter into a contractual agreement with the university. The Guarantors would promise to underwrite the expenses of the college for a specified number of years. This plan was approved by the conference, submitted to both the Association of Commerce and the Louisiana Society of Certified Public Accountants, and subsequently approved by those bodies. The plan was then submitted to the Tulane Board, which referred it to a special committee. On August 13, 1914, a joint meeting of the Board of Guarantors of the Tulane College of Commerce and Business Administration and the Tulane University Board of Administrators was held. The plan was unanimously approved; the college would open in the fall if the Guarantors contributed five thousand dollars per year for a period of

three years ". . . to make good any deficit, if any, caused by the operation of the college."[48]

During a quiet three-week campaign in the late summer of 1914, one hundred and four Guarantors signed the appropriate contracts, and as a result, the Tulane University College of Commerce and Business Administration was established. To no one's surprise, one of the Guarantors, Morton A. Aldrich, was named Dean.

The founding of the College of Commerce and Business Administration of Tulane University resulted from the confluence of three factors: the belief, among leading members of the New Orleans business community that the future growth and prosperity of the city depended upon the establishment of a university college of commerce; the budding utilitarianism of Tulane University at the turn of the century and the financial crunch which was ever a part of Tulane; and the tireless efforts of Morton A. Aldrich working both in the community and in the university. Although each of these factors was necessary for the founding of the college, none was sufficient alone. This does not detract from the efforts of Aldrich, who understood, perhaps as no one else did, that the time had come to start a college of commerce.

NOTES

[1]For New Orleans (Journal of the New Orleans Association of Commerce), Volume I, Number 13, September, 1914, p. 2.

[2]Ibid., pp. 4-5.

[3]Ibid.

[4]L. C. Marshall, ed., The Collegiate School of Business, Its Status at the Close of the First Quarter of the Twentieth Century (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1928), p. 4.

[5]Ibid.

[6]Ibid., p. 45.

[7]Frank C. Pierson, et al., The Education of American Businessmen (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1959), pp. 45-50.

[8]Richard Hofstadter and C. DeWitt Hardy, The Development and Scope of Higher Education in the United States (New York: Columbia University Press, 1952), p. 91.

[9]New Orleans Times-Picayune, New Orleans States, and New Orleans Item, June, 1913 - November, 1914. passim. (especially editorials).

[10]Ibid.

[11]New Orleans States, September 14, 1914.

[12]New Orleans Times-Democrat, December 28, 1913.

[13]Raymond E. Callahan analyzes the "Efficiency Era" in American education in Education and the Cult of Efficiency (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962). Chapters 2, 3, and 9 are especially appropriate.

[14]New Orleans Item, September 22, 1914.

[15]New Orleans Times-Picayune, October 11, 1914.

[16]New Orleans Item, October 12, 1914.

17 Robert H. Wiebe, Businessmen and Reform: A Study of the Progressive Movement (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1962), p. 121.

18 Lawrence R. Veysey, The Emergence of the American University (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), pp. 1-259.

19 Robert L. Church, "Economists As Experts: The Rise of An Academic Profession in the United States, 1870-1929," in The University in Society, Vol. II, ed. by Lawrence Stone (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1974), pp. 571-609.

20 Veysey, Emergence of the American University, p. 90.

21 John P. Dyer, Tulane: The Biography of A University (New York: Harper & Row, 1966), pp. 18-37.

22 J. D. B. DeBow, DeBow's Review (New Orleans, Louisiana: J. D. B. DeBow, Publisher), Volume VII, Number 2, August, 1849, pp. 228-229.

23 Dyer, Tulane, p. 302.

24 Ibid., pp. 322-324.

25 Ibid., pp. 179.

26 Ibid., pp. 172-174.

27 Reports of The President of Tulane University, Volume I, September 14, 1914, pp. 303-308.

28 Donald Halley (faculty member of the college), private interview, New Orleans, Louisiana, April 25, 1973.

29 Ibid. Halley recalled that Aldrich often referred to his experiences at Harvard. On occasion Aldrich would refer to essays he had written as a student there.

30 Edward A. Ross, Seventy Years of It; An Autobiography (New York: Appleton-Century Co., 1936), p. 78.

31 Veysey, Emergence of the American University, pp. 72-76.

32 Dyer, Tulane, p. 107.

33 Ibid.

[34]Scrapbook of Morton A. Aldrich (in possession of his daughter, Mrs. Elizabeth Bridgeman, New Orleans, Louisiana). The book contained clippings of newspaper articles which welcomed Aldrich to the community. These articles noted that the city and university were fortunate to have attracted a man with Aldrich's training and experience.

[35]New Orleans Times-Picayune, March, 1902.

[36]Dyer, Tulane, pp. 129-130.

[37]Scrapbook of Morton A. Aldrich, ibid. It contained a printed brochure on the Tulane Society of Economics.

[38]Ibid.

[39]New Orleans Times-Picayune, August 12, 1912.

[40]Ibid., September 14, 1912.

[41]E. Davis McCutcheon (first graduate of the College of Commerce), private interview, New Orleans, Louisiana, June 20, 1973.

[42]Minutes, New Orleans Association of Commerce, June 17, 1913, p. 4.

[43]Ibid.

[44]New Orleans States, December 31, 1913.

[45]Ibid.

[46]Minutes, New Orleans Association of Commerce, January 6, 1914, p. 2.

[47]Estelle F. Ward, The Story of Northwestern University (New York: Dodd, Mead, and Company, 1924), p. 328.

[48]Minutes, Board of Administrators of the Tulane Educational Fund, August 13, 1913.

CHAPTER II
THE NEXT BEST THING TO CARNIVAL: THE COLLEGE, 1914-1918

Classes in the new college opened on Monday, October 19, 1914, barely one month after it had been established. That month was one of almost frantic activity, as much remained to be done. For one thing, classrooms had to be found. This problem was easily solved when the Association of Commerce offered rooms free of cost to the college.[1] Also, a curriculum and faculty had to be developed. The decision was made to start with only a night program in order to accomodate the students, most of whom worked full-time. Each class would meet one night per week beginning at eight o'clock and ending at nine forty-five. On Monday nights, Commercial Law was offered, taught by Ralph J. Schwarz, a member of the Tulane Law School faculty and a practicing attorney. On Tuesday evenings, Foreign Trade was offered by Edwin E. Judd, the Commercial Agent in charge of the New Orleans Office of the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce of the United States Department of Commerce. A. Norman Young, a Chartered Accountant and manager of the New Orleans branch of a national accounting firm, taught Accounting on Wednesday evenings. Dean Aldrich taught Economics and Business Administration each Thursday. Also on Thursday evenings, John S. Kendall,

head of the Department of Spanish at Tulane, taught Commercial Spanish. Fridays were reserved for special informal talks open to both students and the general public.[2]

Once the facility, curriculum, schedule, and faculty had been decided upon, the final task was to recruit students. This was accomplished in two ways. First, numerous articles appeared in all of the local daily newspapers. These articles generally chronicled the progress of the developing program of the college. Course descriptions and instructor's qualifications were published. Also discussed were the great benefits one could gain by attending the evening sessions. The second recruiting tactic was a continuation of the methods used to establish the college. Local business leaders encouraged participation by enrolling in the courses themselves, thereby offering students an opportunity to work with successful businessmen. It was suggested in the newspapers that these business leaders might hire promising students in the various courses. Local businessmen went even further by encouraging their own employees to take advantage of the opportunities which the new college afforded.[3]

Admissions requirements were minimal, with men twenty-one years of age or over having only to give " . . . evidence of their ability to profit by the course. . . ."[4] Men under twenty-one were required to satisfy the usual university entrance requirements. Juniors and seniors in other colleges of the university were encouraged to enroll. These students

and others were told of plans which included the development of a full-time day program " . . . as complete as . . . [that] in Engineering, Medicine, and Law." It was suggested that if the College of Commerce's experience was similar to that of other colleges (notably, Northwestern), there would soon be a degree program available.[5] By the end of the first week of classes, one hundred and thirty students had enrolled and paid their twenty-dollar fee for each course taken.

In its first Bulletin, the college stated that its purpose was " . . . to offer substantial professional training preparing for a business career." Other, similarly general statements suggested that instruction would be offered for " . . . students sufficiently able and mature to do work of university grade."[6] These stated aims were less ambitious than the claims made in the popular press which had called for the founding of the college. Yet, they were not overly ambitious when one considers the size and nature of the college in the first few years of its operation. The entire annual budget of the college, in its first three years, never exceeded five-thousand dollars. Aldrich, in addition to serving as dean, was the only full-time faculty member; the rest were either professors with appointments in other colleges at Tulane or local businessmen donating their services. But it was a start, and it was a characteristically American educational endeavor. The ties between the business community and the college were perhaps only more explicit examples of what was happening throughout American higher education.

Once established, the new college was confronted with challenges on every front. Like so many other pioneering collegiate business programs, Tulane's had to make itself acceptable to both business and academic communities. Aldrich thus promised to build a program which was both immediately practical and academically rigorous. Despite his optimism about the founding of the college, Aldrich realized its tenuous position. If the European war had brought visions of great commercial opportunity, it had also brought uncertainty. The claims that New Orleans had started a collegiate business program "amidst all this war talk" clearly spoke to the concern as to what the war might bring.[7] To this must be added Tulane's financial uncertainty and reservations about establishing a business program. Those who sought the supposed serenity and security of university faculty life would have found neither in the new College of Commerce.

Aldrich's greatest successes to date had been realized in the business community. In an effort to convince local business leaders of his determination to serve their needs, Aldrich had started the school solely on a night-time basis; this also assured him the greatest access to students. From the beginning, however, he was determined to have a degree program. Aldrich thus echoed the sentiments of a vast majority of utilitarian reformers in higher education who promoted utility, but not vocationalism.[8] Almost immediately, plans were made which called for a two-on-two program--two

years of traditional liberal arts training, followed by two years of professional study. By June of 1915, the program had been approved by the University Council. The college now offered a four-year course leading to the degree of Bachelor of Business Administration (B.B.A.). At the same meeting, the University Council approved a program which enabled students to complete the requirements for both business and law degrees within a six-year period. The Tulane College of Commerce and Business Administration was no longer just a night school.

Both the full-time B.B.A. Program and the combined Business and Law Program started slowly. Despite extensive press coverage of these developments, after five years of operation, there were only eighty-six full-time students enrolled. The first graduate of the program, H. Davis McCutcheon, received his degree in 1918; he was the only graduate that year. Because of the newness of the college and a lack of interest in the College of Law, the combined Business and Law Program failed to attract students. It was dropped in the early twenties.

One of the more visible changes brought about by the day program was that admissions requirements for students under twenty-one years of age became more precisely delineated. In the years from 1915 to 1918, this section of the Bulletin became increasingly detailed. Elaborate prescriptions of acceptable high school courses and units

stipulated both qualitative and quantitative requirements.[9] It must be remembered that these requirements applied to only a few students, since most of the students of the college were over twenty-one years of age.

If there is one trend indicative of the earlier programs in collegiate business education, it was the tendency to attract, by whatever means possible, large numbers of students. Because these programs were without university support, they depended heavily upon tuition income and assistance from the local business community. By far the most effective strategy for attracting students was to offer them courses which had immediate practical and vocational benefit. In this way, Tulane's College of Commerce reflected national trends.[10] During its first five years, the college attracted students in such numbers that each year's enrollment figures made headlines in all of the local newspapers and campus journals. It is not difficult to understand why this was done. Ideologically, utilitarian reformers in education had a strong tradition of democratizing both schooling and society. Predictably, the Tulane College of Commerce was constantly referred to as an institution created by the business community for all of the people of New Orleans. Pleas were issued in the press for employees of a "lower position" to enroll and better themselves through the opportunities offered by the college.[11] The social elevator arguments of many American educators were alive and flour-

ishing in the appeals printed in editorials and feature articles of the local daily newspapers.

If the campaign to attract students had an ideological basis, it also had practical implications for the future of the college. Every student was a potential supporter for the school's efforts. Similarly, and at least as important, the vast majority of students worked in local businesses, and a successful experience in the college not only won over the student, but his employer as well. Another important consideration in the founding of the college was that many of the local business leaders were asked to share their training and experience with students either as part-time instructors or as speakers in the Friday "Business Talks by Business Men." The circumstances which had operated to get the school started were consciously developed and maintained. Eventually, no serious suggestion to curtail the college's activity would be entertained by the Tulane Board.

The boom in collegiate business education at Tulane was typical of what was happening throughout American higher education for business. The increase in the size and number of collegiate business programs was so rapid that business educators themselves became concerned. In an effort to assure that colleges develop adequate programs, Tulane and sixteen other institutions sent representatives to a conference at the University of Chicago in June of 1916. The conference resulted in the formation of the American Association of

Collegiate Schools of Business (AACSB) which had as its object "the promotion and improvement of higher business education in North America."[12] Very quickly, the AACSB established professional standards regarding: admissions; minimum number of semester hous; staffing (rank, training, salary, and teaching load); the number of fields to be offered; and library facilities.[13] The AACSB envisioned itself as an agency which would bring some order to the chaotic proliferation of collegiate business education programs. As a charter member of the AACSB, Tulane's College of Commerce demonstrated its commitment to develop and maintain a program of substantial professional quality. High enrollments were not enough.

The issure of admitting women to the college arose during this time. Although women were barred from the college when it first opened, Aldrich believed that as a matter of simple justice they should be admitted on the same basis as men. The Tulane Board, however, had guidelines which prohibited admitting women to the college.[14] Yet, as America became more directly involved in the war, women became an important source of students for the college. As a result of pressure from Aldrich and local business leaders, women were permitted, by a vote of the Tulane Board, to enroll in the college at the beginning of its second year of operation.[15]

Like most of the activities of the college, the admission of women was given extensive coverage in the local press. The first woman to be admitted to the college,

Miss Ruby Perry, was a teacher of business subjects at Sophie Wright High School. Local newspapers carried this and numerous other articles describing the opportunities available for women at the new college. In a published interview on the topic of women in business, Aldrich stated that " . . . four years of training at the Tulane Commerce College prepares a woman to take an executive post in business. She would be conversant with the inner workings of the world's commercial machinery that is as a rule a mystery to the feminine mind." Aldrich went on to say that a woman thus trained would be "thoroughly equipped and efficient" and that her services would be in demand at high wages.[16] One of the more forceful appeals for women to participate in the college's program appeared in the Sunday, October 24, 1915 edition of the New Orleans Times-Picayune. The article outlined the past deprivation which women had experienced in education and noted that without any campaigns for equal rights, these men opened the college to the women of the city. Women were challenged to take advantage of " . . . this chance to become more efficient [and] increase your earning ability." They were then told "it is up to you" and that the road to success was never a "jitney route."[17] Despite the promises and challenges to women, most of the women enrolled in the college were either high school teachers of business subjects or clerical workers.

The press campaign to recruit women was typical of the

heavy press coverage which the college received throughout this period. Although this coverage was generally most extensive during the annual registration in October, news articles, announcements, advertisements, feature articles, and editorials appeared in all of the local nespapers throughout the year. Many, if not most of these articles were written by Aldrich or one of the faculty members of the college. It is certainly no accident that beginning in 1916, a new course was offered in advertising. This course, jointly sponsored by the college and the New Orleans Advertising Club, was taught by Arthur G. Newmayer, business manager of the New Orleans Item.

The course in advertising quickly became a focus of attention in the college. The field of advertising was cited as new, exciting, and especially lucrative. Several editorials stated that across the nation $700,000,000 was already spent annually on advertising.[18] It was noted further that successful advertising was not accidental and, like most aspects of business, the days of self-education were over and one must now be educated formally in the requisite skills. The course at Tulane was offered as up-to-date, comprehensive, and vital to anyone wishing to enter this new and burgeoning field.

The college proved its own case for advertising. Very early, the New Orleans Advertising Club was asked to conduct the advertising campaign for the college. A college which had

been successful in beginning a professional course in advertising also had to meet the challenges set forth by that course. The campaign devised for the college consisted of handbills describing the college's courses and faculty, storefront window placards strategically placed by local businessmen (many of whom were Guarantors), street car notices and, most importantly, newspaper advertisements and a seemingly endless stream of editorial and feature articles touting the opportunities which the college afforded.

The newspaper coverage of the college was extensive. Every appeal was made to the potential student--course descriptions, sketches of the qualifications of faculty, announcements of free public lectures, promises of increased prestige and salaries as well as a series of cartoons and articles emblazoned with such headlines as "Are You Training For Life's Big League?" and "Pass By the Idlers, Attend the College of Commerce."[19] Finally, at least one editorial, directed to the " . . . clerks, bookkeepers, stenographers and other members of the employed classes" asked the question, "Are YOU one of the derelicts?" and suggested that the Guarantors of the school " . . . at least deserve the appreciation which a large annual attendance . . . would afford them."[20]

The campaign worked. By the end of the First World War, after five years of operation, the college could boast an enrollment of 725, a six-fold increase from the original enrollment. Indeed, by the third year of its operation (1916-17),

the college became the largest in the university.[21] Aldrich had successfully achieved one of his first goals for the college, and he had done so with the continuing support of the business community and the local press.

The college was now training hundreds of local citizens in such fields as accounting, commercial law, business correspondence, commercial spanish, merchandising, advertising, and economics. During its first five years of operation, there was a three-fold increase in the number of courses offered for evening students. Yet, as mentioned above, the day-time program of the college was experiencing growth which was considerably less rapid. By 1918-19, for example, although night students could select from fifteen courses, there were only seven courses available during the day. Indeed, more day courses were listed as "Probably Not Offered" than those that were offered.[22]

The slow growth of the day program, as compared to the night program, has several plausible explanations. First, World War I caused full-time student enrollments to decline in colleges and universities throughout the country. Second, although the rest of the Tulane academic community (especially the College of Arts and Sciences) was willing to allow the college its part-time night activities, it strongly opposed the development of a full-time degree program in commerce. This program not only presented an ideological threat (i.e., against liberal culture), but at this time each college in the

university, was run independently of the others. Indeed, Tulane, during this early period, has been likened to a British university, that is, a collection of independent colleges.[23] The colleges at Tulane were directly competing with one another for students and their tuition payments. Students in the Arts and Sciences College were disuaded from moving into the B.B.A. Program. A third explanation for the slow growth of the full-time program of the college was that it was new and relatively undeveloped compared to others in the university. Finally, the establishment of a viable full-time program was a very expensive undertaking. Without a substantial endowment, it would necessarily take some time to become established.

One of the more obvious consequences of the meager fiscal resources of the college was that of inadequate faculty development. The abundance of willing and surprisingly able part-time and volunteer instructors of the night courses was unfortunately not complemented by highly qualified full-time faculty. Aside from Aldrich, there was never more than one additional full-time faculty member in the college for the first five years of its operation. The first full-time professor was added with the development of the B.B.A. Program in 1915-16. The arrival of William H. S. Stevens, with a Ph.D. from the University of Pennsylvania and teaching experience at Columbia, was widely publicized.[24] Stevens, who taught Business Organization and Management, stayed one

year and left to serve on the Federal Trade Commission in Washington. He was temporarily replaced by William Bethke from the University of Minnesota. In 1917-18, the only full-time faculty member aside from Aldrich was John B. Swinney, from Syracuse University, with teaching and business experience in New York. Swinney was a professor of marketing, but taught courses in Office Management and Business Correspondence as well.

Aldrich's inability to attract a number of qualified full-time faculty is only partially explained by fiscal constraints. Throughout the United States during the first quarter of the twentieth century, business colleges had great difficulty attracting qualified faculty. For one thing, there were not enough people with the amount and kind of education which was necessary. Secondly, colleges and universities could not successfully compete with private business for highly qualified and capable graduates. This latter problem has been, until most recent times, a fairly persistent one in collegiate business education.[25] It might be added that competition with private business for faculty has given rise to higher salaries than those commanded by faculty in the liberal arts. Relatively high business faculty salaries are a source of contention with faculty in the liberal arts colleges.

The slow growth of a full-time degree program and the scarcity of highly trained faculty members was of little

immediate concern to the local business community. Their experiences with the college during these early years of its development were excellent. That the local business community was pleased with the growth and development of the college is best exemplified in their continuing financial support of it. The original agreements to underwrite the deficit expenses of the school were to cover only the first three years of operation. Thus, in March of 1917, discussions were renewed as to the fate of the program. The Board of Guarantors met on March 7 to discuss plans not only to continue the program but to " . . . make it rank with those in great industrial centers."[26] The meeting opened with statements by various members about the necessity for well-supported colleges of commerce for modern commerical cities. Testimonials were offered as to the great work which the college had already performed on a "shoe-string" budget--a budget which was compared with other similar colleges. The business leaders of the city were told that there were colleges throughout the country, many in what were called "jerk-water" towns, who were spending at least twice as much as Tulane and that " . . . if we want a proper college we have to pay for it."[27] Finally, it was announced that there was a special reason why support for the college was vital at this time. Dean Aldrich was rumored to have been offered the deanship of a very large and prominent college of commerce. There was no time to waste lest Dr. Aldrich be "weaned away" from the community.[28]

Three forms of support were suggested as a result of this meeting. The first was an expanded guarantee to underwrite the expenses of the college--that is, more Guarantors promising more money to support its operation. Second, those who could afford it, could offer a minimum, one thousand dollar donation as the beginning of a permanent endowment for the college. Finally, special endowments for a professorship or course of study would be actively sought.

The first of these three suggestions realized the greatest success--in all, 222 Guarantors agreed to underwrite the expenses of the college for three additional years.[29] This tripled the financial base of the college. In addition, four one-thousand dollar gifts were received, but no professorship was supported. Courses had been partially subsidized for the first three years. This type of support was continued. Thus, thanks to the business community that had created it, the college's future was secured at a higher rate of support for three additional years. These Guarantors, added to the excellent tuition receipts from the night students, managed to keep the college fiscally viable. It was generally known that during this period the night program, in effect, subsidized the day course.

Perhaps the final consideration of the college's early development is that of the impact of World War I. It has already been shown that the war precipitated the demand for the college. It has also been suggested that the war was

one of the causes for the slow development of the full-time program. Aldrich, reflecting the views of businessmen and educators alike, felt that the war had increased the demands upon Americans to become more efficient. He was convinced that the consolidation of the American effort and increased efficiency of operation were best achieved through collegiate level business education.[30] Similarly, the war had wrought irreversible changes in principles and practices of manufacturing, merchandising, and management. These changes were believed to be best handled through university level training. Finally, Aldrich stated that "Business morals are a part of business efficiency, and the story of the ways in which the standards of business honor are improving is well worth telling."[31] Aldrich spread his word throughout the community and was eventually named by the United States Commissioner of Education to a national committee of fifteen businessmen and economists " . . . to investigate and report on the means for establishing schools and college courses of study best adapted to fit young men for careers in the foreign service of the country."[32] His reports to the commissioner echoed his statements to the local business community.

Aside from the appeals to foster and support collegiate business training, very few of the college's activities were directly affected by the war. In the 1918-19 Bulletin, for example, "Military and Physical Training" was required of " . . . all physically able male students in the day course."

Also, Aldrich taught a night course entitled Business Economics and the War Conditions which was aimed at helping the ". . . business man in his study of these (war) conditions as they affect business in general and his business in particular."[33]

Less direct, but nonetheless important consequences of the war were felt by the college. For one, the role of women changed in America during the war. This was perhaps most marked in terms of the types of jobs which women were expected to do and the types of careers which women might be expected to enter. The women of New Orleans were constantly reminded of the new opportunities occasioned by the war and of help which awaited them in the College of Commerce.[34] By the end of the war, women accounted for approximately ten percent of the college's enrollment. Another indirect effect, was that the war had created a favorable market for labor. The vast majority of night students enrolled in the college were attempting to upgrade their skills in order to improve their position and salary.

The war also provided the occasion for appeals by the college to attract students. One article noted that German prisoners in English detention camps were studying Spanish in preparation for the capture of the lucrative Latin American trade after the war. Readers were warned that "we must not rest . . ." until we have learned commercial Spanish.[35] Finally, one of the more tangible effects of the war was that

Mardi Gras was cancelled in 1917. In an article describing the cancellation of Carnival, it was noted that "Dr. Morton Aldrich is right--if a young man in New Orleans nowadays hasn't a chance to become a King or Emperor, he can join the College of Commerce and learn to become a Rockefeller or a Carnegie." The article went on to state that Aldrich was the " . . . most jubilant man in New Orleans" because without Carnival, the young men would have the time and money to go to the College of Commerce which was the " . . . next best thing in New Orleans, after the Carnival."[36]

NOTES

[1] New Orleans States, September 13, 1914.

[2] Bulletin of the Tulane University of Louisiana (College of Commerce and Business Administration), Series 15, Number 14, November 1, 1914, p. 6.

[3] New Orleans States, September 11, 1914; New Orleans Times-Picayune, September 14, 1914.

[4] Bulletin of Tulane University, Series 15, Number 14, November 1, 1914, p. 7.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Ibid.

[7] New Orleans Times-Picayune, September 14, 1914.

[8] Lawrence R. Veysey, The Emergence of the American University (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), p. 72.

[9] Bulletin of Tulane University, Series 16, Number 12, September 1, 1915, pp. 12-13; Bulletin, Series 17, Number 12, September 1, 1916, pp. 12-13; Bulletin, Series 18, Number 12, September 1, 1917, pp. 14-15.

[10] Frank C. Pierson, et al., The Education of American Businessmen (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1959), p. 39.

[11] New Orleans States, September 22, 1915.

[12] Charles J. Dirkens, et al., The American Association of Collegiate Schools of Business (Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1966), p. 183.

[13] James H. S. Bossard and Frederick J. Dewhurst, University Education For Business (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1931), pp. 263-264.

[14] Minutes of the Tulane Board of Administrators (Special meeting of the Executive Committee held on October 4, 1915), p. 150. Newcomb College was associated with Tulane. The board assumed, at least until Aldrich presented his case, the educational needs of women could be met in Newcomb College.

[15] New Orleans Item, October 12, 1915.

[16] New Orleans States, October 24, 1915.

17 New Orleans Times-Picayune, October 24, 1915.

18 New Orleans States, September 4, 1916; New Orleans Item, September 7, 1916.

19 New Orleans States, September 27, 1917.

20 New Orleans Item, September 25, 1915 and October 2, 1916.

21 The Tulane Weekly, October 17, 1917.

22 Bulletin of Tulane University, Series 19, Number 12, September 1, 1918, p. 22.

23 Rufus C. Harris (former president of Tulane University), private interview, Macon, Georgia, August 7, 1973.

24 New Orleans Times-Picayune, August 29, 1915; New Orleans States, August 29, 1915; New Orleans Item, August 29, 1915.

25 Frank C. Pierson, et al., The Education of American Businessmen, pp. 4-5; Robert A. Gordon and James Edwin Howell, Higher Education For Business (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), p. 350.

26 New Orleans Times-Picayune, March 7, 1917.

27 Minutes, Board of Guarantors Meeting, New Orleans, Louisiana, March 6, 1917, pp. 6-9. (There were no specific cities or colleges mentioned.)

28 Ibid. Once again, these minutes did not specify a college. It is not known whether or not Aldrich was, in fact, offered a deanship. The Guarantors were told that he was, and there is no evidence that anyone questioned the veracity of this statement.

29 New Orleans States, September 30, 1917; New Orleans Times-Picayune, September 27, 1917.

30 New Orleans States, January 31, 1916.

31 Ibid.

32 New Orleans Times-Picayune, February 6, 1916.

33 Bulletin of Tulane University, Series 19, Number 12, September 1, 1918, p. 24.

[34]New Orleans Times-Picayune, September 16, 1917.

[35]New Orleans Item, September 23, 1917.

[36]Ibid., September 25, 1917.

CHAPTER III
FREEDOM AND FORMALIZATION: THE COLLEGE, 1919-1939

The college became permanently established as America embarked upon the period commonly referred to as the years between the wars. These years, encompassing the decades of the twenties and thirties, were marked by both continuity and change within the college. Continuity was provided by Aldrich who remained dean until 1939. The changes evident during the period reflect the gradual realization of Aldrich's plans. Changes in terms of the students, faculty, and curriculum of the college resulted, more often than not, from Aldrich's attempts to implement his program in the existing university and business settings.

Pioneering programs in collegiate business education, in the early stages of their development, experienced great difficulty in establishing clear and consistent aims or purposes.[1] The stated aim of the college, " . . . to offer substantial professional training preparing for a business career," was developed at the time of its founding and remained virtually unchanged throughout Aldrich's twenty-five year term as dean.[2] That there was no substantial change in the "Aim and Policy" of the college for a quarter century can be understood as indicating that this section of the bulletin was either a vague and innocuous statement which no one seriously considered (this is common in such publications), or that the statement

accurately reflected the intent of its author and the person responsible for its implementation, namely, Aldrich. It is most likely that, regarding the College of Commerce at Tulane, the second alternative most closely approximates the truth. Aldrich had a reputation as one who was attentive to detail and the precise use of language.[3] Thus, for the first twenty-five years of its existence, the college enjoyed a singleness of purpose carefully developed and assiduously maintained by Aldrich.

Unfortunately, the development and maintenance of a purpose, no matter how clear and consistent through time, is not sufficient to assure the successful operation of any institution. The College of Commerce had established itself on a permanent basis, but its relationship to the local business community and to the rest of Tulane University was not fixed. In the twenties and thirties, as before, the College of Commerce was developing in a social, political, and economic environment which could not be ignored.

Throughout these years, the college continued to attract large numbers of students. Like so many other collegiate business programs of the day, student tuition revenue played a crucial role in the fiscal affairs of the college. As the second term of the Guarantors' Agreement ended, the budget of the college came under the control of the Tulane Board. Two factors led to this decision: first, the College of Commerce

had proven that it could support itself; and, second, the college's popularity in the community had helped the university increase its endowment revenues.[4] The College of Commerce was now firmly established within the university and would no longer have to appeal to businessmen for direct financial support.

Enrollment figures for the twenties and thirties show a gradual and consistent increase in both the day and evening programs. The evening program grew from 364 in 1920-21 to 609 in 1938-39. In a "Joint Faculty Statement of Needs and Objectives" presented to Aldrich in 1938, data showed that the students enrolled in the night division during the 1930's were almost all employed (95%), in their twenties (65%), and mostly male (85%).[5] Over half of these students were enrolled in one of the accounting courses offered and about half of them were clerical workers while enrolled. These figures also show that ninety per cent of the night students enrolled for only one course at a time and about sixty per cent of them passed the courses they took.[6]

Students in the night division were attracted by high quality instruction offered in subjects which proved to be valuable either in acquiring a new job or in improving their position in their present one. By 1934, the college published a separate bulletin especially for evening students. This bulletin, and subsequent issues of it, started with a section entitled, "Business Needs Trained Men and Women!" This section

suggested that present and prospective employers were vitally concerned with the education of workers, and that the program of the college had proven itself as an investment well worth the time and money required.[7] About the same time (1934), a placement bureau was established which offered to help businesses select employees and to help students find employment. The success of the placement bureau was well known in the local community. This service assisted students caught in the employment conditions of the Depression.[8]

From the beginning of the full-time degree program in 1916, Aldrich had been dissatisfied with the two-on-two program. He believed that two years of training in the College of Arts and Sciences was inadequate and inappropriate preparation for the program he had developed, and that the arts college was not going to funnel an adequate number of students into the B.B.A. program. The former reason is consistent with Aldrich's utilitarian views of higher education, and the latter is supported by enrollment figures which indicate that very few students entered the program after two years in the arts college.[9]

Differences between the two colleges intensified when the arts college decided that all freshmen and sophomores would take the same programs of study regardless of their upper division major. The arts college refused to teach the liberal arts courses prescribed by the College of Commerce. Aldrich

responded by submitting a resolution to the University Council (predecessor to the senate) which argued that,

> . . . each college of Tulane University shall have the power to determine its educational policy and the requirements for admission to its classes and courses, subject only to the action of the University Council and the Board of Administrators.[10]

The measure passed, and what came to be known as Aldrich's "Declaration of Independence" assured that the arts college would no longer interfere with the college's program.

Beginning in 1919, the college, after receiving approval from the Tulane Board, offered two courses of study leading to the degree of Bachelor of Business Administration--the first was the same two-on-two program previously offered, and the second was a four-year program. Almost immediately the second option became the more popular. The old option was retained only to enable students in other colleges to switch to the B.B.A. program.[11] Although the first two years of the four-year program were taken in the College of Commerce, coursework was equally divided between business and non-business subjects.[12] Later in this period, business subjects began to heavily outweigh non-business subjects. With the development of this four-year option and the increasing professionalization of coursework, the college became more isolated within the university.

The establishment of the four-year option had the immediate effect of increasing the day enrollment by over fifty per cent and the freshmen and sophomore classes by one hundred per cent.[13] The college now had students for four full years. Very quickly a closeness developed among students. Aiding this closeness was the small size of the classes, the isolation of the college from the rest of the university, and the efforts of the faculty and the dean who consciously strove to develop an esprit de corps among students. Evidence of the closeness and geniality of the students abounds both in the written record and in oral accounts of alumnae of the period. In the early twenties, for example, the students presented Dean Aldrich with a proposal for an honor system managed entirely by the students.[14] The plan was implemented immediately and has been cited by faculty and alumnae as a model of its type. Violators of the student honor code were usually expelled from the college. As another example of student interest in the college, an honor group was established in 1924. This group, the Commerce Key, soon petitioned Beta Gamma Sigma, the national honorary business fraternity, for affiliation. In June, 1926, during the college's eighth commencement exercises, two faculty members and six students were inducted as charter members of the Alpha of Louisiana Chapter of Beta Gamma Sigma.[15] The overriding student view of the college during the twenties and thirties was that it was like a large family group cooperating in the education

of young men and women for a business career.[16]

An important part of the college's development during this period was the recruitment of faculty. Although the years between the wars did not witness a substantial increase in the number of faculty, there was a slow process of replacing temporary and part-time faculty with permanent, full-time instructors. More than any other aspect of the college, the development of the faculty was the product of Aldrich's efforts. Because of the autonomy enjoyed by the college and the fact that faculty search committees were not yet used within the college, faculty recruitment was completely at the discretion of Aldrich. There were at least three general directions into which Aldrich could proceed in faculty development: first, he could recruit a highly specialized and trained (doctoral) faculty whose major focus would be upon research and specialized teaching; second, he could recruit generalists who had university training (especially at the graduate level), some business experience, and a willingness and ability to teach undergraduates; and, third, he could retain essentially what he already had, a number of local businessmen, part-time instructors from another college in the university, and an occasional full-time instructor. Although the choices were perhaps not as clear-cut as described, these were the options generally available to most developers of collegiate business programs in America during this period.[17]

Basically, the decisions to be made involved a process of

matching available faculty resources with the economic situation of the college and the perceived function of the college in the university and business communities. The option of hiring highly trained specialists was impractical because there were few faculty of this type available and they were costly to employ. Furthermore, the role of the college as an undergraduate institution, training local citizens for careers in local business, was inconsistent with preparation and interests of a highly trained, research-oriented faculty. The third option was also undesirable because, although the services of local business leaders as instructors had been invaluable to the founding and early growth of the college, the day program required a full-time faculty with training and expertise not found within the community. It must be noted that local businessmen were not excluded from the college's programs during this period--they continued to serve as lecturers in the day and especially the evening programs. Also, the weekly "Business Talks By Business Men" were required of all full-time students and have been constantly referred to as one of the most enjoyable and useful aspects of the program.[18] These talks reflected the utilitarian orientation of the program and were helpful in maintaining ties with the business community.

As soon as he was in a position to do so, Aldrich began to recruit a faculty of generalists with expertise in a major area of business training (accounting or marketing, for ex-

ample). Another requirement set by Aldrich was that the faculty have at least some business experience. Finally, prospective faculty had to be interested in teaching undergraduates. These qualities not only suited the faculty to the needs of the college as it defined itself in the business and academic communities, they were also consistent with Aldrich's ideas about the importance of utility in university training.

Aldrich prided himself on his ability to select faculty members.[19] Beginning in 1922 with Jay C. Van Kirk (M.B.A., Northwestern), he began hiring faculty who met his requirements. By 1930, Aldrich had hired F. Santry Reed (M.B.A., Harvard), Hugh Carnes (A.B., Michigan), Robert Elsasser (M.C.S., Tuck School, Dartmouth), Harvey Marcoux (A.M., Harvard), Leslie "Bill" Buchan (M.S., Illinois), Harry Mitchell (M.B.A., Michigan), and Donald M. Halley (A.M., Northwestern).[20] These eight men, along with Aldrich, quickly became known as the "Nine Old Men" of the College of Commerce.[21] This personal and professional identification with Aldrich promoted a spirit which many alumni recall as a hallmark of the college.[22]

An important aspect of the closeness experienced among students and faculty and between students and faculty is the general decentralized nature of Tulane University during this period. With the establishment of the four-year program, freshmen were directly admitted into the college from high school. College affiliation was established early and strongly

asserted throughout the student's stay at the university. One of the many extracurricular activities of the faculty, at this time, was to go into nearby communities for the purpose of recruiting students. These recruiting efforts were often used to inform high school students, faculty, and administrators of the increasing need for collegiate business training. Upon arrival as freshmen, students were quickly oriented to the activities of the college. Relations with the faculty were close, with the student's progress monitored on a weekly or monthly basis.[23] Parent conferences, more often than not, strengthened faculty-student relations.

Conditions were excellent for maintaining the closeness which characterized the college. Convinced of the legitimacy and worth of their efforts to educate students, the faculty ignored accusations that their program was inconsequential and too vocationally oriented. The primitive state of the college's instructional facilities was another unifying factor. The offices, classes, and workroom of the college were located in the basement of Gibson Hall, the administration building of the university. Furnished with kitchen tables and other makeshift furnishings, the facilities reflected the Depression which the country was experiencing. Library resources, which started with a few texts and periodicals, were likewise makeshift, and only after considerable "scrounging" on the part of faculty and staff was any semblance of respectability devel-

oped. Everyone--faculty, students, and staff--made sacrifices and adjustments to meet the austere conditions.[24]

An examination of the evening program reveals that no formal or systematically arranged curriculum was offered. Students enrolled in the evening division selected from a "Schedule of Night Courses," those offerings which were of interest or use to them. Satisfactory completion of any course was noted in a written statement given to the student. Successful completion of eight courses entitled the student to a certificate issued by the college.[25] Although certain evening courses could be counted toward a degree, the evening division did not offer a B.B.A.

In 1919-20, there were twenty-two night courses offered by the college. This number was twice that of the courses offered to day students. The night schedule included a number of more general and traditional courses such as Accounting, Advertising, Business Correspondence, Business English, and Commercial Law. Also included were courses more narrowly focused upon local needs and interests such as The Marketing of Cotton and Life Insurance Salesmanship. Finally, reflecting post-war economic concerns, was a course offered by Aldrich entitled Business Economics and Readjustment After the War.[26] All of these courses were taught in the Association of Commerce in downtown New Orleans, and they were, with few exceptions, taught by local businessmen and other part-time lecturers.[27]

By 1938-39, the last year of Aldrich's deanship, the night program moved from the Association's office to Gibson Hall. Another change was that these courses were staffed almost completely with the full-time faculty of the college.[28] The number of night courses offered in 1938-39 was eighteen, a slight decrease from the number offered in 1919-20. More important, however, is that there was a definite trend away from the more specialized courses offered earlier. It is likely that this trend resulted from the increased utilization of the full-time faculty and the conscious decision to offer courses which were of the same type and quality as those offered in the day.[29] These courses included Accounting, Advertising, Business English, Business Economics, and Commercial Law. In addition, Aldrich was now teaching a course entitled Management of Employees which dealt with practical, labor-management relations by studying examples and cases.[30] The format of the course enabled Aldrich to cover the material in a series of colorful stories which became notorious among the students of the college.[31] The final change in the night division during this period was that the Friday night "Business Talks" were no longer offered. Night students were invited to the day-time "Business Talks," but most of them worked full-time.

Unlike the night division, the day program involved a formally prescribed curriculum of required and elective courses leading to a degree. With the development of the four-year

option, this curriculum was extended to the freshman and sophomore years. In 1919, the curriculum of the first two years called for students to take a total of thirty-four hours of coursework divided about equally between business subjects and general subjects. Among the general courses were English, Modern Language, Mathematics, History, and Chemistry, while among the business courses were Accounting, Business Economics, Resources and Industries, and Commercial Law.[32] The junior and senior years of the curriculum were less formally prescribed--a total of thirty hours " . . . devoted wholly or almost wholly to business subjects . . ." was the sole requirement.[33] A list of required courses or course options did not exist; students planned their programs with the dean. This flexibility resulted from the small scale of the day-time program. At the time, only eleven courses were offered during the day, fewer and considerably less specialized than those offered at night.

Changes in the day program from 1919 to 1939 were profound. First, the number of day courses offered quadrupled--students in 1939 could select from over forty courses including Accounting, Business and Corporate Finance, Production Management, Business Management, Management of Employees, Marketing, and Business Statistics.[34] In addition, a series of seven courses in business research were added. These courses, one of which was required for seniors, involved students gathering and compiling data and writing a report of their findings. This was

evidence of the general field-orientation of the curriculum, and was an outgrowth of the utilitarian tradition of the college. As seniors were required to take a research course, freshmen were required to take a course entitled "The Executive and His Responsibilities," a general introduction to business principles and practices offered by Robert Elsasser.[35]

The program was not geared to either specialization or basic research. With over forty courses offered in the day and eighteen offered at night, the faculty had to teach a wide range of courses. In fact, it was often necessary for them to teach out of their major area of training.[36] This is where Aldrich's plan to hire generalists was used. Also, the research courses were more applied in that students usually investigated local business conditions or problems. This generalist and utilitarian approach of the college was typical of collegiate business training of the period.[37]

The great proliferation of courses during the twenties and thirties was one of two important changes in the day program of the college. The second change occurred in the curriculum. The curriculum of the day program in 1919 included numerous liberal arts courses and was flexible in the options which a student could take in building a program. By 1939, however, the curriculum required more business courses and allowed fewer liberal arts electives. The freshman year, for example, was taken entirely within the college. The sophomore year was

likewise strictly prescribed with only one elective option--a semester course in Chemistry or Physics as an alternative to "The Changing Business Set Up."[38] Upon this two-year foundation, juniors and seniors, with the guidance of the faculty and permission of the dean, developed a course of study which was suited to their needs. Generally, this involved taking courses in several areas of business and specializing with a number of courses in one field. Juniors and seniors could select from approximately twenty-five courses, all of which were business oriented. Non-business subjects were accepted only in special cases.[39] Upperclassmen admitted into the program from other colleges had to satisfy requirements which basically consisted of a number of courses offered in the freshman and sophomore years.

Aldrich believed that business courses could provide a background which was as liberal as that offered in the arts college. He insisted that Business English, for example, was "business" only in the sense that it was offered in the business college.[40] Students and faculty of the college also believed that their freshman and sophomore courses were sufficiently broad and general to provide the requisite foundation for advanced study in the junior and senior years.[41] Others in the university, especially in the English and Mathematics Departments of the College of Arts and Sciences, were skeptical and critical of these courses which they felt could only be

offered in their college. This debate continued throughout Aldrich's years as dean and was experienced by most colleges of business that offered a four-year program. Because most collegiate business programs in the thirties were four-year programs, the college's struggle and eventual isolation within Tulane was not unique.[42] This struggle and isolation were important aspects of the college's early growth and development.

Instructional methods in the college reflected national trends. The case method, developed at the Harvard University Graduate School of Business, was the most ambitious and widely acclaimed teaching method to develop in collegiate business training.[43] This method placed the student in the position of a businessman who had to act after weighing a variety of considerations. For a number of reasons, however, the case method did not dominate the teaching practices of the college.[44] First, the method was most appropriate in graduate training. Successful case analysis called for an understanding of the principles and practices of business which undergraduates generally lacked. Second, although the case method realized considerable success in various management and management-related courses, some students found it to be of limited use in such courses as accounting, statistics, and economics.[45] Finally, collecting an adequate number of appropriate cases was both a costly and time consuming process. At the College of Commerce, the faculty had to rely upon their own resources

to develop cases. Despite these limitations, the case method was consistent with utilitarian views of education and it brought vitality and immediacy to courses taught by Aldrich, Halley, and others.[46]

The budget and organizational structure of the college were also important aspects of its operation. The College of Commerce was one of the smallest in the country.[47] The budget of the college, reflecting its size and meager beginnings, was likewise small. In the first five years of operation, for example, the total expenses of the entire college never exceeded $13,000 per year.[48] During the decade of the twenties, annual expenses of the college increased to about $50,000 with the single greatest expense being "Instruction." The total expenses of the college gradually increased until they reached about $73,500 in 1938-39. The single greatest expense remained "Instruction" which amounted to approximately $60,000 in that year. The only apparent direct impact of the Depression upon the college was that most expense items were held down or reduced, and faculty and staff salaries were cut ten per cent.[49] No one was laid off, and graduates of the program usually found employment.

From the beginning of its operation, the college's major source of revenue was tuition and fees. Night students in the college paid twenty dollars per course until 1920-21. At that time, the Guarantors' support of the program ended and the

tuition increased to thirty dollars per course. This tuition rate was constant throughout the remaining twenty years of Aldrich's term as dean. Day students paid one hundred dollars per year in 1915-16. This rate was raised to one hundred and fifty dollars at the same time the night tuition increased. The day-time tuition rate of the college increased gradually during the next two decades. In 1938-39, the full-time tuition for one year was two hundred dollars.[50]

The only other reliable source of income for the college during the twenties and thirties was its share of the endowment of the university. This income varied greatly from year to year, but generally accounted for about twenty-five per cent of the total revenues of the college.[51] Like the other colleges at Tulane, the College of Commerce was unable to attract a sizeable endowment, forcing it continually to rely upon student tuition receipts.

The organizational structure of the college reflected its early development and the administrative style of Aldrich. The college had begun as a one-man operation. Aldrich had worked diligently to assure its continued existence in its early years of operation (1914-18), and he had managed to obtain a free and independent position for it within the university during the twenties and thirties. Within the college, Aldrich ruled with a fair and firm hand. No one at the time doubted that Aldrich ran the institution--and no one seemed to mind, because he was

almost universally respected and admired.[52] The closeness which had become characteristic of the college was part of Aldrich's style as an administrator. It is difficult for someone outside the institution to understand that Aldrich was not an egotist working to gain power for his own sake. He was a man of firm conviction who had a clear vision of what he wanted to accomplish in the school. The faculty and students agreed with him and developed strong personal loyalties to him and the college. Also, the college was small in terms of faculty, students, and facilities. Departmental organization was unnecessary, and it would have been inconsistent with the generalist nature of the faculty.

By 1939, the college had become a complete and self-sustaining educational institution housed within Tulane University. The college maintained its own registrar, bursar, admissions personnel, and records. In addition, it had autonomy in terms of its student and faculty recruitment and the design and implementation of its curriculum. The college controlled every important aspect of its program, and Aldrich controlled the college.

An important part of Aldrich's work in the college during this period was his excellent working relationship with A. B. Dinwiddie, president of Tulane. Although Aldrich focused his efforts on the college, he and Dinwiddie worked closely together on Tulane's first successful fund-raising drive in 1919-20.[53] Since that time, Dinwiddie entrusted Aldrich with the

development of the College of Commerce. He had, in fact, allowed a considerable amount of autonomy among the colleges of the university. Tulane was unique, because most universities in America had become centralized under the authority of the president.[54] During Dinwiddie's presidency, as before, Tulane was more a collection of colleges than a modern university.

President Dinwiddie died in 1935 leaving the Tulane Board of Administrators with the task of finding a new president. There was considerable discussion among the faculty about Tulane's internal development and its role in Southern educational affairs. One group of faculty, mostly from the College of Arts and Sciences, sent a document to the board outlining their ideas about the future of Tulane's program and the qualifications which they felt the new president should have. One of their many suggestions was to reorganize the College of Commerce by liberalizing its curriculum. Although it is not known how much influence this document had upon the board, they were aware of its contents as they decided who would be Tulane's next president.[55]

After two years and two acting presidents, the board selected Rufus C. Harris, dean of the Law School, to be president of Tulane. Harris was young, energetic, and determined that Tulane become a university in fact, as well as in name.[56] Centralizing a campus with a tradition of decentralization and with as many powerful deans as Tulane had was not going to be

an easy task. Harris was aided by a faculty retirement rule which made retirement mandatory at sixty-five years of age. This rule had been ignored up to and throughout Dinwiddie's term as president.[57] Harris now enforced it and, within a two-year period, replaced every dean in the university except the dean of the College of Architecture.[58]

Aldrich became sixty-five in January of 1939. He did not want to retire. Still vigorous, Aldrich was considered by everyone in the college to be fully capable of performing his duties as dean. He had dedicated his professional career to the college and had realized great success. Perhaps most important, Aldrich had earned the love and respect of his colleagues and students. He had also earned a position of eminence at the local, state, and national levels.[59] His accomplishments and the recognition thereof, made a forced retirement all the more difficult to accept. When the day came for him to leave, he walked out of his office leaving everything behind. He never returned to the college.[60]

The most important developments in the college during the twenties and thirties were the freedom of its position vis a vis the business and university communities and the formalization of its curriculum especially in the day division. After acquiring its own financial base, the college could, on its own terms, begin to serve the local business community. The college could now offer the type and quality of business courses which

it deemed appropriate. This autonomy did not, of course, mean that the college was isolated from local business affairs. Indeed, the number and strength of the ties to the local community had increased with the field-oriented day curriculum and the utilitarian orientation of the full-time faculty.

Autonomy within the university community enabled the college to develop a faculty and curriculum which was focused upon the more immediate and practical concerns of the community. It enabled the college to serve a new kind of university student, one who came from a lower socio-economic class and was looking to the university to provide him with the necessary skills to succeed in business. The autonomy of the college within the university also enabled it to legitimize business as a professional activity and, in the process, to expand the role of the university in the community.

The formalization of the curriculum reflected the ideas of the faculty and the dean as to what university trained businessmen needed to know. Their decision to have a highly structured curriculum focused heavily upon professional courses was made by numerous other collegiate level business programs in the country. Their confidence in the correctness of this decision was bolstered by the ability of their program to attract large numbers of students and to produce graduates who quickly rose to prominence in the business community of New Orleans.

Ironically, the freedom and formalization which were considered assets throughout the twenties and most of the thirties, eventually became liabilities. The plan for Tulane to become more than a "street-car" institution called for centralization and an end to the autonomy of the colleges. The movement to centralization had academic as well as administrative ramifications--the curriculum of the college, especially the first two years, was going to have to be liberalized and integrated into the program of the arts college. The College of Commerce had to respond to these developments by redefining its position in the university community and providing new answers to the question of how collegiate business education might best be conducted.

NOTES

[1] Frank C. Pierson, et al., The Education of American Businessmen (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1959), p. 39; Robert A. Gordon and James Edwin Howell, Higher Education For Business (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), p. 4.

[2] Bulletin of the Tulane University of Louisiana (College of Commerce and Business Administration), Series 39, Number 11, August 15, 1938, p. 9.

[3] Robert Elsasser (former faculty member of the college), private interview, New Orleans, Louisiana, June 28, 1973.

[4] John P. Dyer, Tulane: The Biography of A University (New York: Harper & Row, 1966), pp. 188-189.

[5] Minutes, College of Commerce Faculty Meeting, Tulane University, New Orleans, Louisiana, 1938, pp. 21-33.

[6] Ibid.

[7] Bulletin of Tulane University, Series 35, Number 11, August 15, 1934, pp. 3-4.

[8] Robert Elsasser, private interview, op. cit.

[9] Minutes, College of Commerce Faculty Meeting, op. cit. 1938, p. 19.

[10] Minutes, The University Council, Tulane University, New Orleans, Louisiana, November 20, 1918.

[11] Donald M. Halley (professor emeritus of the college), private interview, New Orleans, Louisiana, April 25, 1973.

[12] Bulletin of Tulane University, Series 20, Number 14, November 1, 1919, p. 19.

13 Minutes, College of Commerce Faculty Meeting, op. cit., 1938, p. 19.

14 Richard O. Baumbach (alumnus of the college), private interview, New Orleans, Louisiana, July 12, 1973; F. Santry Reed (former faculty member of the college), private interview, New Orleans, Louisiana, July 9, 1973.

15 Richard O. Baumbach, "Beta Gamma Sigma at Tulane" unpublished typescript, April, 1924, Tulane University Archives.

16 Alumni Questionnaire, School History Project, Tulane University Graduate School of Business Administration, New Orleans, Louisiana, August, 1973.

17 Pierson, The Education of American Businessmen, pp. 268-279.

18 Alumni Questionnaire, School History Project, August, 1973; R. O. Simpson (alumnus of the college), private interview, New Orleans, Louisiana, April, 1973.

19 Leslie J. Buchan, private interview, New Orleans, Louisiana, August 10, 1973; Robert Elsasser and Donald Holley, private interviews, op. cit.

20 Bulletin of Tulane University, Series 31, Number 8, July 1, 1930, pp. 6-7.

21 Alumni Questionnaire, School History Project, August, 1973. Many alumni noted that the faculty not only worked closely together, but that they also palyed cards, hunted, and fished together as well.

22 Ibid.

23 F. Santry Reed, private interview, op. cit.

24 Robert Elsasser, private interview, op. cit.

[25] Bulletin of Tulane University, Series 20, Number 14, November 1, 1919, p. 20.

[26] Ibid., p. 26.

[27] Ibid., pp. 7-9.

[28] Bulletin of Tulane University, Series 39, Number 11, August 15, 1938, pp. 6-7.

[29] Halley Reed, Elsasser, and Buchan, private interviews, op. cit.

[30] Bulletin of Tulane University, Series 39, Number 11, August 15, 1938, p. 28.

[31] Richard O. Baumbach, private interview, op. cit., R. O. Simpson, private interview, op. cit. Aldrich apparently used his class as a forum for any subject. For example, on one occasion, Aldrich assessed the legal profession by stating that, "Lawyers are like baboons, the higher they climb up the pole, the more they show their asses." These remarks were recalled by his students many years later.

[32] Bulletin of Tulane University, Series 20, Number 14, November 1, 1919, pp. 19-24.

[33] Ibid.

[34] Bulletin of Tulane University, Series 39, Number 11, August 15, 1938, pp. 21-31.

[35] Ibid., p. 27.

[36] Halley, Reed, Elsasser, and Buchan, private interviews, op. cit.

[37] Leverett S. Lyon, Education For Business (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1922), pp. 348-351.

38 Bulletin of Tulane University, Series 39, Number 11, August 15, 1938, p. 18.

39 Ibid., p. 19.

40 Robert Elsasser, private interview, op. cit.

41 Halley, Reed, Elsasser, and Buchan, private interviews, op. cit.; Alumni Questionnaire, School History Project, August, 1973.

42 Pierson, The Education of American Businessmen, pp. 42-46; Walter J. Matherly, "The Relationship of the School of Business to the College of Liberal Arts," AACSB Proceedings, March, 1937, pp. 5-8.

43 Pierson, The Education of American Businessmen, pp. 287-290.

44 Ibid., Donald Halley, private interview, op. cit.

45 Alumni Questionnaire, School History Project, August, 1973.

46 Donald Halley, private interview, op. cit.

47 James H. S. Bossard and J. Frederic Dewhurst, University Education For Business (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1931), p. 288.

48 "Budget: College of Commerce and Business Administration, 1913-1939," Tulane University, New Orleans, Louisiana, p. 1.

49 Leslie J. Buchan, private interview, op. cit.

50 Bulletin of Tulane University, Series 39, Number 11, August 15, 1938, p. 15.

51 "Budget: College of Commerce and Business Administration, 1913-1939," op. cit., p. 1.

52 Halley, Reed, Elsasser, and Buchan, private interviews, op. cit.; Alumni Questionnaire, School History Project, August, 1973.

53 Elsasser, private interview, op. cit.

54 Lawrence R. Veysey, The Emergence of the American University (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), pp. 303-304.

55 Dyer, Tulane, pp. 239-240.

56 Rufus C. Harris (former president of Tulane University), private interview, Macon, Georgia, August 7, 1973.

57 Ibid. Harris said that the Tulane Board of Administrators ordered him to enforce the retirement rule.

58 Dyer, Tulane, pp. 241-242.

59 Aldrich is recognized as a pioneer in collegiate business education. He helped to organize and was a national officer in the American Association for Collegiate Schools of Business.

60 Halley, Reed, Elsasser, and Buchan, private interviews, op. cit. These men and others on the faculty and staff of the college, at the time, said that Aldrich was embittered at having to retire. Rufus Harris said in an interview that he knew Aldrich was a proud man and that he did not want to retire. Harris, however, maintained that his "hands

were tied" because the Tulane Board ordered him to enforce the retirement rule. Harris has no recollection of any formal attempts by Aldrich to remain dean, and he recalled that he and Aldrich remained friends after Aldrich's retirement. In retirement, Aldrich lead a reclusive life. Although he was honored by alumni on several occasions, he refused to return to the campus. He died on May 9, 1956, in New Orleans.

CHAPTER IV
A DECADE OF CHANGE: THE BUCHAN YEARS, 1939-1949

The College of Commerce was viewed as the most vocationally oriented college at Tulane. Its faculty and students continued to be discredited by the rest of the university as overly concerned with job preparation. And the business curriculum was judged to be unworthy of university status. When combined with a decentralized fiscal organization which placed colleges in direct competition with one another, the low status of the college resulted in its isolation within the university. Very few people at Tulane knew or cared about what was happening in the college. For its part, the college withdrew from participation in university affairs.

The isolation and low status of the College of Commerce changed during the forties. This was caused by three important and interrelated factors: the efforts of President Harris to unify Tulane and create a modern university; the efforts of Leslie J. Buchan, the newly appointed dean of the college, to modernize its curriculum and bring it into a closer working relationship with the rest of Tulane; and, the impact of World War II upon the organization of the university.

President Harris knew very little about the internal affairs of the College of Commerce. He knew it was popular, both among vocationally oriented students and among local businessmen. He also knew that it was isolated from and thought to be inferior to the rest of the university.[1] What

Harris knew concerned him because he felt that Tulane would not realize greatness until its colleges were organized into an integrated whole and offered substantial, university level work. To this end, Harris wanted the College of Commerce to offer a two-on-two program combining general and professional courses or a three-on-two program similar to that offered by the College of Law. Harris reasoned that this would bring the College of Commerce closer to the university and enable it to focus its efforts on developing more substantial professional offerings.[2]

Harris' views were shared by the new dean of the college, Leslie J. Buchan. Buchan, a native of Iowa trained in accounting at the University of Illinois, had been hired by Aldrich in 1930 as a professor of accounting. As one of the "Nine Old Men" of the college, Buchan was representative of the type of faculty which Aldrich recruited--he had a master's degree, successful business experience (he had been a partner in an accounting firm in Miami, Florida), and was interested in teaching undergraduate courses. Buchan quickly realized that the program and people of the college suited him as well as he was suited to them. In recruiting Buchan, Aldrich emphasized that although the college did not have high admission standards, it did have high standards of performance. The small size of the college (compared with most state institutions) and the closeness among the faculty and students also attracted Buchan.[3]

It was up to Harris to appoint a new dean when Aldrich retired; faculty search committees were not used at Tulane in 1939. Harris knew what he wanted in a dean--someone young and willing to help him enhance the status of the college and bring it closer to the university.[4] It soon became apparent that Buchan shared Harris' view that the time had come to put aside the intercollege rivalries which were traditional at Tulane. Buchan also felt that the freshman and sophomore years of the business program were best spent in the College of Arts and Sciences. Beyond this, and of great interest to Harris, was Buchan's desire to raise admission standards, implement a Master of Business Administration (M.B.A.) program, and develop a division of research within the college. This convergence of ideas about the future of the college combined with Aldrich's recommendation that Buchan was "more than just an accountant" led Harris to decide that Buchan should be the next dean.[5]

The third source of change during this period was World War II. When Buchan took over in the summer of 1939, Europe was once again threatened with the outbreak of war. By the time the college opened its doors in September, that threat had become a reality. The war in Europe and the fear that America would soon be drawn into it caused a particular uneasiness in the university community. The question as to what would happen to Tulane in the event of American involvement was frequently discussed. The war could cripple the

university--the conscription of students and faculty and the realignment of national priorities in terms of higher education could have forced Tulane to suspend operations temporarily.[6]

When America declared war in 1941, President Harris offered all of the resources of the university to assist in the war effort. Harris later traveled to Washington to investigate the possibilities of assuring Tulane's continued operation. He returned with an agreement which had been negotiated with the United States Navy.[7] The new program (V-12) called for Tulane to coordinate the training of commissioned officers (Tulane had just received a Naval Reserve Officers Training Corps program). The money received from the Department of the Navy and the priority status afforded the university enabled Tulane to continue operation throughout the war years.

The war brought numerous changes to Tulane. Navy personnel not only took courses, but were housed, fed, and given basic military training on campus.[8] More importantly, in order to do business with the Navy, Tulane had to restructure its fiscal organization. The Navy insisted upon centralized budgeting and finance. This requirement forced the very changes that Harris and Buchan wanted. Thus, the war precipitated the centralization of Tulane and was, for some, a blessing in disguise.[9]

As the war helped Tulane organize itself along the lines

of a modern university, it also helped the College of Commerce in its movement toward modernization and meeting the goals established by Buchan. Because of the more immediately practical and vocational nature of business education, the College of Commerce received a substantial portion of the Navy V-12 students. (The College of Engineering also received a substantial number of these students.) Also, beginning in March, 1944, the college was selected as a Naval Pre-Supply School, one of nine in the nation.[10] The combination of the V-12 and Pre-Supply programs assured the college of a constant supply of well qualified students.

The war also brought the college closer to the rest of Tulane. The aforementioned fiscal reorganization meant that colleges of the university were no longer competing for student revenues and students could freely enroll in courses outside of their college. And, in addition to centralized budgeting, centralized purchasing and receiving brought the College of Commerce (along with most of the other colleges) closer to the operation of the university. With respect to students, centralized registration and commencement encouraged a sense that they were all Tulane students who happened to be studying in one of its colleges. Also, a high percentage of students enrolled in the College of Commerce were navy trainees who focused much of their attention upon military activities. This reduced their identification with the college. Finally, Buchan's skills as an organizer and

administrator were quickly recognized by Harris who appointed him as his assistant. Buchan administered the Navy V-12 program throughout the university and was one of a handful of presidential advisors who fiscally restructured Tulane.[11]

The changing position of the college within the university was but one of many important changes experienced during the decade of the forties. Internal changes in the curricula, students, and faculty of the college came at an accelerated rate during and after World War II. The college even changed location during this period, obtaining a long overdue facility of its own. Although John Dyer, in his history of Tulane, suggests that the Buchan years (1939-49) were largely a continuation of the policies and practices established by Aldrich, closer examination of the college reveals that although Buchan held Aldrich in great esteem, he brought about significant changes as dean.

Although the stated aim of the college remained unchanged throughout the forties, the program established to realize that aim was revised extensively. The most important changes in the college were its increasingly formalized organization into divisions; the development of a new research division (May, 1940); the establishment of a graduate division (May, 1940); the revision of the undergraduate program; the development of special programs (most of which were connected with the war effort); the

transfer of the evening program to the newly organized University College; and, the organization of the Department of Economics at Tulane in the College of Commerce. Taken together these changes reflect an effort to raise the level of work offered by the college as well as an effort to integrate the college's program into that of the rest of Tulane. These changes also reflect the college's response to the wartime emergency.

During his first year as dean, Buchan organized the college into four divisions by retaining the undergraduate and night divisions and creating the graduate and research divisions. Although these separate divisions were deemed necessary for administrative reasons, all phases of the college's activities were directed by one faculty.[12] The limited number of faculty still made departmental organization unnecessary. Initially, the organization of the college into various divisions had little real effect other than to provide a semblance of sophistication to the college's program. Indeed, at the time that these divisions were organized (1940), only the undergraduate and night divisions had any substantial offerings. One of Buchan's challenges as dean was to give substance to the new divisions he had established.

The division of business research was deeply rooted in the utilitarian orientation of the Aldrich years. The division was created to perform applied research for the local

business community. The college recognized that researching business problems which were neglected by individual businesses was a necessary part of its professional responsibility.[13] Research was to be conducted by members of the faculty, assisted by Fellows of the graduate division, and counseled by an advisory committee of business leaders. Although very few college-wide projects developed out of the research division, numerous studies conducted by individual classes were presented to local businessmen. These research activities provided opportunities for students to study local businesses and to display their skills to prospective employers. Of equal importance were the ties developed and maintained between the college and the local business community. Unfortunately, the program, at least during the Forties, never developed beyond the activities of a few professors. Part of the problem was that the war diverted the college's attention to teaching.[14] The research division did not begin to realize its full potential until the Fifties.

Closely connected with the development of the research division was the initiation of the Master of Business Administration (M.B.A.) program in May of 1940. This was one of Buchan's early goals for the college. He believed that the establishment of an M.B.A. program would improve the undergraduate program and enhance the college's status in the university community. More specifically, Buchan believed that the M.B.A. program would encourage faculty development

and provide a core of researchers who could serve the local business community.[15]

The general regulations applied to the M.B.A. program remained basically unchanged for the decade that Buchan was dean. Students were admitted to the program with either a bachelor's degree in business or commercial studies or any bachelor's degree from a recognized institution. Graduates of recognized colleges of commerce were expected to complete the program in one year (thirty semester hours), while graduates with no prior commercial training were expected to take two years of work (sixty semester hours).[16] All students were required to take six semester hours of economics (three hours of economic history and three hours of economic theory) and six semester hours of thesis research and writing. Courses available for graduate credit were offered in such fields as accounting, economics, labor, management, marketing, and finance.[17] The major change in graduate course offerings from 1940 to 1950 was a significant expansion of the number of economics courses. This resulted from moving the economics department into the College of Commerce (see below, P. 92).

Although the graduate program held the promise of improving and modernizing the college, it suffered the same slow beginning that afflicted the research division. For one thing, the faculty was unprepared for and uninterested im graduate training. Also, the job market for graduates in an M.B.A. program was almost non-existent in New Orleans.

Finally, and most importantly, the college's commitment to train large numbers of undergraduates left the faculty with little time or energy to devote to a graduate program.[18] As a consequence, graduate students rarely consisted of more than five percent of the full-time enrollment of the college throughout the forties. A cycle was in evidence with regard to graduate training in the college--the program received little attention because there were so few students involved, and students were not attracted to a program that was, for the most part, only an extension of the undergraduate division. Despite the slow growth of graduate training, a commitment had been made to begin a program which would figure prominently in the history of the college.

Although substantial changes occurred in the undergraduate program, some of what had been established during Aldrich's quarter century as dean remained when Buchan left in 1949. The four-year curriculum, for example, was retained. This curriculum was more popular than the two-on-two curriculum among the nation's collegiate schools of business. This popularity resulted from the ease with which a college program could be unified, coordinated, and controlled.[19] Despite these advantages, Buchan felt that the college's program could be strengthened by having the student study a year or two within the arts college before entering the program. But Buchan experienced student, faculty, and alumni resistance to change and the disruptions

which World War II brought to the college.[20] The war brought opportunities to initiate change in some areas and prevented change in others.

Buchan's inability to drop the four-year curriculum did not preclude substantial changes within that curriculum. An analysis of the prescribed curricula of the college from 1939 to 1949 reveals significant changes in the proportion of courses taken in and out of the college, courses required as general business courses, and professional electives. Courses taken out of the college were taught by the faculty of another college while the student was enrolled in the College of Commerce. General business courses were required courses in business of a foundational nature which, in current language, could be called a core curriculum (accounting or economics, for example). All of these courses were taught by the college faculty. Professional electives were business courses which students could select in addition to the required core of general business courses.

From 1939 to 1949, the proportions of these three types of courses changed dramatically. In 1939, students could take their entire program within the College of Commerce.[21] By 1949, students were taking forty-two hours (or thirty-five per cent of their degree requirements) outside of the College of Commerce. Some of these courses were required (mathematics, english, and foreign language) and others were electives taken in other colleges. It might be added that

this suggests improved relations between the college and the rest of the university.

On a percentage basis, the general business courses (core) changed slightly--from forty-five percent of degree requirements in 1939, to fifty percent in 1949. The general business courses required in 1939 consisted of sixty hours offered in the freshman and sophomore years and included courses in economics, accounting, marketing, business English, and business mathematics.[22] By 1949, however, the type of core courses required for a degree became more firmly established. Students were required to take sixty hours of general business courses spread throughout the four years of the program. These courses included economics (eighteen hours), accounting (nine hours), marketing (six hours), business law (six hours), management (six hours), economic statistics (six hours), finance (three hours), and English (six hours).[23]

Because much of the 1949 undergraduate curriculum of the college was required, the number of professional electives was significantly reduced. A total of eighteen hours could be taken as professional electives (fifteen percent of total degree requirements) in 1949. These electives were available only to juniors and seniors.[24] This was a significant reduction from the number of hours offered as professional electives in 1939--sixty hours, thirty each in the junior and senior years.[25]

Undergraduate course offerings during this period reflected the growth of the college and the establishment of a core of general business courses. From 1939 to 1949, the total number of undergraduate day courses offered jumped from forty-seven to seventy-one, while the subject areas dropped from sixteen to thirteen. More significantly, over seventy-five per cent of the courses offered in 1949 were offered in five areas: economics (twenty-one courses); accounting (fifteen courses); marketing (nine courses); management (five courses); and finance (five courses).[26]

Without formally announcing the establishment of a core curriculum of general business courses, the college had developed one both in terms of the required program of study and the number of courses offered in these subjects. In this way, the college reflected the national trend toward standardization of collegiate business curricula.[27] It might be added that the development of a core of required general business courses precluded the growth of narrowly focused specialization at the undergraduate level. This was consistent with the generalist tradition established by Aldrich. The undergraduate program of the college remained dedicated to providing students with substantial training in a number of general business courses, not to training students in a field of specialization.

In addition to the regular undergraduate curriculum, a number of special programs were implemented. These programs

were often related to the training of personnel for the American war effort. In 1941-42, students in the college were either deferred as trainees for essential occupations or designated as Army Reserve Enlistees or Navy V-1/V-7 students. The V-1 and V-7 students were juniors and seniors who were allowed to complete their studies before induction into the Navy. In June, 1943, amidst the confusion of government attempts to mobilize its manpower resources, the Army called up its Reserve Enlistees.[28] This left the college with only civilian and Navy students.

In July, 1943, the Navy V-1 and V-7 programs were merged into a V-12 program which included underclassmen as well as juniors and seniors.[29] One of the most important aspects of the Navy program was the acceleration of the college's calendar from two to three semesters per year. Although this acceleration caused difficulty in coordinating the college calendar with others at Tulane, the entire university was soon placed on an accelerated basis. Students responded favorably to the accelerated program. Faculty, on the other hand, were concerned about its impact upon the quality of instruction. They were also disappointed that their pay for teaching an additional semester would be raised by only one-third instead of the expected one-half.[30]

The first major change in the V-12 program came in March, 1944 when the college was designated as one of nine Navy Pre-Supply schools in the country. Students entered the Pre-

Supply program after completing two semesters of college. After four semesters of Pre-Supply training, successful students entered the Navy Supply School which had been established in the Graduate School of Business at Harvard University.[31] Students at Tulane who would have entered the V-12 program, entered the Pre-Supply school instead. At the end of the 1944-45 session, the first and only group of Pre-Supply trainees graduated. As the war ended, the various emergency programs which the college had administered for the Navy were gradually merged into the Tulane Naval Reserve Officers Training Corps (NROTC).[32]

Aside from war related changes in the college's curriculum, three other changes occurred while Buchan was dean. The first of these changes was really the revitalization of an old idea--the combined Commerce-Law program. In 1940-41, Buchan re-established this program in conjunction with the College of Law. Although the program had failed to generate interest in the 1920's, Buchan believed that commercial studies provided a good foundation upon which legal training could be based. The program allowed a student to enter the College of Law after three years in the College of Commerce. At the end of his first year in the law college, the student received a B.B.A., and at the end of his third year, he received a Bachelor of Laws.[33] To Buchan, the program also brought the college closer to the rest of the university and enabled other colleges to see the " . . . high caliber of

training offered in our college."[34] Despite a promising start in which several commerce-law students received special recognition in the university, the program once again floundered in the wake of the college's wartime activities.

A more controversial and important change in the college was the formation of a university-wide Department of Economics controlled by the College of Commerce. Before the 1946-47 academic year, the study of economics at Tulane was spread throughout three colleges: Arts and Sciences, Newcomb (the women's college), and Commerce and Business Administration. This fragmentation resulted in the duplication of certain courses and inadequate offerings because in each of the three colleges, the economics department consisted of one or two faculty members. Buchan recognized the low state of economics at Tulane and proposed that the various departments be unified and expanded to develop a program worthy of university status. Buchan's pleas were well received by President Harris who organized the new department in the College of Commerce.[35]

Placing the University Department of Economics in the College of Commerce provided economics with an organizational and administrative structure necessary to raise its position in the university. Also, the generally accepted status of economics as a legitimate academic discipline enhanced the status of the College of Commerce in the university community. Yet, if it was a good move for both economics and the college, it was not a move without controversy.

Academically, it sparked a controversy between theoretical and applied economists. This debate among professional economists centered around the purposes of economics as an academic discipline, and was reminiscent of the debate between advocates of liberal culture and utilitarian education. Politically, the move seemed to provide evidence that while Buchan assisted in centralizing the fiscal operation of Tulane, he was also trying to extend his control over certain portions of it.[36] Finally, within the college, economics now dominated what was heretofore a carefully balanced combination of faculty and courses. All of these issues arose immediately, but were overshadowed by the war. Only later did they return as significant points of controversy both in the college and in the university.[37]

The third change implemented by Buchan was to transfer the college's entire Night Division to the newly created University College of Tulane. Since its organization in 1914, the College of Commerce had maintained an extensive program of courses for part-time students at night. These courses were immensely popular in the local business community and were a source of pride to the college. Night courses were taught mainly by full-time faculty who used the same texts as in day courses and required the same level of performance. Although night students received a certificate for the completion of eight night courses, no college credit was earned. A similar type of program had been developed in the Division

for Teachers at Tulane. This program, directed to furthering the education of in-service teachers and providing a mechanism to enable students in the College of Arts and Sciences to obtain state teacher certification, enjoyed a popularity among students similar to that of the College of Commerce's Night Division.[38] As part of an effort to centralize the part-time programs at Tulane and to enable business students to obtain college credit for their work, University College was organized in the 1942-43 session.

University College, modeled upon a similar college at Washington University in St. Louis, was so named because it offered courses selected from various colleges of the university.[39] Its creation enabled Tulane to meet the needs of those unable to attend a university full-time. Also, by expanding its continuing or adult education program, Tulane was able to tap a lucrative educational market and serve local community needs. This was especially important because the war had reduced the full-time student population. The elevation of the evening program to college status gave it the legitimacy required to attract students and to pacify faculty members who shunned part-time college work. Students could now receive a degree from Tulane by attending part-time. Instead of a certificate, business students who successfully completed the prescribed program would be awarded the degree of Bachelor of Commercial Science (B.C.S.).[40]

Although the creation of University College stripped the

College of Commerce of one of its most popular and financially successful programs, reaction within the college was minimal. For one thing, the University College program was unchanged from the Night Division of the college--the same courses, texts, and instructional staff were used.[41] Also, the full-time day program was strong and the loss of evening revenues was unimportant in light of the fiscal centralization of Tulane. The college, for the most part, controlled the University College commercial program. This was assured because Buchan had been named Assistant Director of University College.[42] In the years after Buchan, the commercial program of University College gradually developed courses and personnel independent of the College of Commerce.

Changes in the college's program were paralleled by changes in the faculty during the forties. The number of full-time faculty, for example, increased from fifteen in 1939 to twenty-three in 1949.[43] Although a fifty per cent increase is significant, the college remained small when compared to state collegiate business institutions. More important than the number of faculty members, was their level of training. Only one member of the full-time faculty in 1939 had received a doctorate. By 1949, however, eleven of the twenty-three had completed doctoral training.[44]

The dramatic increase in the level of training of the full-time faculty resulted, in part, from the incorporation of the economics department into the college's program. Mem-

bers of that department who came into the College of Commerce from other colleges at Tulane as well as those who were hired from outside, were generally trained at the doctoral level. Also, as a part of his plan to upgrade the program of the college and its status in the university community, Dean Buchan established a plan whereby full-time faculty could receive partial pay while working on their doctorate. Hugh Carnes, Harry Mitchell, and Buchan himself received doctorates under this plan. Finally, graduate schools of business were training more students at the doctoral level, and colleges of business throughout the country were eagerly hiring them. The college thus reflected the national trend toward more highly trained faculties.[45]

The recruitment of new faculty presented problems--Buchan found it difficult to attract well qualified personnel. Positions in government and business generally offered better pay. (This difficulty was experienced by colleges of business throughout the country.) At Tulane, this problem was compounded by the feeling that southern universities were particularly disadvantaged. Candidates for faculty positions feared that southern universities were backward and out of the mainstream of professional activity.[46] Prospective faculty also expressed concern about the quality of education available for their children. Whether or not these fears were well founded is not important; what is important is that they were generally held and they made Buchan's task all the more difficult.

The generalist, utilitarian orientation of the faculty which had been developed and maintained by Aldrich remained essentially unchanged throughout Buchan's deanship. What had been almost exclusively an undergraduate teaching faculty, remained an undergraduate faculty. The main reason for this was that the war required the faculty to devote most of its time and effort to an accelerated undergraduate program. The only major non-teaching activity of the faculty was consulting with local and regional business and governmental agencies and delivering occasional addresses to local civic groups.[47] Other traditional faculty activities such as research, publishing, and graduate training were postponed. Also delayed was a faculty study of the undergraduate curriculum.[48]

The relationship of the dean to the faculty of the college changed. Although seven of the original "Nine Old Men" remained, the increased size and professionalization of the faculty took its toll--the intimacy of the Aldrich days was gone. And, despite Buchan's admiration of the personal administrative style of Aldrich, he did not model his administration upon it.[49] Most importantly, Buchan implemented numerous, far reaching changes which occasioned considerable anxiety in the college and university. More often than not, these changes were made without faculty consultation. Yet, Buchan found the college faculty cooperative. The tradition of strong administrative leadership developed by Aldrich had resulted in a faculty which Buchan found to be too passive and accepting of his decisions.[50]

The number and type of students served by the college changed dramatically during the period of Buchan's deanship. When Buchan took over as dean in 1939, there were 262 day students and 682 night students enrolled.[51] With the transfer of the night division to University College, the college's enrollment was reduced to one-third its former size. Then, with the American involvement in World War II and the college's participation in various naval training programs, the full-time day enrollment tripled to 757 in 1945. Full-time student enrollments remained high. The G.I. Bill of Rights enabled hundreds of returning veterans to enroll in full-time programs in the college. By the end of the decade, the day enrollment had stabilized to 500, twice the number of full-time students in 1939.

An important consequence of the great influx of students into the college was a loss of the intimacy which had become a hallmark of the college. Most indicative of this were problems with the student-operated honor system. Despite the support of the dean, faculty, and a majority of students, the growth of the student population brought forth a series of violations of the honor code heretofore unknown in the college.[52] Also, the increased size of the student body was not accompanied by an increase in the number of faculty until after the war.[53] As a result, the faculty taught more students and taught in fields for which they had little preparation. The cost, in terms of instructional quality, was

noticeable. Students and faculty alike expressed concern, but were hopeful that wartime conditions would be temporary.[54]

The wartime and postwar growth of student enrollments was not, however, disastrous. If the war and G.I. Bill brought students to the college in unprecedented and almost unmanageable numbers, it also brought students of greater maturity and geographic and intellectual diversity. This was especially true of the veterans who poured into the college. These men brought a maturity and competitive spirit which impressed both the faculty and non-veteran student alike. Veteran students were serious, diligent, sophisticated, and so ambitious that the faculty was concerned that they dominated the college's student population.[55] Veterans did indeed, for a while, dominate curricular and extra-curricular activities as well as the social life of the student body. Seventeen and eighteen year-old freshmen were no match for the veterans.[56]

Students of the college became increasingly active in the university. The liberalized curriculum, especially for freshmen and sophomores, brought students into direct contact with the rest of Tulane. Commerce students performed consistently well in courses outside of the college and were increasingly active in every aspect of university life from fraternities and sororities, to student government and intercollegiate athletics.[57] This gradually dispelled the notion that commerce students were academically backward and preoccupied with vocational concerns. And, the waning intimacy

and esprit de corps among students in the college was partially offset by an emerging Tulane ("Green Wave") spirit.

The most concrete evidence of the changes which occurred during the Forties was the construction of a facility devoted exclusively to the college's activities. The new building, constructed of limestone in the prevailing romanesque style of surrounding buildings was symbolic of the integration of the college's program with the rest of Tulane and its improved status in the university community. As a part of the estate of the late Norman Mayer, a successful New Orleans cotton broker, the funding of the new building reflected the traditionally close ties of the college to the local business community. Although lacking formal business training himself, Norman Mayer had great faith in higher education for business. This was first expressed when he became one of the original Guarantors of the college. Mayer died in 1937, and his widow wanted his memory to be perpetuated.[58] Mrs. Mayer's attorney, Monte Lemann, had been a student of Morton Aldrich and was a strong supporter of the college. Lemann suggested that a gift to the university for the purpose of constructing a building to house the College of Commerce would be appropriate. Mrs. Mayer agreed and bequeathed the sum of three hundred thousand dollars to the College of Commerce.[59]

The terms of the gift called for the construction of two buildings, the Norman Mayer Memorial, to house the college, and the Norman Mayer Library, specifically for the college's

collection.[60] Construction on the Norman Mayer Memorial began in 1940 and was completed by February of 1942. Library construction was delayed because of a shortage of materials occassioned by the war. After the war, the money available to build the library was insufficient, and it was agreed that an addition to the original structure would meet the terms of Mrs. Mayer's bequest.[61] This construction began in 1947 and on May 11, 1949, the entire structure was dedicated. Speakers at the dedication ceremonies focused their remarks upon the close relationship of the college to the local business community and upon the increasingly important role of university level business training. Utilitarian ideas about the function of a university in society echoed in the halls.[62]

The new building was a monument to the college's success. The popularity which had enabled it to remain financially viable and independent of Tulane during the Aldrich years, was now so great that the college became a source of revenue for the university.[63] The decade of Buchan's tenure as dean witnessed an almost five-fold increase in the college's annual budget. More importantly, the net income of the college from 1939 until 1949 was in excess of three hundred and fifty thousand dollars.[64] These monies went into the university coffers. Given the perennial financial crises of Tulane, and the fact that most colleges operated on a deficit, the College of Commerce was indeed an asset to the university.

The relationship of the college to the local business community was likewise successful. The close ties established by Aldrich were maintained and strengthened. An important part of this was Buchan's understanding of the history of the college and its debt to local businessmen. The most important change during this period, however, required very little of Buchan or the college. As graduates of the college rose to prominence in the New Orleans business and civic community, relations improved because the college could now call upon its alumni.[65] These alumni credited the college with much of their success and were vigorous supporters of its activities. Although the college did not need their direct financial support, their assistance in such areas as hiring graduates and providing field experiences and relevant business cases for students was vital.[66]

By the end of the decade, many of the changes envisioned by Buchan had been realized. The college was a more integral part of Tulane, and its program had been modernized and expanded to include professional training at the graduate level. Buchan's administrative and organizational skill earned him considerable respect within the university community. It also led to an increasingly heavy schedule. Each year seemed to add yet another responsibility. By 1946, Buchan, in addition to serving as dean of the college, was also functioning as assistant to the president (acting as the comptroller of the university), assistant director of University

College, acting director of maintenance for the university, and secretary of the American Association of Collegiate Schools of Business.[67]

These positions, especially as dean and assistant to the president, called for Buchan to formulate and implement new policies which centralized authority at Tulane. These policies were difficult for some to accept, and because Buchan was rarely diplomatic, conflicts arose.[68] The work, the pressure, and the persistent conflicts led Buchan to attempt to disengage himself from the affairs of the university and to focus his attention on the college. When his attempts met with only partial success, Buchan decided to leave Tulane altogether. He accepted an offer to administer the fiscal affairs of Washington University in St. Louis beginning in July of 1949.[69]

The forties were indeed a decade of change for the college. Its growth and improved status in the university, the standardization and modernization of its curricula, and the preliminary development of new and promising programs marked significant advances. Yet, much remained to be done. The graduate and research divisions, for example, needed additional attention and financial support in order to develop more substantial offerings. Also, the programs of the college and the activities of its faculty needed to be more effectively promoted in the region. As the decade closed, the college changed deans and was once again confronted with

the question of how the professional businessman might best be educated. In its deliberations, an almost imperceptible, yet significant difference emerged. The college had to answer the question, not as an independent college, but as an integral part of Tulane University.

NOTES

[1]Rufus C. Harris (former president of Tulane), private interview, Macon, Georgia, August 7, 1973.

[2]Ibid.

[3]Leslie J. Buchan, private interview, New Orleans, Louisiana, August 10, 1973

[4]Rufus C. Harris, private interview, op. cit.

[5]Ibid. Harris' decision to appoint Buchan surprised a number of the faculty who believed that Aldrich was grooming Robert Elsasser to become his successor. Elsasser felt that Harris refused to appoint him because he was independent like Aldrich. However, Harris insisted that Aldrich recommended Buchan.

[6]John P. Dyer (the historian of Tulane), private interview, Slidell, Louisiana, April 14, 1973.

[7]Rufus C. Harris, private interview, op. cit.

[8]John P. Dyer, private interview, op. cit.

[9]Leslie J. Buchan, private interview, op. cit.

[10]Bulletin of The Tulane University of Louisiana (College of Commerce and Business Administration), Series 45, Number 14, December 1, 1944, p. 12.

[11]Rufus C. Harris, private interview, op. cit.; Leslie J. Buchan, private interview, op. cit.

[12]Bulletin of Tulane University, Series 41, Number 9, July 15, 1940, p. 14.

[13]Ibid., p. 17.

[14]Leslie J. Buchan, private interview, op. cit.

[15]Ibid.

[16]Bulletin of Tulane University, Series 41, Number 9, July 15, 1940, p. 40.

[17]Ibid., pp. 41-59.

[18]"Report of the Dean: College of Commerce and Business Administration, Session 1946-1947," in Report of the President of Tulane University, Series 48, Number 13, November, 1947, p. 30.

[19]Frank C. Pierson, et al., The Education of American Businessmen (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1959), pp. 225-226.

[20]Leslie J. Buchan, private interview, op. cit.

[21]Bulletin of Tulane University, Series 40, Number 8, July 1, 1939, pp. 18-20.

[22]Ibid.

[23]Bulletin of Tulane University, Series 49, Number 12, October, 1948, pp. 27-28.

[24]Ibid.

[25]Bulletin of Tulane University, Series 40, Number 8, July 1, 1939, pp. 19-20.

[26]Bulletin of Tulane University, Series 49, Number 12, October, 1948, pp. 33-48.

[27]E. T. Grether, "The Development of the AACSB Core Curriculum," in The American Association of Collegiate Schools of Business, by Charles J. Dirksen, et al. (Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1966), p. 147.

[28]"Report of the Dean: College of Commerce and Business Administration, Session 1942-1943," in Report of the President, Series 45, Number 8, July 1, 1944, p. 29.

[29]Ibid.

[30]Donald M. Halley (Professor Emeritus of the college), private interview, New Orleans, Louisiana, April 25, 1973;

Leslie J. Buchan, private interview, op. cit.

[31]"Report of the Dean: College of Commerce and Business Administration, Session 1943-1944," in Report of the President, Series 46, Number 2, February, 1945, p. 26.

[32]Ibid., Series 47, Number 8, July, 1946, p. 24.

[33]Bulletin of Tulane University, Series 41, Number 9, July 15, 1940, pp. 31-32.

[34]Leslie J. Buchan, private interview, op. cit.

[35]Rufus C. Harris, private interview, op. cit.

[36]Ibid.

[37]Leslie J. Buchan, private interview, op. cit.; Robert W. French (former dean of the college), private interview, Birmingham, Alabama, June 30, 1973. French inherited these issues and had to deal with them during his term as dean.

[38]John P. Dyer, private interview, op. cit.

[39]Bulletin of Tulane University (University College), Series 43, Number 9, July 15, 1942, p. 8; Leslie J. Buchan, private interview, op. cit. Buchan said that most aspects of the University College program were copied from Washington University in St. Louis. He said that even the cover of the University College bulletin was copied from that of Washington University.

[40]Bulletin of Tulane University (University College), Series 44, Number 9, July 15, 1943, p. 15.

[41]Leslie J. Buchan, private interview, op. cit.

[42]Bulletin of Tulane University (University College), Series 43, Number 9, July 15, 1942, p. 6.

[43]Bulletin of Tulane University (College of Commerce), Series 40, Number 8, July 1, 1939, pp. 5-7; Series 49, Number 12, October, 1948, pp. 5-7.

[44]Bulletin of Tulane University (College of Commerce), Series 49, Number 12, October, 1948, pp. 5-7.

[45]John T. Wheeler, "A Comparison of Changes in AACSB Schools," in The American Association of Collegiate Schools of Business, by Charles J. Dirksen, et al. (Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1966), pp. 14-25.

[46]Leslie J. Buchan, private interview, op. cit.

[47]The dean listed faculty activities in his annual report to the president. See, for example, "Report of the Dean: College of Commerce and Business Administration, Session 1944-1945," Report of the President, Series 47 Number 8, July, 1946, pp. 25-26.

[48]John C. Rumble, "Suggestions for the Improvement of the College of Commerce and Business Administration, Tulane University," unpublished typescript, Tulane University Archives, March 29, 1949.

[49]Leslie J. Buchan, private interview, op. cit.

[50]Ibid. It is interesting that Buchan found the faculty too passive because several faculty members, including Donald Halley and Robert Elsasser, found Buchan to be rather authoritarian and generally uninterested in consulting with the faculty.

[51]"Report of the Dean: College of Commerce and Business Administration, Session 1939-1940," op. cit., p. 15.

[52]Minutes, College of Commerce Faculty Meeting, Tulane University, New Orleans, Louisiana, 1944-1948, passim. The major portion of faculty meetings dealt with student performance and conduct.

[53]"Report of the Dean: College of Commerce and Business Administration, Session 1946-1947," in Report of the President, Series 48, Number 13, November, 1947, p. 36.

[54]Ibid.; Alumni Questionnaire, School History Project, Tulane University Graduate School of Business Administration, New Orleans, Louisiana, August, 1973.

[55] Alumni Questionnaire, School History Project, August, 1973; F. Santry Reed (former faculty member of the college), private interview, New Orleans, Louisiana, July 9, 1973.

[56] Ibid.

[57] Rufus C. Harris, private interview, op. cit.

[58] Transcript of the speech delivered by Monte Lemann at the dedication of the final structure, May 11, 1949.

[59] Letter from Dean Buchan to the faculty announcing Mrs. Mayer's bequest dated June 11, 1940.

[60] Ibid.

[61] Letter from J. Blanc Monroe (of Monroe and Lemann, Attorneys At Law) to Dean Buchan stipulating that the revision of the original bequest was consistent with the terms of Mrs. Mayer's will, August 2, 1947.

[62] Transcript of the speeches delivered at the dedication of the final completed structure, May 11, 1949. On file in the Tulane University Archives, New Orleans, Louisiana.

[63] "Report of the Dean: College of Commerce and Business Administration, Session 1946-1947," in Report of the President, Series 48, Number 13, November, 1947, p. 28.

[64] Ibid.

[65] Robert W. Elsasser (former faculty member of the college), private interview, New Orleans, Louisiana, June, 1973.

[66] Leslie J. Buchan, private interview, op. cit.

[67] Rufus C. Harris, private interview, op. cit.

[68] Ibid.

[69] Leslie J. Buchan, private interview, op. cit.

CHAPTER V
PROJECTING A NEW IMAGE:
ROBERT W. FRENCH AS DEAN, 1949-1955

President Harris' ideas about the college had not changed dramatically. He wanted it brought closer to the rest of Tulane and he wanted its curricula modernized and a greater emphasis placed upon faculty research and scholarly writing. He also felt that the college needed someone who could enhance its image in local, state, and regional business communities. Harris found the desired balance of scholar, administrator, and promoter in Robert Warren French. French, with a doctorate in economics from the University of Michigan, had excellent academic credentials and successful experience in administering programs in economic research. After meeting in the Spring of 1949, it was evident to Harris that French's training and experience were combined with a personality which would be attractive to the university and business communities.[1] French was hired and took over as dean in July, 1949.

French approached the problem of integrating a professional college into a predominately liberal arts institution by not considering it a problem at all. He viewed his relations with the other deans as cordial, relaxed, and based upon mutual respect. Because his training was in economics and liberal arts, he felt at ease in the university community and as qualified as the other deans.[2] Also, because French was from outside

the institution, he did not share the heritage of isolation which had characterized the college's relations with the rest of Tulane. Although divisions remained and invidious comparisons of faculty credentials and student performance persisted, the years of isolation had come to an end.

Although French was new to Tulane, he was well known in the New Orleans and Louisiana business communities. Immediately after World War II, French had conducted an economic survey of the port of New Orleans and had been appointed assistant director of the Bureau of Business Research at Louisiana State University in Baton Rouge. French had established a reputation as a capable economic analyst with a flair for developing new projects and promoting them to private and public agencies. New Orleans businessmen were impressed and optimistic that the dynamic young economist could effect great changes in local business affairs.[3]

When Harris discussed the deanship with French, he said that he wanted the College of Commerce and Business Administration to be as respected by local businessmen as the Colleges of Medicine and Law were respected by local doctors and lawyers.[4] This kind of challenge appealed to French who immediately established new lines of communication with local businessmen. Here again, French's strategy was basically personal and social. Throughout his tenure as dean, French spoke to area civic and business groups, and encouraged his faculty to do likewise. As

a consequence, the college realized an enhanced visibility in the community.[5]

An important part of the promotion of the college's activities to the community was a considerable increase in the number of institutes and conferences sponsored by the college. Among the more noted of these were: the Tulane Institute of Foreign Trade and Port Operations; the Tulane Tax Institute; the Southern Public Relations Conference; and meetings of the Public Affairs Research Council (PAR).[6] These activities were supplemented by the expansion of the research division of the college which was now called the Division of Economic and Business Research. The college now presented itself as a regional center for the study of business and economic activity and was increasingly recognized as such in local business circles.

Changes in the college's curriculum, courses, faculty, and students were less pronounced than its changing image in the community. The college's program was still divided into undergraduate, graduate, and research divisions. Of these three divisions, the undergraduate curriculum and course offerings were the least changed during the five years of French's term as dean. For example, despite repeated expressions of concern about the quality of undergraduate students enrolled in the college, admissions requirements remained unchanged. The college also retained the four-year curriculum and no evidence can be found that an effort was made to implement

the two-on-two or three-on-two curricula proposed earlier by Buchan. The proportion of general education courses, professional business core courses, and professional electives remained unchanged.[7] And, although French would have preferred a two-on-two program, he felt that the existing curriculum was liberal enough in terms of general education courses in the freshman and sophomore years.[8]

Within the four-year curriculum, only minor changes were made during this period (1949-55). The core of required business courses remained unchanged--sixty semester hours in accounting, economics, marketing, management, business law, statistics, finance, and business communications were required. Likewise, the number of professional electives remained unchanged--eighteen semester hours (six courses) selected from a list of thirteen subject areas were required in 1955.[9] The general education requirements were changed in two ways: first, students could choose a sequence of courses in the College of Arts and Sciences in lieu of a foreign language; and, second, a number of ROTC courses were required. These courses were added to the regular curriculum and were not taken in lieu of other general education courses. Thus, the requirements for graduation, at least for ROTC students, increased from 120 hours in 1949 to 128-134 hours in 1955.[10]

The number and type of undergraduate courses offered by the college changed only slightly during this period. Courses

in the required business core listed above dominated the offerings. There was a twenty per cent increase in the number of courses offered over the five year period--from 80 in 1949, to 96 in 1955.[11] This increase is explained by the expansion of course offerings in economics (eight additional courses) and new offerings in foreign trade (three courses) and transportation (three courses). In addition to these changes, certain courses were retitled in order to be brought into line with current terminology.[12]

French's efforts to promote the college resulted in an improved Business Talks program. French believed that these talks provided students with interesting and knowledgeable speakers on a variety of topics, and enabled business leaders to observe the people and programs of the college firsthand. Because of the renewed interest generated by French, the number of Business Talks doubled and more speakers were brought in from outside the city and state. Speakers who were considered experts in a particular subject area of business education were also included (accounting or production management, for example).[13] Taken together, these changes increased student and faculty interest in the program, and increased the visibility of the college in the business community.

Unlike the undergraguate program of the college, the graduate program was viewed as needing revision. The focus upon graduate education resulted, at least in part, from French's

belief that a truly professional program in business could only be offered at the graduate level.[14] French, like Aldrich and Buchan, was sensitive to national developments in business education; and, as graduate training grew more prominent among the nation's collegiate schools of business, its role in the college was likewise viewed as increasingly important. It was also felt that the South's business and industrial development was proceeding at an accelerated rate, and that southern collegiate business institutions needed to respond accordingly. Also, within Tulane, there were attempts to improve graduate training in those areas already offered and to expand into fields where it was not.[15] Finally, within the college, it was believed that improved graduate training would benefit both the undergraduate and research divisions.[16]

The most significant development in the graduate program of the college came with the implementation of a doctoral program in economics. This program, made possible by a grant from the General Education Board, was the culmination of earlier attempts to strengthen the position of economics within Tulane. French's training and interest in economics accelerated the developing program to the point that by 1951, the General Education Board was willing to provide the funds necessary to hire senior faculty, support research projects, and expand library holdings in the field.[17] The new faculty, courses, materials, and research projects which developed as a part of the new Ph.D.

program in economics, accounted for most of the changes in the graduate program during French's deanship. In fact, aside from the doctoral program in economics, there were few changes in the graduate curriculum of the college. Degree requirements, in terms of hours, courses, and the thesis, were not changed significantly.[18]

French encountered three problems in dealing with the graduate program. The first of these problems was the small number of students available for graduate study. The old problem of needing students to justify developing a better program and needing a better program to attract students continued. French attempted to solve this problem by using a strategy that had worked for Aldrich in building the undergraduate program, namely, building upon a base of part-time, evening students.[19] Thus, in 1949, during the first year of his deanship, French started an evening Master of Business Administration program. This was only partially successful because, although it increased graduate enrollment and enabled graduate course offerings to be increased, few students remained long enough to complete their degree requirements. There were more students, but there was no appreciable increase in the number of degrees awarded.[20]

The second major problem, the generally poor caliber of student, was related to the first. If the college could have had a larger pool of students from which to choose, higher admissions standards could have provided a more acceptable cal-

iber of student. Faculty concern about the quality of incoming graduate students was expressed throughout the period.[21] By 1955, admissions standards were formalized; and, more importantly, criteria for admission to candidacy were made consistent with those established by the graduate school of the university. The faculty also decided that students of questionable admissibility pass the Admissions Test for Graduate Study in Business (ATGSB).[22] The problem of attracting well qualified graduate students was exacerbated by the lack of scholarship funds. Each year the college cited this as one of its greatest needs. Although this problem persisted throughout the period, the first graduate scholarship, endowed by the Lykes Brothers Steamship Company, was an important beginning.[23] The lack of scholarship funds available for graduate students suggests that local businessmen were disinterested in graduate training. They generally believed that undergraduate training was adequate for their personnel needs.[24]

The final problem which French faced was that of developing an adequate faculty. Immediately upon accepting the deanship, he had to recruit six new faculty members. During the five years of French's deanship, the number of faculty increased by thirty per cent and the percentage of faculty with doctorates increased by fifty per cent.[25] Changes in the faculty reflected French's efforts to improve its quality by recruiting people who were more interested and better trained in conducting

business research. Faculty recruitment was also focused upon the economics program which had received the aforementioned grant to develop a doctoral program. Two full professors of economics, Clarence Danhoff and H. Gordon Hayes, were recruited specifically for the purpose of building the new doctoral program.[26]

The faculty, in terms of their interests and academic preparation, reflected the characteristics of collegiate business faculties throughout the nation. In 1949, over half of the twenty-seven full-time faculty members were full professors. These included the five remaining members of the "Nine Old Men", senior members of the economics department, and several senior officers of the various ROTC units in the university. Aside from the ROTC officers, the majority of full professors were men with long careers of service in the college. There was also a group of young, newly hired men. The veteran faculty members generally taught in professional business fields, while the newer members worked in economics. Half of the full-time faculty in 1949 had completed doctoral training.[27]

Despite the interest in focusing upon research, the faculty continued to direct most of their efforts to teaching. With an average class load of twelve semester hours and a teacher-student ratio of approximately twenty-eight to one, faculty time for non-teaching activities was restricted.[28] When community service, consulting, and university and college committee

assignments are added, it is surprising that any research was conducted. The press of time not only affected the amount of research, it also influenced the type of research performed. Research projects during this period were usually descriptive, rather than analytic or conceptual. This type of research was typical of the business research conducted in most colleges of business elsewhere in the nation.[29]

French's efforts to recruit young, qualified faculty members were successful. During his brief tenure as dean, French recruited four men who eventually became deans of the college.[30] Others recruited by French went on to become prominent in such institutions as the Ford Foundation, the federal government, and major universities. French's ability to recruit a strong faculty despite such obstacles as low salaries, high housing costs, a poor public school system, and a scarcity of qualified candidates, is further evidence of his skills in dealing with people.

Among those hired by French was the first woman faculty member of the college, Elsie Watters. French had met Watters at Louisiana State University and quickly discovered her scholarly and administrative skills. When French left to go to the University of Texas, Watters followed in order to assist him and complete her doctoral program. At Tulane's College of Commerce, Watters assisted French by carrying out a number of the administrative charges he initiated--finishing, as it were,

much of what French started.[31] Her status as a faculty member, and one particularly close to the dean, presented problems to a faculty unaccustomed to dealing with a woman in her position. Eventually, because of her academic and administrative competence, Elsie Watters was accepted as a colleague.[32] She remained at Tulane for several years after French's departure and eventually accepted an administrative position with the Tax Foundation in New York.

The research activities of the college had been formally organized into a division in 1940. Throughout the forties, the research department, without a budget or staff, accomplished little aside from an occasional project directed by a professor and conducted by one of his classes. This situation was one which French, the former director of business research bureaus at Louisiana State University and the University of Texas, hoped to remedy.[33] French's plan consisted of lobbying, both in and out of the university, for funds in order to provide the department, now designated as a bureau, with a separate budget. He also wanted to appoint a faculty member to administer the bureau's program. Finally, French attempted to recruit new faculty with an interest and proven ability in business and economic research and to encourage the existing faculty to devote more of their time to research.[34]

French's efforts were only partially successful. After his years as dean, the bureau was conducting more organized

research than ever before. This, however, amounted to very little. Each year a project or two involving several faculty members and graduate students were conducted. These projects usually involved the economics faculty and consisted largely of surveys of local or regional business and industrial activities. Such projects as an economic survey of Terrebonne Parish, a study of port administration, and an analysis of capital accumulation in the South, were conducted during the first half of the fifties.[35] For his own part, French served on the President's Council of Economic Advisers and reactivated the Tulane Society of Economics (directed by Professor Gerald Warren).[36]

Organized research in the college, reflecting its meager funding and inadequate faculty and administrative support, advanced slowly and failed to become an important part of the college's activities. Although college funds were occasionally spent on a project in the bureau, a separate budget was not developed. This lack of funds precluded the assignment of a full-time director of research and the hiring of graduate assistants and a clerical staff. It also precluded the necessary released time to allow interested and able faculty to conduct projects. Also, older faculty members generally devoted their time to teaching rather than to research. Newer faculty members, although willing to devote time to research, were usually involved in finishing their doctoral programs and

were less able to perform research tasks. Finally, French, except for his first year as dean, was heavily involved in affairs outside of the college.[37]

Despite the uncertainty caused by American participation in the Korean War, student enrollment in the college remained stable during the five years of French's deanship. The average enrollment for the period remained about 475 students, with thirty per cent of the students classified as freshmen; sixty per cent classified as either sophomores, juniors or seniors; and ten per cent classified as graduate students.[38] An overwhelming majority of the students were male and about half of these were involved in one of Tulane's ROTC units. Veterans of World War II, although accounting for a dwindling percentage of students, continued to influence both curricular and extracurricular student activities.[39]

The College of Commerce, like other colleges of business, continued to attract students who generally performed poorly on standardized admissions tests. This was true of freshmen and beginning graduate students alike. The college continued to attract students who were mainly interested in a college education as preparation for a job. Both the faculty and administration of the college were concerned about these student characteristics and attempted to remedy them.[40] Attempts to improve student quality consisted of increased recruitment efforts (with a further loss of faculty time) and higher ad-

missions standards. These efforts were supplemented by better counseling of students experiencing difficulty in maintaining acceptable grades. The major problem of these students, it was thought, was improper or inadequate study skills and the tendency for a large number of students to work in off-campus jobs. The dean's office, at French's direction, also took an increasingly active role in advising these students.[41]

Student extra-curricular activities continued to expand both within the college and the university. Student government was active, especially in the areas of freshman orientation and the honor system. Student leaders, whose academic requirements were raised during this period, worked closely with the dean's office and reported its activities directly to the dean. The honor system, which had experienced considerable difficulty in the war years, was revised in order to involve the faculty more actively in its operation. A handbook entitled, "Can You Accept the Challenge?" was circulated. It explained the operation of the honor system, especially the student's obligations to it.[42] Students were also increasingly active in university-wide student affairs. Participation and leadership in such activities as student government, the Hullabaloo (student newspaper), Jambalaya (yearbook), and service organizations (Omicron Delta Kappa and Blue Key) increased throughout the period.[43] Students also represented the college in intramural athletics and on intercollegiate athletic teams.

Student perceptions of the college during this period varied considerably.[44] Most praised the closeness among students and between students and faculty, and most felt that the quality of instruction was good, especially in the functional areas such as accounting, statistics, finance, and marketing. Their perceptions of student performance were similar to that of the faculty, namely, that many students were not as academically oriented as those of other colleges. A number felt that this was natural in a professional school, and even regretted that the classes did not have a more vocational focus. Others viewed the vocational orientation of students as a drawback which lowered the quality of the school's program.

French's efforts to improve the image of the college culminated in the celebration of its Fortieth Anniversary in April of 1955.[45] The celebration, coordinated by French and leaders of the college's alumni organization, started with an open house for alumni, former faculty, and representatives of local business and civic groups. Highlighting the open house was a class in which Professor Donald M. Halley demonstrated instructional strategies including the case method. The open house was followed by a cocktail party at Tulane's Alumni House and a banquet honoring "Doc" Aldrich and the original guarantors of the college.[46] Once again, French's promotional skills brought success. The celebration was highly publicized in the press, and letters were sent to everyone affiliated with or potentially

helpful to the college. The results were gratifying--the college's image was enhanced and donations to the college's alumni fund increased.[47]

The years of French's deanship were relatively stable when compared to those of the previous decade. Although a number of new faculty had been brought in, their impact was felt mainly in the doctoral program in economics. French had also changed certain administrative practices within the college--the committee system was reorganized and more formally structured as were the operations of the dean's office.[48] But these changes were minor. No significant changes in the undergraduate or graduate programs were made. And, despite the fear that the Korean War would disrupt college activities as World War II had, very little happened in terms of students or faculty.[49]

French was satisfied with the college's stability. He had been recruited to enhance the image of the college, not to change it. His activities as founder and director of the Public Affairs Research Council (PAR) in Louisiana and later as Vice President for Development of the university, left him with little time to devote to the day-to-day operations of the college.[50] These external activities improved the image of the college and enhanced French's reputation as a dynamic and personable spokesman.

French's resignation as dean came as no surprise and marked a less radical transition than the departures of Aldrich

or Buchan. In 1954, at the request of the Tulane Board of Administrators, French became involved in the financial development program of the university. He began to promote the university as he had promoted the college.[51] The timing of his resignation depended upon the readiness of the associate dean, Paul V. Grambsch, to assume leadership.[52] In 1955, when Grambsch completed his doctoral training and could devote his full energies to the college, French resigned to assume his university development duties full-time. French remained in that position for only a brief period before assuming the Directorship of the Port of New Orleans in 1956.[53] The college and the university lost French to the community which he had been hired to bring them close to.

NOTES

[1]Rufus C. Harris, private interview, Macon, Georgia, August 7, 1973.

[2]Robert W. French, private interview, Birmingham, Alabama, June 30, 1973.

[3]E. Davis McCutcheon (first graduate of the college and New Orleans businessman), private interview, New Orleans, Louisiana, June 20, 1973.

[4]Rufus C. Harris, private interview, op. cit.

[5]Alumni Questionnaire, School History Project, August, 1973. A number of alumni who were active in local business affairs remarked that French was a very effective promoter of the college.

[6]"Report of the Dean: College of Commerce of Tulane University, 1954-55," p. 10. (hereinafter referred to as "Report of the Dean")

[7]Bulletin of the Tulane University of Louisiana (The School of Business Administration), Series 55, Number 9, August, 1954, pp. 38-39.

[8]Robert W. French, private interview, op. cit.

[9]Bulletin of the Tulane University of Louisiana, Series 56, Number 1, January 1, 1955, p. 42.

[10]Ibid., p. 43.

[11]Ibid., Series 49, Number 12, October, 1948, pp. 33-48; and, Series 56, Number 1, January 1, 1955, pp. 50-66.

[12]"Report of the Standing Committee on Undergraduate Studies," Tulane University School of Business Administration, October 22, 1955, p. 1.

[13]"Report of the Dean," ibid., 1954-55, p. 3.

[14]Robert W. French, private interview, op. cit.

[15]John P. Dyer, Tulane: The Biography of a University (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), pp. 253-257.

[16]"Report of the Dean," op. cit., 1954-55, p. 5.

[17]Ibid., 1951-52, p. 19. A grant of 1.2 million dollars was awarded to the university for the development of several doctoral programs including the one in economics.

[18]Bulletin of Tulane University of Louisiana, Series 56, Number 1, January 1, 1955, pp. 45-48.

[19]Robert W. French, private interview, op. cit.

[20]"Report of the Dean," op. cit., 1952-53, p. 10.

[21]Ibid., 1949-50 through 1954-55, passim.

[22]"Report of the Standing Committee on Graduate Study," Tulane University School of Business Administration, May 25, 1955, p. 1.

[23]Bulletin of Tulane University of Louisiana, Series 55, Number 9, August, 1954, p. 23.

[24]Robert W. French, private interview, op. cit.; Paul V. Grambsch (faculty member and dean), private interview, Atlanta, Georgia, August 4, 1973.

[25]Bulletin of Tulane University of Louisiana, Series 49, Number 12, October, 1948, pp. 5-8; Series 55, Number 9, August, 1954, pp. 6-8.

[26]"Report of the Dean," op. cit., 1951-52, p. 19.

[27]Bulletin of Tulane University of Louisiana, Series 50, Number 12, October, 1949, pp. 5-8.

[28]"Report of the Dean," op. cit., 1952-53, p. 17.

[29]Frank C. Pierson, et al., The Education of American Businessmen (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1959), pp. 311-312.

[30]These men are Paul V. Gramsch, Howard Schaller, C. Jackson Grayson, and Peter A. Firmin.

[31]Robert W. French, private interview, op. cit. Many of French's faculty colleagues confirmed that Ms. Watters carried out many of French's duties.

[32]Bernard J. Capella (faculty member), private interview, New Orleans, Louisiana, July 24, 1973; Paul V. Grambsch,

private interview, op. cit.

[33]Robert W. French, private interview, op. cit.

[34]Ibid.

[35]"Report of the Dean," op. cit., 1954-55, pp. 7-8.

[36]Ibid.

[37]Robert W. French, private interview, op. cit.

[38]"Report of the Dean," op. cit., 1954-55, Table II.

[39]Robert W. French, private interview, op. cit.

[40]"Report of the Dean," op. cit., 1954-55, p. 2.

[41]"Report of the Dean," op. cit., 1951-52, pp. 8-10.

[42]"Report of the Honor Board Committee," Tulane University School of Business Administration, March 11, 1953, p. 1.

[43]"Report of the Dean," op. cit., 1950-51 through 1954-55, passim.

[44]Alumni Questionnaire, op. cit.

[45]"Report of the Dean," op. cit., 1954-55, pp. 12-13.

[46]Ibid.

[47]A folder entitled "Fortieth Anniversary Celebration" contained correspondence from scores of business and civic leaders regarding the school and its anniversary celebration. Ledger sheets recording donations to the alumni fund were also in the folder.

[48]Robert W. French, private interview, op. cit.

[49]"Report of the Dean," op. cit., 1951-52, pp. 1-2.

[50]Robert W. French, private interview, op. cit.; Paul V. Gramsbch, private interview, op. cit.

[51]Robert W. French, private interview, op. cit.

[52]Ibid.; Paul V. Gambsch, private interview, op. cit.

[53]Robert W. French, private interview, op. cit.

CHAPTER VI
REALIZING THE IMAGE:
PAUL V. GRAMBSCH AS DEAN, 1955-1960

When French resigned, Grambsch's title was changed from associate to acting dean. President Harris searched for a new dean, but no available person was as promising as Grambsch. Both French and Harris were impressed with Grambsch's administrative skills as well as his knowledge of and dedication to the field of higher education for business.[1] Grambsch was also highly regarded and well liked by faculty, students, and alumni of the college. To Harris, he seemed to be a natural choice. Harris' offer included the same challenge that he had issued to French--to make the school as respected in the community as the schools of medicine and law.[2]

Although not yet thirty-five years old, Grambsch had significant teaching and administrative experience. With a master's degree from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and a doctorate in Production Management from Indiana University, Grambsch also had substantial academic preparation. Most importantly, Grambsch was aware of national developments and trends in higher education for business, and was committed to making Tulane's program pre-eminent in the South and equal to the best in the nation.

Grambsch's perception of national developments in higher education for business strongly influenced his priorities for

changing the school's program. He focused on about a dozen schools situated throughout the country which served as models for the changes he envisioned.[3] He also hoped that they would provide him with the type and caliber of faculty he wanted. In addition to studying the curricular and instructional developments of these institutions, Grambsch visited them occasionally. As a result of these contacts, both Grambsch and Tulane were viewed as innovative. The impact of these contacts upon Tulane's program was significant.

Grambsch was aware of the boom in higher education for business. By the mid-fifties, one out of every seven undergraduate degrees granted in the country was in business.[4] The boom was in some ways reminiscent of the earlier period when the field was first offered at the university level. Like the earlier period, there were serious concerns about the quality of education being offered. This concern focused on differentiating a "vocational" program from one that was "truly professional." Vocational programs were viewed as those which merely prepared students for their first job. They were further characterized as narrowly defined, overly specialized, and concerned with students memorizing vast amounts of descriptive information. Professional programs were viewed as differing in both the scope and depth of preparation. These programs were viewed as emphasizing a broad liberal arts foundation upon which professional courses of a more scientific and ana-

lytic character were built.

Grambsch believed that in order for Tulane to develop a truly professional school of business administration, changes would have to be made. The stability that the school had experienced under French gave way to a period of significant and rapid change. Grambsch took President Harris' challenge seriously, and welcomed the freedom he had been given in developing the school. His first step in changing the program was to appoint committees of like-minded faculty to study the school's long-range development.[5] These committees were eventually combined into the "Special Committee on School Development" which presented a statement of aims for the school, and specific program revisions for the school to consider. The report of this committee, filed in April of 1957, echoed Grambsch's views of the school.[6]

The committee report, which became a blueprint for reforming the school's program, recommended liberalizing the undergraduate curriculum, focusing professional courses on scientific and quantitative analysis, and expanding the post-baccalaureate program.[7] Taken together, these reforms suggested a hierarchy of training. First, a liberal arts foundation would be required which would provide a broadened sense of the cultural context of business. This would be followed with an introduction to the tools of analysis from the social, mathematical, and natural sciences, and communications skills from

literature, languages, and speech. Next, a core of professional business courses would be offered which would continue to broaden the student's perception of business and refine his skills of analysis and communication. Finally, students would take clinical courses which would enable them to apply their skills and knowledge to simulated business situations involving cases, role playing, and computerized management games. Specialized training in any one area of business education, such as finance or marketing, was minimized.

The undergraduate program was liberalized in two ways. First, a two-on-two curriculum was finally adopted in which all coursework in the first two years was taken outside of the school in the College of Arts and Sciences. In addition, one-third (twelve hours) of the junior year was taken outside of the school.[8] Thus, less than half of the undergraduate program was devoted to professional business courses. The second means of liberalizing the undergraduate curriculum involved altering the focus of the professional business courses. Grambsch wanted the faculty to relate professional courses to the social and cultural environment in which American business operated.[9] His aim was to broaden the focus of undergraduate business education in much the same way that social foundations of education sought to broaden teacher education. Grambsch believed that this "cultural approach" would make the undergraduate business program more liberal and less vocational. His concern was

mainly with the general pedagogical attitude of the faculty. Every course, he believed, "must be sufficiently broad in its coverage and of such rigor that it contributes to the students' general education, as well as to his business education."[10]

In addition to broadening the scope of its undergraduate business courses, the school attempted to alter their intellectual content. Grambsch viewed these courses as overly concerned with describing current business practices and with presenting factual information to be memorized by the student. Once again, the concern with vocationalism surfaced--such courses might prepare a student for his first job, but they were seen as inadequate preparation for a career in professional management. Business professionals were basically viewed as managers, that is, decision makers, problem solvers, and organizers. Increasingly, business was viewed as a science which called for rigorous quantitative analysis of complex variables. Thus, Grambsch wanted to replace these narrowly focused, descriptive courses with ones which would provide students with the analytical skills necessary to solve business problems.[11]

Grambsch believed that the foundation for these analytical skills was higher mathematics. The traditional business mathematics courses, were replaced with a required two-course sequence in college mathematics (algebra, geometry, and trigonometry) offered by the mathematics department of the university. In addition, two courses in advanced mathemetics were required.

These courses focused on such topics as differential and integral calculus, matrix algebra, linear programming, axiomatics (construction of models), and introduction to statistical inference.[12] Completing the quantitative foundation was a course in statistical applications required in the junior year; and a senior level course entitled, "Quantitative Analysis" which was described as dealing with the

> Application of quantitative methods of analysis to business problems. Objective and quantitative analysis of alternative business decisions. Probability concepts and distributions, decision-making under conditions of uncertainty and certainty. Application of quantitative techniques to inventory and cost control and capital budgeting problems. Linear programming, integrated electronic data processing, and information theory.[13]

The new, analytical focus of the undergraduate program was similarly applied to business courses taken in the junior year. Required courses in economic and financial analysis sought to provide arenas where quantitative skills could be applied. And, although not overtly quantitative, other areas covered in the junior year, including industrial relations, marketing, and production management, were focused upon theoretical and problem solving pursuits. The entire junior year was aimed at preparing students to be thoughtful decision makers and problem solvers.

The senior year of the program focused on the fundamentals of management and the application of analytical and communication skills to simulated business situations. The theories and processes of management were presented including the history of management thought, managerial functions, decision processes, human relations, management science, and organization theory. Subsequently, management simulation was conducted utilizing the case method and business games. In these classes, students assumed the role of an executive of a corporation in competition with other corporations for existence in a common market. Such variables as market conditions and long-term business trends were introduced through the use of a recently acquired electronic computer.[14]

The four-year undergraduate curriculum was crowded with one hundred and forty-four semester hours of coursework. It reflected the school's ambitious objective of providing both a liberal education and rigorous analytical and theoretical training. The school's bulletin warned students that they would find the program "a rigorous intellectual adventure [which] challenges students to think independently, to study extensively, and to gain professional competence."[15] This was tantamount to a declaration that the day of easy business courses and programs was over.

The school's efforts to meet the demands of a truly professional program of business education were increasingly

focused upon graduate education. From the beginning of his term as dean, Grambsch argued that the school's priorities should be shifted in the direction of post baccalaureate education. Once again, the "Special Committee on School Development" was crucial. In addition to suggesting changes in the undergraduate program, the committee recommended that the graduate program be given top priority.[16] The committee, in its report to the faculty, cited numerous reasons for this. First, it noted the absence of an outstanding graduate school of business administration in the South, despite the "urgent need for such a school."[17] Second, it pointed to the inferior status which graduate studies had traditionally held in the school. Third, a graduate program would be housed completely within the school, rebuilding the esprit de corps which had characterized the school under Aldrich, and allowing the school's faculty maximum control over the curriculum. Fourth, faculty members would teach upper division undergraduate and graduate courses thus enabling them to develop their particular specializations further. Finally, graduate business education was viewed as the new frontier in higher education for business, and, as the school had pioneered in undergraduate training, it should now assume a similar position in graduate training.[18]

Although not an explicit part of its recommendations to the faculty, the "Special Committee on Development" was very much aware of the weaknesses of graduate business education at

Tulane. These weaknesses were well understood by Grambsch who had seen the program suffer from lack of direction and faculty support, meager funding, and inadequate courses.[19] This resulted in a program which could not attract students in sufficient numbers or quality. (See above, pp. 116-118.)

The new graduate program, like the undergraduate program, emphasized managerial functions and decision making. Although it was offered to students who had prior business training or no business training at all, students with a liberal undergraduate background were seen as gaining the greatest advantage for the program.[20] For those with no prior business training, the program consisted of two years of study. The first year required thirty semester hours of 500 level courses (graduate or undergraduate credit) distributed in the following manner: Accounting (three semester hours); Economics (six semester hours); Finance (three semester hours); Marketing (three semester hours); Organization Theory (three semester hours); Production Management (three semester hours); and Quantitative Analysis (six semester hours).[21] Students entering the program with prior business training could waive all or part of this work. The second year, taken by all students, was built upon the foundation of professional courses and consisted of twenty-four semester hours in administration, including Administrative Policy, Managerial Economics, Analysis of Business Conditions, and Business and Society (three semester hours each); six

semester hours of Business Research; and six semester hours of electives focused on an area of specialization.[22]

Although the first year of the new program reflected only minor changes, the second year was less specialized, more prescriptive, and more quantitatively oriented. In the second year of the old program, twenty-four of the thirty hours were devoted to specialized study.[23] Of these twenty-four hours, six were allocated for a thesis which treated a narrowly defined topic. In contrast, the new program allowed for only six hours of specialization. It also called for six hours of Business Research which required the student to integrate and apply his knowledge to simulated management situations. The new program was also more prescriptive; for example, every student was required to take the same sequence of four courses in administration.[24] Finally, the quantitative focus which became characteristic of the undergraduate program dominated the graduate program. American economic life was portrayed as increasingly complex and manageable only in quantitative terms. Thus, in describing the Master of Business Administration program, the school's Bulletin stated:

> The tremendous growth in the scale and complexity of American economic life has challenged business men to draw upon all fields of knowledge for relevant concepts, methods, and techniques which will aid in the solution of business problems. Quantitative solutions are daily being sought for problems which once were thought

> to lie strictly in the realm of guesswork. Constant effort is being made to gain more exact understanding of organizations and organizational behavior. Also, it is now recognized that the business executive must have a broad perspective concerning the role of business in society.[25]

Grambsch's interest in developing the quantitative focus of the program led to the acquisition of an IBM electronic computer and the establishment of the university computer center in the business school. In 1955, Grambsch collaborated with Dr. James Sweeney, a computer expert trained at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Grambsch eventually hired Sweeney and initiated discussions with the Univac Corporation, hoping to receive a grant of money or equipment to establish a computer facility at the school.[26] Although these efforts were unsuccessful, the school attracted the attention of the International Business Machines Corporation (IBM). After consulting with the other deans and the vice-president of the university, Grambsch signed an agreement with IBM whereby the corporation would lease a computer facility to the university at a sixty per cent discount. Because of Grambsch's aggressive pursuit of the computer facility, and because no other dean was as convinced of its importance, the computer was housed in the business school.[27]

Grambsch considered the acquisition of the computer facility to be a significant accomplishment. He was convinced that the computer would play an increasingly important role in

business, and was pleased that the school was one of the first in the nation to acquire one. With Sweeney as director, the computer center quickly became one of the focal points of the university--students and faculty from arts and sciences, engineering, and medicine used the center with increasing frequency.[28] Also, immediate contacts were established with Carnegie Tech which was involved in the development of some of the first computer-assisted management games in the nation.[29]

The school acquired a reputation for its innovative and quantitatively oriented program. This program was eventually noticed by the directors of the Ford Foundation. While visiting the dean of the business school at Columbia University, Grambsch was referred to Neil Chamberlain, President of the Ford Foundation.[30] Grambsch met with Chamberlain in New York and presented his ideas about the future of business education at Tulane. Subsequently, Chamberlain and several other officials from the foundation visited the campus in the Winter of 1957, and met with several of the younger members of the faculty. Chamberlain was impressed with the program, faculty, and facilities (especially, the computer center) of the school and offered assistance.[31] Grambsch wrote the grant proposal in the Spring and Summer of 1958. The proposal was approved and a grant of $200,000 was awarded for a five year period. The grant was for "general support" of the school with monies allocated for faculty development, curriculum development, re-

search, and consulting from experts in various fields of higher education for business.[32] The money enabled the school to significantly accelerate the development of its programs and faculty. Equally as important, however, was the recognition it brought to the school.[33]

During Grambsch's term as dean, student body changes reflected the new priorities of the school. Shortly after Grambsch became dean, Tulane instituted university-wide admissions requirements. These standards were higher than those of the school, and, because business students often performed poorly on standardized admissions tests, enrollments began to decline.[34] The number of undergraduate students enrolled in the school dropped thirty per cent during Grambsch's term as dean (from 457 in 1955 to 302 in 1960).[35] A subsequent decline also occurred in the number of undergraduate degrees awarded. However, because admissions requirements were now higher, the quality of the students, as measured by standardized achievement tests, improved. Similar trends were viewed at many other institutions across the nation. This was believed to have resulted from efforts to become more selective and to offer more rigorous programs.[36]

At least part of the declining undergraduate enrollment was offset by an increasing number of graduate students. Also, Grambsch decided to drop the part-time Master of Business Administration program because students rarely completed their

studies. The growth of the new Master of Business Administration program was, therefore, significant because now all students were full-time. This resulted in a dramatic increase in both the number of credit hours taken and the number of degrees awarded. For example, the school awarded three Master of Business Administration degrees in 1956 and thirty-seven in 1960.[37] Grambsch hoped that the school would eventually award from seventy-five to one hundred Master of Business Administration degrees each year. To this end, he worked to expand the school's recruitment and financial aid efforts for graduate students.[38]

The school's faculty consisted mainly of the remainder of the "Nine Old Men", all of whom were rapidly approaching retirement, and a group of younger faculty recruited by French and Grambsch. The older faculty, although active in undergraduate teaching and university service, were generally disinterested in research and graduate teaching. They were, however, convinced by one of their peers, Donald M. Halley, that the changes which Grambsch wanted were reasonable and reflected changes in higher education for business.[39] They respected Grambsch and supported his programs willingly. The younger faculty both supported and carried out many of the new programs and activities of the school. These faculty also assumed major responsibilities in developing the research program of the school. Jack Grayson, one of these younger faculty, chaired

the school's research committee. This committee's efforts were advanced significantly by the Ford Foundation grant. The grant also supported faculty development seminars lead by such noted figures as Kenneth Boulding, Professor of Economics at the University of Michigan and Alfred Oxenfeldt, Professor of Marketing at Columbia University. Other visiting professors and consultants were brought in from the Ford Foundation, Harvard University, and Princeton University.[40]

The grant money and the deans' efforts to recruit a more research oriented faculty significantly improved the amount and type of research performed by the faculty. By 1959, for example, five books were in progress, with two ready for publication. Numerous scholarly papers were also presented to regional professional conferences (Southern Economics Association and the Southwestern Social Science Association). These activities were supplemented by the special programs which the school continued to sponsor, such as the Tax Institute and Institute of Foreign Trade and Port Operations. The faculty also developed new instructional materials and computer-assisted management and finance games.[41] Grambsch felt that the faculty was finally realizing its potential in scholarly productivity.

The school's relations with the rest of the university continued to improve during Grambsch's term as dean. Grambsch was personally responsible for much of this improvement. His organizational and managerial skills were recognized while he

worked with an informal group of deans. This group, led by Fred Cole, the academic vice-president of the university, became what Grambsch called a "management team" which administered the internal operations of the university.[42] Grambsch's position was, in some ways, reminiscent of Buchan's in that he was intimately involved in the development and administration of university policy. His skills and knowledge of managing complex institutions (in this case, the university) provided a strong argument for the legitimacy of modern business school programs in higher education. The deans of the various colleges appreciated whatever assistance a professional manager might offer.[43]

In addition to Grambsch's position in the university, the undergraduate and graduate curricular revisions were viewed by other segments of the university as improving the school's program. The acquisition of the electronic computer and the establishment of the university computer center in the school were seen as evidence of the school's modernization. Of similar importance, was the receipt of the Ford Foundation grant. Finally, the younger faculty's commitment to and achievements in more legitimate scholarly pursuits, namely research and publications, were well received throughout Tulane.[44]

The school also became a favorite meeting place for faculty, administrators, and visitors to the campus. This happened because the school had the most modern and comfortable

meeting room on campus--the Morton A. Aldrich Conference Room. When Aldrich died in 1956, the alumni organization of the school (Tulane Commerce Alumni Club) searched for some way to perpetuate his memory. They finally decided to set aside and refurbish a portion of Norman Mayer Hall and dedicate it to "Doc" Aldrich.[45] Once again, Aldrich united the faculty, students, and alumni of the college. The alumni group, which was generally unwilling to support the university's alumni giving program, was able to generate support in Aldrich's name for something which would benefit the business school. It is, however, ironic that the conference room was extensively used for university functions--effecting a unity which was impossible in Aldrich's day.

Grambsch was credited with improving the school significantly. His visits to leading schools of business enhanced his visibility as well as that of Tulane. The Ford Foundation was especially impressed with him and, when the deanship of the University of Minnesota opened in 1960, the foundation recommended Grambsch as a candidate. Thus, although Grambsch wanted to continue his work at Tulane, he decided that the opportunities and challenges of the position at Minnesota were too great to resist. Grambsch resigned in August of 1960 with mixed feelings, regretting that his tasks were not completed, but anxious to deal with the challenges at Minnesota. To him, the deanship of the business school at Minnesota offered an oppor-

tunity to develop a program of national stature. Also the university was large, state-supported, and situated in a rapidly developing industrial and financial urban complex. Finally, as the father of eight children, the housing market and public schools of Minneapolis were very attractive.[46]

In many ways, Grambsch helped to realize the image which French had created for the school. The new undergraduate and graduate curricula were representative of those recommended by the American Association of Collegiate Schools of Business and national task forces which had studied collegiate business education.[47] His acquisition of the computer center and the Ford Foundation grant brought both recognition and substantial changes to the school. Grambsch left the school feeling that it was finally on its way to realizing a pre-eminent position in higher education for business in the South.[48]

NOTES

[1]Robert W. French, private interview, Birmingham, Alabama, June 30, 1973; Rufus C. Harris, private interview, Macon, Georgia, August 7, 1973.

[2]Rufus C. Harris, private interview, op. cit.

[3]Paul V. Grambsch, private interview, Atlanta, Georgia, August 4, 1973.

[4]Robert A. Gordon and James Edwin Howell, Higher Education For Business (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), p. 21.

[5]Paul V. Grambsch, private interview, op. cit.

[6]Paul V. Grambsch, James W. Sweeney, Louis H. Jordon, and Donald M. Halley, "Report of the Special Committee on School Development," April 15, 1957.

[7]Ibid., pp. 3-6.

[8]Bulletin of Tulane University of Louisiana (School of Business Administration), Series 60, Number 16, December 15, 1959, p. 32.

[9]Paul V. Grambsch, "Memorandum to President Rufus C. Harris," April 5, 1956. This memorandum, outlining Grambsch's plans for the school, accurately foretells many of the curricular changes which the "Special Committee on Development" proposed and the faculty approved.

[10]Ibid., p. 2.

[11]Ibid.

[12]Bulletin of Tulane University of Louisiana, op. cit. p. 45.

[13]Ibid., Series 62, Number 2, January 15, 1961, p. 48. Although the course was required in 1960, a full course description did not appear until 1961.

[14]Ibid., Series 60, Number 16, December 15, 1959, p. 14.

[15]Ibid., p. 29.

[16]Paul V. Grambsch, et al., "Report of the Special Committee on School Development," April 15, 1957, p. 6.

[17]Ibid.

[18]Ibid.

[19]Paul V. Grambsch, private interview, op. cit.

[20]Bulletin of Tulane University of Louisiana, Series 59, Number 15, December 1, 1958, p. 12.

[21]Ibid., p. 22.

[22]Ibid.

[23]Ibid.

[24]Ibid.

[25]Ibid., p. 12.

[26]Paul V. Grambsch, private interview, op. cit.; James W. Sweeney, private interview, Atlanta, Georgia, August 7, 1973.

[27]Rufus C. Harris, private interview, op. cit.

[28]James W. Sweeney, private interview, op. cit.

[29]Paul V. Grambsch, private interview, op. cit.

[30]Ibid.

[31]Ibid.

[32]"Report of the Dean of the School of Business Administration, Tulane University, 1958-59," p. 1. (hereinafter referred to as "Report of the Dean")

[33]Ibid.

[34]"Report of the Dean," op. cit., 1959-60, p. 1.

[35]Ibid.

[36]Robert A. Gordon and James Edwin Howell, Higher Education For Business (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), pp. 327-331.

[37]"Report of the Dean," op. cit., 1959-60, p. 6.

[38]Paul V. Grambsch, private interview, op. cit.

[39]Donald M. Halley, private interview, New Orleans, Louisiana, April 25, 1973; Paul V. Grambsch, private interview, ibid. Grambsch credited Halley with enlisting the support of the older faculty.

[40]"Report of the Dean," op. cit., 1958-59, p. 13.

[41]Ibid., pp. 9-14.

[42]Paul V. Grambsch, private interview, op. cit.

[43]Ibid.

[44]Rufus C. Harris, private interview, op. cit.

[45]"Report of the Dean," op. cit., 1958-59, p. 10.

[46]Paul V. Grambsch, private interview, op. cit.

[47]Frank C. Pierson, et al. The Education of American Businessmen (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1959), pp. 226-228 and pp. 266-267.

[48]Paul V. Grambsch, private interview, op. cit.

CHAPTER VII
THE MOVE TO GRADUATE EDUCATION: THE DEANSHIPS OF HOWARD SCHALLER AND C. JACKSON GRAYSON, 1960-1968

Paul Grambsch left a legacy of curriculum innovations needing implementation and a vacancy for the deanship of the School of Business Administration. For the first time in the school's history, a faculty committee was appointed to find a new dean. In their opinion, the best replacement for Grambsch was Howard Schaller, chairman of the school's economics department.[1]

Howard Schaller had a rich educational and employment background. He received a bachelor's degree in economics and business administration from Duke University in 1947, and a master's degree in economics from Northwestern in 1948. After serving as an economics instructor at Auburn University in 1948 and at Duke University in 1950, he became a research assistant at Duke in 1951 and received his Ph.D. in economics there in 1953. He taught economics at the University of Tennessee for one year, and came to Tulane in 1953 as an assistant professor of economics. Schaller served as chairman of the economics department from 1955 until 1960 when the deanship of the business school became available.[2]

Schaller wanted to be dean of the business school for a number of reasons. The curriculum changes initiated by Grambsch were not yet implemented, and, because he had worked

on them, Schaller felt responsible for their implementation. Schaller had also worked with Grambsch on the "Pierson Report," a Carnegie study of university level business education which called for the teaching of quantitative methods.[3] This encouraged Schaller who had been involved in developing just such a curriculum at Tulane. He felt that some regional if not national recognition might come to the school as a result of its new curriculum.[4] He also felt that he was in a good position to effect a smooth transition and maintain positive relations between the school and the rest of the university.

Schaller wanted the school to continue evaluating its programs. Like Grambsch, he perceived an increasing complexity in modern society and a consequent demand for people trained at the master's level. Thus, Schaller believed that the future of business education lay not in undergraduate business programs, but in MBA programs. He believed that the curricular innovations of the Grambsch administration would lead to the eventual elimination of the undergraduate program and the expansion of professional training at the graduate level. Finally, although he had no intention of building an administrative career, he was tempted by the challenges of the position. Schaller accepted the deanship with the condition that at the end of three years there would be a mutual review and he could resign.[5]

The selection of Schaller as dean was complicated by the

transition of the presidency of Tulane from Rufus Harris to Herbert Longenecker. Maxwell Lapham served as acting president of the university until Longenecker's arrival in September of 1960. Lapham appointed a search committee but was reluctant to approve Schaller because Lapham was only acting president. When the search committee asked Schaller to become dean, Lapham refused to authorize the appointment, saying that Longenecker would have to approve it. Longenecker approved the appointment, and Schaller became dean of the business school in August of 1960.[6]

Schaller believed that the dean should deal primarily with internal matters of the school.[7] Faculty relations and recruitment were very important considerations to him, and, for the most part, Schaller was on good terms with the faculty. Although some faculty would later disagree with Schaller, there were no major confrontations. The traditional closeness and camaraderie among the faculty continued. This was beneficial to the operation of the school, but the closeness of the faculty led to complacency. Schaller dealt with faculty complacency by encouraging the faculty to increase their participation in scholarly activities. For his part, Schaller joined the Inter-University Committee of Economic Research on the South and the Committee on Urban Economics. His writing generally took the form of book reviews. This work reflected his own intellectual interests and was professionally

beneficial, brought recognition to the school, and served as a model for faculty activities.[8]

As mentioned above, faculty recruitment was important to Schaller. Approximately half of the full-time faculty during this period were appointed by Schaller. Over half of Schaller's appointees were in the field of economics, many of whom are still at Tulane. James Murphy, Stephen Zeff, and Eric Vetter were appointed by Schaller and are currently teaching at the school.[9] A number of other personnel were appointed by Schaller to teach evening courses.

There were no major curricular revisions during Schaller's deanship. For the most part, the school was merely implementing the new curriculum initiated by Grambsch. In the undergraduate curriculum, the business problems course was replaced with a non-credit freshman assembly, and the freshman social studies option was broadened to include psychology and philosophy. A management seminar for seniors introduced complex business games into the program, and a course in quantitative analysis introduced computer laboratory experiences. In the graduate curriculum, two new management courses were introduced, and the accounting program was made more flexible.[10] None of the changes reflected a change in the philosophy of the school.

Although no significant curricular revisions were made at this time, the school decided to eliminate the undergraduate program and invest its time and resources in graduate education. This decision profoundly affected every aspect of the future

development of the school. The elimination of the undergraduate program was a logical extension of the changes initiated by Grambsch. His plan called for replacing the vocationally oriented business curriculum with one which was more theoretical and quantitatively oriented. Business arithmetic, for example, was replaced with quantitative analysis. The school now sought to prepare business generalists, skillful in management decision making and the use of quantitative methods in solving business problems.[11]

The basic issue confronting the school was to determine the most appropriate level of academic preparation for modern business executives. Like French and Grambsch, Schaller had expressed the view that such training could best be offered at the graduate level.[12] This view, combined with the need to efficiently utilize the school's resources, led to the decision to drop the undergraduate program. Schaller also believed that undergraduate business education was inadequate preparation for modern business life.[13] Like Grambsch, he believed that an arts and sciences background would provide a better foundation for graduate training. He also felt that students should understand science and its impact on business and society. Science had revolutionized organization and production methods, and business decisions relied increasingly on computer analysis. Schaller thus considered engineering to be an excellent preparation for business education because it was mathematically

and scientifically oriented.[14]

The school was also confronted with changing enrollment patterns during this period. Industry increasingly demanded men and women with MBA degrees and undergraduate preparation in liberal arts or engineering. As a result, the pool of MBA applicants was increasing across the nation.[15] Full-time graduate enrollments at Tulane increased from 29 students in the fall of 1960, to 45 students in the fall of 1963--an increase of over 33 percent. The part-time graduate program which had been discontinued in 1960, was resumed in 1963. Its enrollment of 110 students indicated a substantial interest in the part-time MBA program.[16] The business faculty also anticipated an increase in the demand for in-service education, commonly referred to as "executive development programs." They believed that the need for these programs would increase as new management techniques were developed and as business life became more complex. The school now sought to expand its existing programs which included the Institute on Foreign Transportation and Port Operations and the Tulane Tax Institute and to develop new ones. A greater commitment of resources was needed to increase the quantity and quality of these programs.[17]

While the demand for MBA programs increased, the demand for undergraduate business training decreased.[18] Higher admission standards which had been designed to improve the quality of students, had resulted in decreasing undergraduate enroll-

ments. During Schaller's deanship, undergraduate enrollments declined from 345 students in the fall of 1960, to 298 students in the fall of 1963. Freshman enrollments declined dramatically during this period from 131 students to 94 students.[19] Declining enrollments in undergraduate business programs were part of a national trend. A survey conducted by the school revealed that undergraduate business schools with high tuition and selective admissions were finding it difficult to attract students. In schools with low tuition and relatively open admissions policies, enrollments were declining as a percentage of total enrollments within these universities.[20] These trends indicated a bleak future for the undergraduate business program at Tulane.

Changing enrollment patterns were accompanied by similar changes in the relative quality of graduate and undergraduate applicants. Aptitude test scores and undergraduate records indicated an overall improvement in the quality of entering graduate students.[21] One reason for this was the increasing pool of applicants to the graduate program, enabling the school to become more selective. Also, a large number of the graduate students were military officers. These students were more highly motivated than their non-military counterparts. They were career men who believed that poor work might preclude a promotion. They dominated classes and student organizations such as the MBA club.[22] Well qualified undergraduate students,

on the other hand, were difficult to find. One comprehensive study of this problem revealed that business undergraduate students ranked sixth from the bottom out of twenty undergraduate fields on intelligence test scores. Other studies indicated that the average business student was less qualified for university work.[23] Tulane's more rigorous quantitative business curriculum made it less likely that poorer students would stay in the program. Schaller had expected that the rigorous curriculum would attract higher quality students and eliminate the poorer ones. Although the overall quality of undergraduate students remained constant, the school decided that there were not enough superior students to warrant retaining the program.[24]

Schaller presented the school's plan to drop its undergraduate program to the Tulane Board of Administrators at its December meeting in 1962.[25] Although a number of prominent local businessmen were on the board and one of them, Gerald Andrus, was an alumnus of the school, the board unanimously approved the school's plan. The alumni's reaction to the plan was less positive. Their view was that the school had been too hasty in its decision and had eliminated a program that had served them and the local business community well.[26] Furthermore, the decision appeared to discredit their degrees. Older faculty, most of whom were about to retire, were likewise displeased. These men felt that the school had established a strong undergraduate program which was recognized throughout the nation. They were not yet convinced that graduate business

training was as promising as Schaller and the majority of faculty believed.[27]

The decision to drop the undergraduate business program necessitated the separation of the economics department from the business school. The Department of Economics had been housed in the school since Buchan's deanship. However, with the decision to drop the undergraduate program, economics would play a much smaller role in the school. Only two courses, Macro Economics and Micro Economics, were taught for the MBA program.[28] Schaller and many of the economics faculty felt that economics belonged in the College of Arts and Sciences from which service courses could be offered to the business school. Since the role of the economics department in the MBA program would be minimal, their interest and understanding of issues pertaining to the business school would also be minimal. When the vote was taken on dropping the undergraduate program, the economics department voted for it, and, in effect, voted themselves out of the business school.[29]

Schaller was aware of the far-reaching implications of the decision to offer an exclusively graduate program. The relationship of the school to the local business community, for example, would change significantly. The New Orleans business community was satisfied with the school's undergraduate program, and could not readily absorb the increasing numbers of MBA graduates. To Schaller, this meant that the school would

have to focus its attention on regional and national businesses. The school's image as a pioneer in quantitative methods would serve it well in attracting students and faculty from beyond the New Orleans area.[30]

Once the decision was made, Schaller felt that his work as dean was finished. He resigned on September 1, 1963. Schaller had implemented Grambsch's curricular revisions and had set the future course of the school. He wanted to return to his work in economics. Although he was satisfied with his accomplishments as dean, he was not interested in a career in administration. After resigning the deanship, he chaired the economics department for a year. He left Tulane in 1964 in order to teach business economics and public policy at Indiana University.[31]

Schaller's choice for the dean's position was C. Jackson Grayson. Grayson had received his Bachelor of Business Administration degree from Tulane's business school in 1944 and his Master of Business Administration degree from the University of Pennsylvania in 1947. He had served as an accounting instructor at Tulane between 1947 and 1949, and was rehired as an associate professor by Robert French in 1953. He left in 1955 to assist French in the development office of the university. After acquiring his Doctor of Business Administration degree at Harvard, Grayson returned to Tulane in 1959 as an associate professor and became associate dean in 1961. He was still serving in that capacity when Schaller resigned.[32]

Schaller was pleased with Grayson's performance as associate dean, and admired his understanding of new developments in higher education for business. Grayson had worked diligently with Schaller in promoting the decision to offer only graduate level business education at Tulane. Also, Grayson was well liked by the faculty, and he could get their support for his ideas.[33] Thus, to Schaller, Grayson was the logical choice for the deanship.

Grayson, however, did not want to be dean. He felt uncomfortable as an administrator because he disliked dealing with the daily operations of the school. He believed that Schaller had relied too heavily on him for this as associate dean. He wanted to resign that position and return to the classroom. Finally, he had accepted a year-long teaching position at a management institute in Switzerland and was looking forward to going there.[34]

A search committee chaired by Clinton Phillips was formed to search for a new dean. After much persuasion by Schaller, Grayson agreed to talk with President Longenecker about the deanship. At Schaller's request, Grayson drew up a list of conditions under which he would accept the deanship. They were extravagant and Grayson believed that they would not be accepted. Among the conditions were a large salary increase, leave of absence during the 1963-64 school year, each summer off to return to his farm, and a strong associate dean to manage

the daily operations of the school.[35] Surprisingly, Longenecker accepted these conditions and Grayson became dean on September 1, 1964.

During Grayson's leave in Switzerland, Clinton Phillips served as acting dean. He too, supported the business school's decision to offer only graduate education. Indeed, Phillips had written a monograph explaining and justifying that decision.[36] He saw the role of acting dean as one of maintaining the status quo rather than moving in new directions for the school.[37] Thus, his year as acting dean saw no major changes in the personnel, policies, or programs of the school.

The transition of the business curriculum from undergraduate to graduate had begun before Grayson returned from Switzerland. Phillips had integrated the content of a computer programming course with a junior level mathematics course. He had also elevated and renumbered some senior marketing courses to the graduate level, eliminated the graduate examination requirement, and substituted an elective for the managerial economics course.[38] Most significantly, he had formed a Format Committee to study the curriculum, and had appointed Peter Firmin as its chairman.

Grayson returned in 1964 with no formal plans for the business school. He was, however, interested in strengthening the roles of behavioral science, quantitative methods, and computerized business games in the graduate curriculum. He also wanted to expand the role of the case study method and promote

development of a doctoral program. Finally, Grayson wanted to develop the image of the school beyond that which it had acquired in quantitative methods. He hoped to do this by instituting an International Studies program focused on Latin America.[39]

In the spring of 1965, the Format Committee presented its recommendations on the curriculum to the faculty. The strong quantitative emphasis of the business program was retained. Beginning in 1966, students would be required to have the equivalent of six hours of undergraduate mathematics before entering the business program. Included in the curriculum was a course in linear algebra, probability and statistics, and several courses in computerized business games.[40] The Format Committee's recommendations were unanimously adopted by the faculty and implemented in the fall of 1966.

Grayson had gained a reputation in the school as an innovative teacher. He was interested in new teaching strategies and encouraged the faculty to try them.[41] He traveled extensively during his term as dean in order to observe new teaching techniques and present them to the faculty. His travel, including a semester as visiting professor at Stanford, prompted students to complain that he was never available.[42] Grayson promoted the case study method most vigorously. This technique, which had become the hallmark of Harvard's business program, involved studying and evaluating real-life business problems

and business decisions. Although a number of the older faculty had used business cases occasionally, the method was never an extensive part of the program.[43] With Grayson's encouragement, the use of business cases increased to the extent that it became an established teaching method in the school.[44]

Grayson also felt responsible for recruiting and maintaining a highly qualified faculty. Nine new faculty members were hired during his deanship. The appointments reflected Grayson's desire to balance the quantitative and behavioral orientations of the school. Of these, Associate Professor Linn and Assistant Professors Barach, Killeen, and LaValle remained in 1974. Encouraging faculty research activity continued to be a challenge because of faculty complacency. The time required in designing and implementing the new graduate curriculum likewise impeded faculty research.[45]

The quality of students enrolled during this period improved because the school dealt exclusively with graduate students. This had been one of the projected benefits to dropping the undergraduate program.[46] The strongest indicator of this trend was student scores on the Aptitude Test for Graduate Schools of Business (ATGSB).[47] The 1964 enrollment figures revealed that 45 percent of the student body had a science or engineering background. These students were thought to be among the best prepared to enter the MBA program. The business school was no longer a residual choice for poor students, but

was attracting very capable students. A growing number of military students also contributed to improved student quality.[48]

With the apparent success of the MBA program, Grayson and some of the faculty believed that a doctoral program should be developed. They believed that if schools like Harvard and Stanford had doctoral programs, then Tulane should have one as well. Many faculty members also believed that there was a need for teachers and researchers in higher education for business. Tulane, they felt, could help meet this need with a doctoral program.[49] Thus, in the fall of 1964, Clinton Phillips was appointed to chair a committee charged with developing a doctoral program. After a year-long study, a program was presented to the faculty and approved.[50] The program was designed to train students in general business administration, including such disciplines as mathematics and statistics, behavioral sciences, and economic theory. Students also studied in a field of specialization such as accounting or management science.[51] Because the doctoral program trained teachers and researchers rather than business executives, students entered the program directly from undergraduate school. The degree awarded would be a Doctor of Business Administration (DBA).

The doctoral program enrolled its first two students in 1966. In 1967, as part of a university-wide movement to cut expenses, it was considered for termination along with other recently developed doctoral programs.[52] Grayson worked to

maintain the doctoral program and negotiated a compromise with the university. The graduate school of business would continue the program at no cost to the University. Thus, the doctoral program would either pay for itself or cease to exist.[53]

Tulane's financial problems were increasingly felt by the school. The Ford Foundation grant had aided the school in its development in the early sixties. (See above, pp. 141-142.) By 1967, the grant had expired leaving the school dependent upon the university once again. The tightening financial situation led President Longenecker to suggest that the school be brought closer to the local business community. Grayson responded by establishing the Affiliates Program.[54] This program sought to bring the school and the business community closer together and solve the financial problems of the school at the same time. The school would create a series of seminars or workshops designed to meet the needs of affiliating business firms. In return, affiliates would either pay for these services directly, or make tax deductible donations to the school.[55] Thus, the school hoped to maintain and possibly expand its teaching and research programs. Although the university usually prohibited fund-raising efforts by a school, an exception was made because of the critical shortage of funds.[56]

Grayson was, however, disinterested in the local business community. Like Schaller, he wanted to focus on the internal development of the business school. Grayson believed that the school and the business community had very little in

common and that the move to an exclusively graduate program had widened the gap between them. To him, the local business community was backward and conservative.[57] Because he disliked having to court the local business community for money, Grayson's relations with President Longenecker were strained. Grayson also allowed the school's relations with the rest of the university to deteriorate because he was more interested in cultivating relations with other business schools.[58]

Grayson was concerned that the school was becoming too heavily identified with quantitative methods. He tried to balance the school's quantitative reputation by hiring a faculty with training and experience in behavioral sciences. He also tried to gain recognition for the school's Latin American program. Latin American programs had been proposed since Aldrich's years as dean. The location of the school in New Orleans, a natural port city with access to Latin American countries, enhanced these proposals. The Latin American program, however, had never received financial support from either the school or the business community. In the spring of 1966, Grayson asked Stephen Zeff to contact business schools in Latin America in order to establish a faculty-student exchange program. In the summer of 1967, Zeff toured four Latin American countries to develop the program.[59]

A special doctoral program was inaugurated in which Latin American students or faculty could come to Tulane for courses

and return home to write their dissertations. The curriculum included nine hours of International Business and twelve hours of Latin American courses from other university departments.[60] Zeff developed a Spanish newsletter to inform Latin American students about the program. For the first time, it appeared that a Latin American program might be developed.

Grayson obtained a grant from the Ford Foundation to fund the "Conference on Education of International Business" and named Zeff chairman of the conference.[61] This was the first national business conference ever held at Tulane and Business Week gave it much publicity.[62] More importantly, Tulane gained visibility for its efforts in international business education. The business school was no longer identified solely with quantitative methods. Grayson also gained national visibility. His work with George Shultz on the task force for the conference led to Grayson's appointment as the first director of President Nixon's Price Commission in October of 1971.[63]

Despite the efforts of Zeff and Grayson, the Latin American program failed. Only one person applied, and no one ever completed the program. The major reason for its failure was financial. The business school did not have the money to send faculty members to Latin America to recruit students and engage in an exchange program.[64] The program was dropped in 1969, and no attempt has been made to re-establish it.

By the fall of 1967, except for the Affiliates Program,

every program in the school was in jeopardy. Enrollments in the MBA program were not increasing, and the curriculum was quantitatively oriented when quantitative methods were no longer fashionable. The Latin American program had failed to develop and the doctoral program was threatened with termination. The financial situation of the school was critical and the faculty decreased from twenty to fifteen full-time teaching members. Adding to the school's difficulties, Grayson resigned in the fall of 1967 and planned to depart at the end of the academic year.[65]

Grayson left Tulane to become dean of the business school at Southern Methodist University in Dallas, Texas. He had declined a previous offer by the school, but was eventually convinced to accept the position by William Clement, a prominent Dallas businessman.[66] Grayson was attracted by the Dallas business community and was impressed with its commitment to make the business school one of the best in the country. A group of businessmen made contributions to the school which doubled the school's budget. Grayson was offered an attractive salary and great autonomy in administering the school.[67] When compared with the situation he faced at Tulane, the position at Southern Methodist University was indeed attractive. Grayson was tiring of his position in the school, and felt that he was no longer effective with President Longenecker. Although the business school was in serious trouble, Grayson believed that there was nothing more he could do.

NOTES

[1]Howard G. Schaller, private interview, Chapel Hill, North Carolina, August 6, 1973.

[2]Ibid.

[3]Frank C. Pierson, et al. The Education of American Businessmen (New York: McGraw Hill, 1959), pp. 208-211.

[4]Howard G. Schaller, private interview, op. cit.

[5]Ibid.

[6]Tulane University Bulletin, School of Business Administration, 1961-1962, Series 62, Number 2, January 15, 1961, p. 15.

[7]Howard G. Schaller, private interview, op. cit.

[8]Ibid.

[9]Tulane University Bulletin, Graduate School of Business Administration, 1973-1974, Series 74, Number 2, April, 1973, pp. 36-37.

[10]"Annual Report of the Dean, School of Business Administration, 1960-1961," p. 7.

[11]Tulane University Bulletin, School of Business Administration, 1960-1961, Series 60, Number 16, December 15, 1959, p. 28.

[12]"Annual Report of the Dean, 1960-1961," op. cit. p. 2.

[13]Howard G. Schaller, private interview, op. cit.

[14]Ibid.

[15]Clinton A. Phillips, Experience With Undergraduate Business Program (New Orleans: Tulane University, 1964), p. 37.

[16]"Annual Report of the Dean, 1963-1964," op. cit., p. 3.

[17]Clinton A. Phillips, Experience With Undergraduate Business Program, op. cit., p. 35.

[18]Ibid., p. 27.

[19]"Annual Net Enrollment," Office of Student Records and Registration, Tulane University, June 10, 1964, n.p.

[20]Clinton A. Phillips, Experience With Undergraduate Business Program, op. cit., p. 28.

[21]"Annual Report of the Dean, 1963-1964," op. cit., p. 3.

[22]Howard G. Schaller, private interview, op. cit.

[23]Clinton A. Phillips, Experience With Undergraduate Business Program, op. cit., p. 29.

[24]Ibid., p. 28.

[25]Tulane University Bulletin, School of Business Administration, 1963-1964, Series 64, Number 6, May, 1963, p. 16. It took four years to phase out the undergraduate program. The school was renamed the Graduate School of Business Administration in December of 1966.

[26]Alumni Questionnaire, School History Project, August, 1973.

[27]F. Santry Reed, Professor Emeritus, private interview, New Orleans, Louisiana, July 9, 1973.

[28]Tulane University Bulletin, School of Business Administration, 1963-1964, Series 63, Number 16, December 16, 1962, p. 22.

[29]Herman Freudenberger, Economics Department, Tulane University, private interview, New Orleans, Louisiana, August 13, 1973.

[30]Howard G. Schaller, private interview, op. cit.

[31]Ibid.

[32]C. Jackson Grayson, private interview, Dallas, Texas, August 15, 1973.

[33]Howard G. Schaller, private interview, op. cit.

[34]C. Jackson Grayson, private interview, op. cit.

[35]Ibid.

[36]Clinton A. Phillips, Experience With Undergraduate Business Program (New Orleans: Tulane University, 1964).

[37]Clinton A. Phillips, private interview, College Station, Texas, August 16, 1973.

[38]"Annual Report of the Dean, 1963-1964," op. cit., p. 2.

[39]C. Jackson Grayson, private interview, op. cit.

[40]"Annual Report of the Dean, 1964-1965," op. cit., p. 3.

[41]C. Jackson Grayson, private interview, op. cit.

[42]Alumni Questionnaire, School History Project, August, 1973.

[43]F. Santry Reed, private interview, op. cit.

[44]Tulane University Bulletin, Graduate School of Business Administration, 1967-1968, Series 67, Number 11, October 15, 1966, p. 35.

[45]"Annual Report of the Dean, 1966-1967," op. cit., p. 15.

[46]Clinton A. Phillips, Experience With Undergraduate Business Program, op. cit., p. 30.

[47]"Biennial Progress Report, Academic Years Ending July, 1970," Exhibit II, MBA Class Comparison Profiles, 1964-1970, p. 16.

[48]C. Jackson Grayson, private interview, op. cit.; Howard G. Schaller, private interview, op. cit.

[49]"Annual Report of the Dean, 1964-1965," op. cit., p. 6.

[50]Ibid.

[51]Tulane University Bulletin, Graduate School of Business Administration, 1967-1968, Series 67, Number 11, October 15, 1966, p. 37.

[52]Tulane University Self Study, 1967-1968, Volume III, "Graduate and Professional Programs, Part 2," p. 356.

[53]Ibid.

[54]"Annual Report of the Dean, 1966-1967," op. cit., p. 28-29.

[55]Tulane University Self Study, 1967-1968, Volume III, "Graduate and Professional Programs, Part 2," pp. 355-356.

[56]C. Jackson Grayson, private interview, op. cit.

[57]Ibid.

[58]Ibid.

[59]Stephen Zeff, private interview, New Orleans, Louisiana, August 3, 1973.

[60]Tulane University Bulletin, Graduate School of Business Administration, 1967, 1968, Series 67, Number 11, October 15, 1966, p. 33.

[61]Stephen Zeff, Business Schools and the Challenge of International Business (New Orleans: Tulane University, 1968), p. v.

[62]"How Business Schools Welcome the World," Business Week, December 9, 1967, pp. 118-124.

[63]"The Take-charge Price Czar," Time Magazine, December 20, 1971, p. 19.

[64]C. Jackson Grayson, private interview, op. cit.

[65]Ibid.

[66]Ibid.

[67]Ibid.

CHAPTER VIII
THE MOVE TO AUTONOMY AND FISCAL SELF-SUFFICIENCY: PETER A. FIRMIN AS DEAN, 1968-1974

Peter A. Firmin came to the business school in 1949 after completing a Master of Business Administration program in accounting at the University of California, Berkley. Although he initially discussed a position with Dean Buchan, Firmin was hired by his former teacher at Louisiana State University, Robert French.[1] Firmin taught for two years and, with French's assistance, received a Rockefeller Foundation Fellowship to pursue doctoral studies at the University of Michigan. He rejoined the faculty in 1953, acquired his Certified Public Accountant's credential, and settled into a teaching career. Firmin completed his degree in 1957, was promoted to Associate Professor in 1958, and, with Grambsch's encouragement, took a leave of absence in 1960 to do post-doctoral work at Harvard.[2] Firmin's experience at Harvard broadened his view of accounting and management. Grambsch, Schaller, and Grayson also noticed that Firmin's interest in higher education for business had been spurred.[3]

In 1967, when Grayson decided to resign, he approached Firmin about succeeding him as dean.[4] Firmin expressed his interest and applied to the faculty search committee which had been established to seek a replacement for Grayson. In December of 1967, the search committee recommended to President

Longenecker that Firmin be hired as dean. Firmin met with Longenecker on several occasions and presented his appraisal of and future plans for the school. Longenecker was impressed with Firmin's proposals and recommended to the Tulane Board of Administrators that Firmin be installed as dean of the school immediately.[5]

During the interviews with President Longenecker, Firmin learned first-hand about the critical situation facing the school. The university, which had constantly faced financial problems, had surveyed its various divisions and concluded that each of its divisions had to support itself financially.[6] To many, it appeared that this plan was especially appropriate for a school of business and management. The business school, however, was operating with an annual deficit of about three hundred thousand dollars.[7] Recent developments in the school, most notably the abandonment of the undergraduate program, exacerbated the problem. Tuition revenues dwindled dramatically, while expenses continued to rise.

The crisis was felt directly when, during Grayson's last year as dean, four vacant faculty positions were not funded. These vacancies, and those created by Grayson's departure, caused the faculty to question whether the school could continue to function.[8] Additional faculty departures were expected among those remaining. Firmin perceived the desperation

of the situation and proposed that the school be established as a fiscally independent entity.[9] The plan which he submitted to the president and the board was to make the school financially self-sufficient within five years. In approving Firmin, the board likewise approved his plan.[10]

Not since the earliest days of Aldrich's deanship had the school been faced with such a challenge. Firmin's proposal consisted of two strategies: increasing student enrollments and soliciting external funds for the school.[11] In 1967, there were about one hundred full-time students enrolled.[12] When four faculty members resigned, it appeared to the president and the board that replacements were unnecessary. The problem, as perceived by Firmin, was that in order to offer an MBA program of reasonable quality, a minimum of twenty faculty would be required, regardless of student enrollment. The only feasible solution was to recruit a student body of sufficient quantity to justify a full-time faculty of twenty. Firmin believed that an enrollment of three-hundred full-time MBA students would be optimum.[13] Although a student body of this size would probably be too small to have a significant national impact, it would at least enable the program to survive and would not strain the faculty or physical resources of the school.

Firmin's second strategy was to take charge of the fiscal operation of the school by soliciting, receiving, and expending external funds. Except for the first few years of its

existence, external funds, such as those solicited from individual or corporate donors, had never been a significant concern of the school. When university operations were centralized under President Harris, funding responsibilities were likewise centralized. Schools and colleges within the university were forbidden to solicit external funds for their respective divisions.[14] Alumni gifts, endowed professorships, and scholarships were all managed by the university finance office. Thus the deans, although accountable for expenditures within their respective colleges, were never fully accountable in terms of fiscal operations.

Firmin hoped to increase both individual and corporate funds by soliciting gifts to the school and developing contractual arrangements with the school through the Affiliates Program.[15] His first action was to expand the Affiliates Program by raising the cost to corporations from fifteen hundred dollars to twenty-five hundred dollars. For the additional thousand dollars, affiliates would receive several guaranteed positions in a series of management development seminars. These seminars were to be focused on improving the management skills of practicing (in-service) executives. The topics of these seminars would be determined by the Business School Council. Nationally known experts in relevant topics would also be brought in on a consulting basis. The first of these seminars was developed by Grayson during his last

semester at the school.[16]

Firmin also vigorously pursued alumni and corporate donations to the school. In the past, alumni had been reluctant to give to the university development program because their donations could not be specifically designated for use by the business school.[17] The new arrangements changed this and alumni were now told that their donations would support the school's program directly. As a result, alumni donations increased from zero in 1967 to over $32,000 in 1971.[18] Local commercial, industrial, and financial firms were likewise asked for assistance. Firmin's efforts were so successful that, on occasion, he was called in by the university development office and told that he was interfering with their solicitations.[19] These instances decreased as Firmin solicited donors who had not previously supported Tulane.

As Firmin's plan called for fiscal self-sufficiency in the school, it likewise called for a degree of independence which the school had not enjoyed since the early years of Aldrich's deanship. This independence had a profound impact upon the administrative structure of the school. Once again, the school was solely responsible for recruiting, admitting, educating, and placing students. In most respects, therefore, the school had become an autonomous educational unit with its own admissions, registration, and placement offices, student aid office, public relations office, alumni affairs office, and

even a policy board, the Business School Council.[20] The school's independence was most evident when it began to conduct its own commencement exercises in 1973.

Firmin believed that an essential component in his proposal to make the school financially independent was the recruitment and development of a first-rate faculty. By the time he assumed the deanship, the full-time teaching faculty had dwindled to fourteen, a number which, as noted above, Firmin believed to be inadequate to offer an MBA program of reasonable quality. Firmin's recruitment strategy was similar to that of Paul Grambsch. Firmin went to the major graduate schools of business and recruited the best people he could. Firmin convinced these people that Tulane's school of business offered them an opportunity to teach and research in an attractive university setting. They were also attracted to the youth and closeness of the faculty and the exclusively graduate program.[21] Firmin offered them salaries which were competitive with those in the Midwestern region of the country.[22]

Firmin's recruiting efforts were successful. By the time he left the school in 1974, the full-time teaching faculty had grown to twenty-five. Most of the faculty were young, with a median age of about thirty-five. They were experienced in business and government and had doctorates from major business schools such as Stanford, Harvard, Cornell, and Northwestern.[23] As part of the continuing effort to develop a diversity of

training and experience, most faculty were trained in more than one field of management. And, although quantitative methods remained a key area of interest, the faculty also included experts in behavior and organizational analysis as well as the functional areas of accounting, marketing, and finance.

The faculty was also involved in programs outside the school. One faculty member, for example, was involved in a program for the financial development of the local Black community sponsored by a private foundation. Another worked with the food stamp distribution program in the New Orleans metropolitan area. Still others worked with the Chamber of Commerce preparing comparative analyses of the New Orleans business community with those in Atlanta, Dallas, and Houston. Within the university, several faculty members worked with the schools of law, engineering, and medicine in developing and implementing interdisciplinary programs.[24]

The faculty, although relatively few in number, began to lose the complacency which had been characteristic of previous faculties in the school.[25] The loss of complacency resulted from the fact that jobs in business schools were not as readily available as they had been, and because the faculty had been recruited from highly competitive institutions. Procedures for faculty promotion and tenure, reflecting the new competitiveness, were formalized during this period. The faculty committee responsible for promotion and tenure now recommended

faculty and documented a candidate's academic performance. Finally, as part of an effort to acquaint students, alumni, and the local business community with the affairs of the school, a newsletter was published which discussed faculty accomplishments. This encouraged the faculty to pursue consulting, research, and community service activities.[26]

Firmin was proud of the faculty he had recruited. He believed that their training, experience, and teaching abilities enabled them to compete favorably with any graduate business faculty in the country.[27] Unfortunately, the faculty was also a source of frustration. Firmin rarely worked with the faculty because he spent so much time raising funds and recruiting students, and because he was an admittedly authoritarian administrator. Consequently, the faculty did not develop a consensus about the purpose or direction of the school's program. Firmin had recruited a strong and diverse faculty who identified more with their respective disciplines than with the school or with the MBA program itself.[28] Faculty opinion, for example, was divided on whether the school should prepare researchers, academicians, or professional managers. Likewise, some faculty favored general preparation, while others preferred specialized training in an area of business.[29]

The independence of the faculty was another source of contention. Throughout most of the school's history, the faculty had willingly followed the dean. This faculty, however,

wanted to play a more active role in school affairs.[30] As mentioned above, Firmin, especially in the early years of his deanship, was preoccupied with external affairs and tended to decide internal matters without consulting the faculty. Two decisions which Firmin made brought considerable dissent from the faculty. First, after circulating some position papers favoring the implementation of an individualized approach to instruction, Firmin sought and received funding from the Frost Foundation ($50,000) and the Esso Education Foundation ($30,000).[31] When his proposal was presented to the faculty for implementation, the faculty balked because they were not committed to the idea of individualized instruction and because they felt they had not been part of the decision. Firmin then appointed a faculty task force to study the issue and present its findings to the faculty. An individualization plan was finally approved and implemented in certain core courses in the program.[32]

Firmin's second decision, not to grant a leave of absence to a faculty member who wanted to pursue a doctoral program, was also resisted by the faculty. Firmin had failed to consult the appropriate faculty committee and his decision was tantamount to firing the faculty member in question. The faculty presented its grievances to Firmin and a decision was made to reorganize the administrative structure of the school.[33] Heretofore, the school would have an "external" dean, Firmin, who retained the title of dean and continued to be the chief ad-

ministrative officer of the school. The position of associate dean was created. The associate dean would be responsible for the internal, academic affairs of the school. This position was filled by Eric Vetter, a twelve year veteran of the school who was respected by and worked well with the faculty.[34] This arrangement effectively resolved the differences between Firmin and the faculty.

In contrast to the occasionally stormy faculty relations, students were generally pleased with the school. They were especially appreciative of its small size and the closeness which developed among students and between students and faculty.[35] Many students saw these years as transitional and felt that the school had effectively dealt with the change to an exclusively graduate program. They also believed that the school was gaining recognition as one of the better business schools in the country. Students gave both the faculty and Dean Firmin credit for offering an innovative curriculum which focused on both general management and functional business areas. Specifically, they viewed Firmin as an effective administrator who was friendly, receptive to student views, and heavily involved in soliciting funds for the school.[36]

Reflecting the school's recruitment goals, students were more diverse in terms of their geographic, educational, and vocational backgrounds. About half of the students came from the South, with about twenty per cent each from the Northeastern

and Midwestern regions of the country. The remaining ten per cent came from the far West or from foreign countries. Their undergraduate training was likewise diverse with only one quarter of them trained in business. The remaining students were about evenly divided among social science, engineering, and science undergraduate backgrounds.[37] Contributing greatly to the diversity of the student body was a significant (twenty-five to thirty per cent) number of career army officers. Tulane's business school and that of the Georgia Institute of Technology had contracted with the Army to train a number of career officers in management, operations research, and computer science. Tulane received the majority of students in management and operations research, while the Georgia Institute of Technology trained those in computer science.[38] The army students were admitted under the same criteria as civilian students, and were often more highly qualified and motivated than their civilian counterparts. Thus, although they were in a minority, the army students often dominated both curricular and extracurricular affairs of the school.[39]

Student unrest, which characterized university life during the late sixties and early seventies, was not a factor in the school. And, although the university experienced some strikes and disruptions, business students did not participate. They were more interested in working in American corporate life, rather than disrupting it.[40] Many business students were also

employed, married, and older than typical university students. These qualities were shared by both military and civilian business students. Interestingly, unrest among students elsewhere on campus indirectly affected the school because a number of potential donors or corporate affiliates were distrubed by Tulane's tolerance of student radicals.[41]

Student enrollments grew during Firmin's years as dean from about one hundred full-time students in 1968, to about two hundred and sixty in 1974.[42] Part-time enrollments declined from one hundred in 1968, to seventy in 1972. By 1974, the part-time enrollment had climbed back to one hundred. Part-time enrollments were easily affected by local business developments, most notably the establishment of a National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) construction facility in an eastern suburb of New Orleans.[43] The full-time enrollment of two hundred and sixty was somewhat less than that which Firmin believed to be optimal in terms of faculty and physical resources of the school. The slow growth of the national economy and the lack of national visibility of the school was believed to have hampered student recruitment.[44] It is important to note, however, that the school continued to be selective in its admissions practices. It was thus able to maintain a student body which ranked in the top twenty per cent of students enrolled in business programs across the nation.[45]

The school's curriculum changed very little during Firmin's

term as dean. And, although he felt that it required evaluation and revision, Firmin's concerns with funding and recruiting faculty and students took precedence. The MBA program continued to focus on providing prospective executives with the appropriate knowledge, skills, and attitudes. In 1968, the program consisted of sixty semester hours, generally taken in two years. Only three courses could be taken as electives. The remaining courses were taken in "Basic Concept Areas" (accounting, quantitative methods, economic analysis, and behavioral analysis); "Applied Areas" (financial management, marketing management, production management, and analysis of business conditions); and, "General Administrative Areas" (legal environment, social environment, management policy, management simulation, and information systems).[46] By 1974, these areas had been rearranged and renamed with the major change being an expansion of the electives to seven courses. The curriculum still consisted of sixty semester hours now taken in a "Core Set," "Advanced Set," and "Elective Set" format. There was no substantial alteration of the core (basic concept areas) except that quantitative methods were subsumed under the title of "Management Science."[47] Throughout the period, students with prior graduate business education could petition to have certain core requirements waived. The majority of students, however, took the entire sixty-hour program.

Contrasting the relatively stable curriculum was an attempt

by the school to radically revise instructional methods. In 1968, three methods of instruction predominated: the case method in which a student was confronted with a factual situation in which he had to identify the problem, propose alternative solutions, establish criteria for evaluation solutions, and make a decision; the computer assisted management game in which teams of students managed various firms in a computerized model of a hypothetical industry; and, lectures from the school's faculty and other academic and business lecturers.[48] By 1974, the school had implemented a program of individualization which sought to enable students to learn at their own pace, and to utilize instructional resources which were best suited to them. (See above p. 182.) This program, which had been initiated in 1971, called for a series of learning modules covering the material presented in the "Core Set."[49] Once the "Core Set" modules were developed and functioning, the school planned to individualize the remaining portions of the curriculum. Because the school underestimated the time and effort required in this project, progress in individualizing the curriculum has been slow. Thus, in many courses, case studies, computerized management games, lectures, seminars, and other more traditional instructional methods still predominate.[50]

In addition to the full-time MBA program, a part-time program and several interdisciplinary programs were offered. Students in the part-time MBA program were required to meet the

same entrance and exit criteria as those in the full-time program. Firmin viewed this program as an important service to the local business community, and felt that although relatively few of these students completed their studies at Tulane, they were receiving beneficial instruction.[51] As part of its efforts to attract students and enhance the diversity of its student body, the school aggressively pursued several interdisciplinary programs with other schools in the university. The most notable of these programs were those with the schools of engineering, architecture, law, and public health (hospital administration). These programs rarely generated significant enrollments because the other schools were disinterested in them.[52]

Firmin's emphasis upon strengthening and expanding the MBA program left little time or resources for the doctoral program in business. Ever since the decision to offer an exclusively graduate program, certain faculty had argued for the development of a doctoral program. The program, however, never received the resources necessary to make it viable. Firmin placed the program among the lowest of his priorities for the school.[53] By 1974, the program had dwindled to two students working in a tutorial arrangement with their doctoral committees. Only one student ever completed the program.[54]

Strengthening ties with the local business community and business alumni was a much higher priority for Firmin. The

decision to make the school a fiscally independent entity within the university required Firmin, like Aldrich, to enlist the advice and support of local individuals and corporations. The local environment in which the school functioned was viewed as a mixed blessing. On the one hand, New Orleans was a unique and interesting city in which to live and work. The cultural attractions of the city enticed numerous faculty members and students. Likewise, the location of New Orleans on the river and its proximity to the Gulf of Mexico were cited in the school's bulletin as offering great potential for commercial, financial, and industrial development. Yet, the school felt hampered by its location in the South and by its identification as a Southern school. Basically, the school viewed its problem as one of visibility.

> The problem of visibility is aggravated by the fact that the City of New Orleans is not considered to be among the more progressive, and it is not on the "beaten path." Few corporate headquarters are here, the city is not a cross-roads for business travelers in spite of its high tourist appeal, and no major national business publisher has a correspondent office in New Orleans. Thus, when magazines like Business Week, Nation's Business, or Forbes, and newspapers like the Wall Street Journal and the National Observer wish to run a story involving comments from a faculty, administrative, or student member of a graduate school of business administration, our views are not normally solicited.[55]

The lack of visibility was seen as a hindrance in such important

areas as fund raising, student recruitment, faculty recruitment, and alumni placement.[56] To the school, New Orleans was not large or progressive enough to support it adequately.

Firmin sought to improve this situation in a number of ways. Aside from the previously mentioned Affiliates Program, Firmin expanded the size and advisory role of the Business School Council. This group, which had been established by Grayson, was appointed by Firmin to represent a broad geographic area including New York, Chicago, Houston, and Cleveland in addition to New Orleans.[57] In 1974, the council included about thirty-five corporate executives who were called upon to advise the school of current developments in business and to suggest ways in which the school might improve its program. The council also took on a major responsibility for advising and assisting the school in its fiscal development. Thus, the council brought the school closer to the business community from which it had to receive a significant portion of its financial support. The school's use of a business council was similar to that of business schools in private universities throughout the nation.[58]

Firmin also sought the support of the school's alumni more vigorously than any previous dean. Since its beginning, the school had graduated about 2800 students with baccalaureate degrees and about 800 with masters degrees. Although the majority of the alumni had settled in New Orleans and the deep South, there were alumni in every state in the country in 1972

except Alaska.[59] Firmin appointed a veteran faculty member, Bernard J. Capella, to direct alumni relations. Also, an Alumni Advisory Committee was formed which represented a broad geographic area. This committee was organized for the same purposes as the Business School Council. One of its first decisions was to establish alumni chapters in cities where the school had significant numbers of alumni and where the school wanted to enhance its visibility. Thus, alumni chapters were established in New York, Washington, Atlanta, and Houston.[60]

Firmin's plan to make the school financially independent was successful. The combination of increased tuition revenues, affiliate funds, and corporate and alumni gifts enabled the school to meet all of its direct expenses by the end of 1973.[61] Indirect expenses such as utilities and building maintenance were partially covered by the university. Each year the school came closer to covering all of its costs, both direct and indirect.[62]

By 1974, the school was no longer in danger of being dropped by the university. Its future, to that extent, was secure. It appeared to Firmin that this was an appropriate time for the school to once again take stock and set a course for its future development.[63] Firmin believed that in order for the school to have a significant impact upon business affairs, it would have to develop a more defined focus for its programs. Typically, Firmin thought in terms of the school

developing an identity and market for its "product."[64] He had developed a proposal for the school to become a center of applied research and information about resource management in the Gulf South region. However, he was uncertain whether the school was ready to make a major decision concerning its future.[65] Firmin was also uncertain whether he was the appropriate person to lead the school in a new direction.

As Firmin was deliberating on how to most effectively present his ideas to the faculty, he was invited by the University of Denver to become dean of their business school. Their offer included the same challenge which Firmin had accepted at Tulane--to make the school self-sufficient. The attraction was too great. Firmin accepted the offer which included the opportunity to work with university-wide financial development. He resigned his position as dean and left at the end of the 1974 academic year.

The relationship of the business school to Tulane University and the New Orleans business community had come full circle. Although the similarities between Peter Firmin and Morton Aldrich should not be overdrawn, there are significant similarities in terms of the tasks both men faced. Both men were called upon to perform much like the businessmen they educated. Like Aldrich, Firmin had to sell higher education for business to Tulane. And Firmin, like Aldrich, administered a school which was, for the most part, an autonomous unit within

the university. The precarious financial position of the school forced both deans to rely heavily upon external support.

Firmin saw similarities between his position and that of Aldrich. And, although he knew that he was personally different from the almost legendary character that had established the school, he nevertheless identified with Aldrich.[66] Firmin could speak to students and businessmen with the voice of experience because business education at Tulane, after a period of security within the university, was again a business enterprise. The school's product, higher education for business, once again competed in both academic and business marketplaces.

NOTES

[1]Robert W. French, private interview, Birmingham, Alabama, June 30, 1973.

[2]Peter A. Firmin, private interview, New Orleans, Louisiana, June 22, 1973.

[3]Paul V. Grambsch, private interview, Atlanta, Georgia, August 4, 1973; Howard G. Schaller, private interview, Chapel Hill, North Carolina, August 6, 1973; and, C. Jackson Grayson, private interview, Dallas, Texas, August 15, 1973.

[4]C. Jackson Grayson, private interview, op. cit.

[5]Herbert Longenecker, private interview, New Orleans, Louisiana, June 20, 1973; Peter A. Firmin, private interview, op. cit. Firmin took over as dean before Grayson's resignation was to become effective. This was done to prevent the faculty from becoming even more demoralized. For the remainder of his time at Tulane, Grayson developed the executive training seminars which Firmin offered in the expanded Affiliates Program.

[6]Herbert Longenecker, private interview, op. cit.

[7]"Biennial Progress Report, Academic Years Ending July, 1972," Exhibit XII, Statement of Revenue and Expenses, n.p.

[8]Stephen A. Zeff, private interview, New Orleans, Louisiana, August 3, 1973. Zeff was on the faculty and chairman of the promotion and tenure committee of the school.

[9]Peter A. Firmin, private interview, op. cit.

[10]Ibid. Firmin also noted that the deans of the schools of medicine and law likewise developed plans for financial self-sufficiency. Firmin's statements were corroborated in an interview with President Longenecker.

[11]Ibid.

[12]"Biennial Progress Report, Academic Years Ending July, 1972," Exhibit V, Enrollment Report, n.p.

[13]Peter A. Firmin, private interview, op. cit.

[14]Ibid.

[15]Ibid.

[16]C. Jackson Grayson, private interview, op. cit.

[17]Peter A. Firmin, private interview, op. cit.

[18]"Biennial Progress Report, Academic Years Ending July, 1972," Exhibit XIV, Alumni Gifts, n.p.

[19]Peter A. Firmin, private interview, op. cit.

[20]Tulane University Bulletin, Graduate School of Business Administration, 1973-1974, Series 74, Number 2, April, 1973, pp. 23-28.

[21]Eric Vetter, Associate Dean of the school, private interview, New Orleans, Louisiana, July 13, 1973; Stephen A. Zeff, private interview, op. cit.

[22]"Biennial Progress Report, Academic Years Ending July, 1972," p. 6.

[23]Ibid.

[24]"Biennial Progress Report, Academic Years Ending July, 1970," p. 8.

[25]Stephen A. Zeff, private interview, op. cit.

[26]Ibid.

[27]Peter A. Firmin, private interview, op. cit.

[28]Stephen A. Zeff, private interview, op. cit.

[29]Peter A. Firmin, private interview, op. cit.

[30]Eric Vetter, private interview, op. cit.; Peter A. Firmin, private interview, op. cit.

[31]"Biennial Progress Report, Academic Years Ending July, 1972," p. 2.

[32]Ibid.

[33]Peter A. Firmin, private interview, op. cit.

[34]Ibid.

[35]Alumni Questionnaire, School History Project, August, 1973.

[36]Ibid.

[37]"Biennial Progress Report, Academic Years Ending July, 1972," Exhibit VI, MBA Entering Class Comparison Profile, n.p.

[38]Ibid., p. 4.

[39]Eric Vetter, private interview, op. cit.

[40]Peter A. Firmin, private interview, op. cit.

[41]Ibid. Firmin stated that during the time of the most serious disruptions on Tulane's campus, several potential donors withheld their support because of campus unrest.

[42]James T. Murphy, Acting Dean of the school, private interview, New Orleans, Louisiana, July 2, 1974.

[43]Ibid.

[44]"Biennial Progress Report, Academic Years Ending July, 1972," p. 9.

[45]Ibid., Exhibit VIII, Admission Report, n.p. The criteria for this judgment were the scores of students on a standardized test, the Aptitude Test for Graduate Schools of Business (ATGSB).

[46]Tulane University Bulletin, Graduate School of Business Administration, 1968, Series 69, Number 8, August, 1968, pp. 16-24.

[47]Tulane University Bulletin, Graduate School of Business Administration, 1973-1974, Series 74, Number 2, April, 1973, p. 6.

[48]Tulane University Bulletin, Graduate School of Business Administration, 1968, Series 69, Number 8, August, 1968, pp. 38-39.

[49]"Biennial Progress Report, Academic Years Ending July, 1972," pp. 2-3.

[50]Eric Vetter, private interview, op. cit. Vetter

chaired a faculty task force which studied the school's plan for individualization.

[51]Peter A. Firmin, private interview, op. cit.

[52]Ibid.

[53]Ibid.

[54]James T. Murphy, private interview, op. cit.

[55]Biennial Progress Report, Academic Years Ending July, 1972," p. 9.

[56]Ibid.

[57]Tulane University Bulletin, Graduate School of Business Administration, 1973-1974, Series 74, Number 2, April, 1973, p. 58.

[58]American Assembly of Collegiate Schools of Business Bulletin, Volume II, Number 3, April, 1975, pp. 31-35.

[59]"Biennial Progress Report, Academic Years Ending July, 1972," Exhibit XV, Distribution of Active Living Alumni, n.p.

[60]"Biennial Progress Report, Academic Years Ending July, 1972," p. 7.

[61]Peter A. Firmin, private interview, op. cit.

[62]James T. Murphy, private interview, op. cit.

[63]Peter A. Firmin, private interview, op. cit.

[64]Ibid.

[65]Ibid.

[66]Ibid.

AFTERWORD

It is fitting that today, Tulane's business school relies on the community in much the same way that it did at its beginning. Over sixty years have passed since Morton Aldrich convinced the businessmen of New Orleans that a school of commerce was vital for their continued prosperity. Likewise, he was convinced that the school's future was tied to the community. Aldrich gained only grudging acceptance of the college by the university. Yet, his quarter century as dean witnessed the development of a professional program which helped to transform Tulane from a nineteenth century liberal arts college, to a modern university. By the time of Aldrich's retirement in 1939, Tulane, like most institutions of higher learning in America, had become an academic bazaar offering a variety of scholarly wares. And Tulane, ever mindful of its need to attract a clientele, welcomed the burgeoning ranks of students seeking business training.

In the following decade, the college, led by Leslie Buchan, played a crucial role in converting the university into a modern, centralized institution. The bazaar became a department store complete with centralized management of its programs, students, faculty, and finances. The school, like the university, was changed dramatically by the processes of modernization and centralization. Most notable was its move away from

the local business community by developing a more modern and less vocational curriculum. The identification of the school with national collegiate business education was witnessed by faculty and students alike.

Throughout the fifties and most of the sixties, the school grew increasingly secure in the university and isolated from the local business community. The school, because of the status it acquired through its association with the university, defined professional business training, and legitimized business as a professional activity. During these years, the school, with an image created by Robert French and made substantial by Paul V. Grambsch, sought and gained the attention of other business schools across the nation. The move to a quantitatively oriented curriculum, and the decision to eliminate the undergraduate program brought the school closer to national developments in higher education for business, and further isolated it from the business community.

By 1968, the school had a faculty of highly trained scholars, researchers, and teachers, as well as a curriculum which was in the forefront of business schools. It also offered the most innovative instructional methods available in higher education. What the school did not have were sufficient students and finances. Tulane's commitment to business education, which had been strong while the school attracted large numbers of students, suddenly disappeared. Tulane once again

faced critical financial problems and questioned whether it could afford a program which was not paying for itself.

The program facing the school was deceptively simple--pay its own way or close. The major responsibility for solving the school's problem was taken by Peter A. Firmin. Firmin, in effect, took the school back to its beginnings. And, if a bazaar or department store were no longer appropriate metaphors, perhaps a modern specialty shop, or boutique, was appropriate. The school no longer sought to offer broad educational services, but focused its resources exclusively on educating management executives. More importantly, the school re-established its ties with the business community. Although the new community was more expansive than that which Aldrich faced, its relationship to the school was the same. Firmin, like Aldrich, had to convince businessmen that they needed the school. And he was convinced, like Aldrich, that the school needed the business community.

Since Firmin's resignation in 1974, the school has maintained its ties with the business community and has reinstated the undergraduate program. When the school dropped its undergraduate program in 1962, Tulane retained a Bachelor of Commercial Science Program as part of its part-time, evening offerings. This program was neither administered nor staffed by the business school. In 1975, when the business school was visited by an accreditation team from the American Assembly of Collegiate Schools of Business

(AACSB), it was told that its accreditation was in jeopardy because the undergraduate evening program did not meet its standards. The AACSB required that all business programs offered by a university had to be accredited in order for any business program to be accredited. The evening program, in other words, had to be dropped or revised to meet the standards.

The decision about the evening business program was faced by Sheldon Hackney, who had replaced Herbert Longenecker, as President of Tulane. Hackney consulted with Harper Boyd, the new dean of the business school, and James Murphy, the school's associate dean who had served as acting dean during the period after Firmin's resignation. Hackney called for a study of the evening business program. This study revealed that although the program attracted some part-time, evening students to the university, the majority of its students came from the arts and sciences college of the university. These data were contrary to the school's earlier findings that undergraduate business education at Tulane faced dramatically declining enrollments. (See above, pp. 156-157.) Hackney decided that if the demand existed, then the business school should develop a program to meet it. Consequently, the school devised a two-year upper division program leading to a bachelor of science degree in management. The program, started in 1976, was a "two-on-two" program in which students spent their first two years in the arts and sciences college, and their last two years in the business school.

The new program has attracted approximately two hundred students and has helped the school develop a more comfortable financial base. Tuition revenues from both the undergraduate and graduate programs have increased substantially since 1976. These revenues and those from the Affiliates Program and the Alumni and Corporate Giving Programs have placed the school in the most secure financial situation in its history. Because of this, there is considerable optimism that the school's programs will continue to improve and expand.

Harper Boyd, who replaced Peter Firmin as dean, is a nationally recognized leader in the field of marketing. Prior to his arrival at Tulane, Boyd had been a professor of marketing and management at Northwestern and Stanford Universities. As editor of the Journal of Marketing Research and author of numerous books and articles in the fields of marketing and management, Boyd's reputation has enchanced the image of the school. To date, his efforts have been focused primarily on program development.

The school's move to reinstate its undergraduate program underscores the most prominent theme of this study--the responsiveness of institutions to a changing environment. Changing times and settings have called for changes in the school's curriculum, organization, and faculty, as well as changes in its relationship to the academic and business communities. These changes are a vital part of the history of the school and the environment in which it functioned. (The Pierson study

and the Gordon and Howell study are excellent sources which describe this phenomenon among university business programs throughout the nation.)

The school was founded in response to the demands of businessmen who believed that they could be educated best in a university setting. Once established, the school was confronted with the conflicting demands of the business and academic communities. Its early programs were condemned by the university community as narrowly vocational and by the business community as overly theoretical and impractical. Collegiate business education had not yet developed as a legitimate part of university education and no one knew what professional businessmen needed to learn most. This, of course, did not prevent the field from growing into one of the most popular in American higher education.

The response of many business schools to the growing demand for their services was merely to offer more of what they had been offering. This did not happen at Tulane. After the school was established as a permanent segment in the university, it began revising its curricula in response to what it perceived as the changing nature of American business. Generally, these curricular revisions attempted to meet yet another set of conflicting demands--the need for businessmen with a broad and general understanding of the world, and, at the same time, with more specialized skills. The compromise which resulted was not new in higher education. Students were required to

take two years of liberal or general studies, followed by two years of specialized professional study. This integration, or combination, of general and professional studies made business schools a more integral part of universities.

The development of professional business management into a science with its own tools of quantitative and behavioral analysis made additional demands upon business educators. These demands were most crucially felt in the curriculum which was already crowded with general business courses and collections of courses in such areas as accounting, marketing, and finance. To these demands must be added those of businessmen and educators who were convinced increasingly that the best education for professions was offered at the post baccalaureate level. Once again, changing times and settings led the school to revise its curricula and redefine its position in the business and university communities.

It is important that institutions, like people, behave intelligently. Intelligent responses to changing times and settings are vital for the survival and growth of institutions. Such responses should be characterized by thoughtful consideration of the social conditions in which institutions function and reflection on possible consequences of their actions. An accurate and comprehensive understanding of their pasts not only provides institutions with identities, it is an important precondition to intelligent institutional behavior. An under-

standing of the historic conditions which have influenced their development will enable institutions to set better courses of action for the future.

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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

James F. Fouche' was born in Manchester, England, on September 26, 1945. After spending his early childhood in rural Georgia and Flordia, Jim moved with his family to New Orleans, Louisiana, in 1953. He attended public schools in New Orleans and graduated from Alcee Fortier High School in 1963. In January of 1964, Jim entered Louisiana State University in New Orleans. Jim was awarded the Bachelor of Arts degree in History from this institution in 1968. At that time, he started teaching at Ursuline Academy, a Catholic school for girls.

From 1968 until 1972, Jim taught Social Studies in parochial schools in New Orleans, took the required courses for certification as a secondary school teacher, and completed requirements for the Master of Arts degree in History from Louisiana State University in New Orleans. In 1973, he entered the doctoral program in the Foundations of Education Department at the University of Florida. Jim is currently an assistant professor in the Education Programs Unit at Northern Kentucky University in Highland Heights, Kentucky. He is married to the former Kathy Flick and has a son, Jonathan Kane.

I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Robert R. Sherman, Chairman
Professor of Education

I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Arthur O. White
Associate Professor of Education

I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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This dissertation was submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the Department of Foundations of Education in the College of Education and to the Graduate Council, and was accepted as partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

August 1978

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